Introduction
Within the contemporary Arab world, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan occupies a paradoxical position. Surrounded by states that have experienced civil war, regime collapse, foreign occupation and sustained insurgency, the Kingdom has maintained a remarkable degree of internal order over the past century. To outside observers, and particularly to its Western allies, Jordan has long projected an image of relative moderation: a constitutional monarchy with an active parliament, a nominally free press, and a king who speaks the language of reform. It has been celebrated as an island of stability in one of the world’s most volatile regions, sometimes even dubbed the Switzerland of the Middle East. The aim of this article is to critically investigate how this stability has been achieved, arguing that it has not been earned through genuine political reform or democratic accountability but manufactured through authoritarian control. What looks like a progressive state is, on closer examination, a carefully managed authoritarian order in which the appearance of reform functions as a technology of control.
The primary instrument through which this manufactured stability has been achieved is what Daniel Brumberg defines as liberalised autocracy: hence, a durable political equilibrium in which controlled openings serve to consolidate rather than challenge authoritarian rule[1]. The colonial foundations of the Jordanian state, and the specific historical conditions of its formation, created the structural preconditions within which this form of governance became both possible and necessary. Jordan offers one of the most instructive cases of how stability can be constructed, legitimised and exported as a model, while concealing the authoritarian foundations on which it rests.
The Architecture of Authoritarian Stability
Eva Bellin argues that the MENA’s resistance to democratisation stems from “the presence of an exceptionally muscular coercive apparatus endowed with both the capacity and will to repress democratic initiatives originating from society[2]”, combined with the systematic co-optation of elites through patronage and managed political inclusion. It is this kind of manufactured stability that has defined political order across much of the Arab world.
From the 1990s onwards, episodes of political opening became increasingly common, but they were typically followed by renewed consolidation of regime control. Steven Heydemann explains this paradox through his concept of authoritarian upgrading: hence, the process of “reconfiguring authoritarian governance to accommodate and manage changing political, economic, and social conditions[3]”. Instead of treating political openings as concessions to democratic pressure, authoritarian upgrading understands them as instruments through which regimes actively extend their reach, broaden their coalitions, and pre-empt the formation of genuine opposition. In other words, manufactured stability is not only imposed from above through coercion; it is also reproduced from within by those who benefit from the existing order[4].
Heydemann’s framework is complemented and sharpened by Brumberg’s concept of liberalised autocracy, a regime form in which controlled openings generate a veneer of openness that confers domestic and international legitimacy without threatening the foundations of authoritarian rule. As Khalil al-Anani confirms, “the most important characteristics of the liberal autocracy are to preserve the existing regime and not to allow any radical change in the pillars of governance[5]”. Regimes that operate under this logic deliberately engineer a controlled plurality by tolerating limited political competition, permitting a degree of press freedom, and allowing circumscribed civil society activity.
This insight is central to understanding Jordan. According to Anne Mariel Peters and Pete W. Moore, “Jordan’s political ‘opening’ was […] a deliberate move to consolidate Hashemite authority[6]”. Thus, what has appeared to outside observers as a comparatively moderate and modernising state in a volatile region is, on closer examination, a carefully managed political order in which liberalism functions as a technology of authoritarian reproduction.
Tribes, Patronage, and the Engineering of Compliance
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a constructed state. Its borders were drawn by British imperial design in 1921, its ruling dynasty imported from the Hijaz region of present-day Saudi Arabia, and its sovereignty granted by a colonial power rather than achieved through an organic process of national self-determination. According to Jillian Schwedler, until the late nineteenth century “Transjordan was not a cohesive political or social entity[7]”, but a mosaic of communities of social organisation whose “primary basis of affiliation and prestige was the tribe (‘ashira)[8]”. This configuration suggests that political authority was embedded within social structures rather than centralised institutions, a dynamic that would later facilitate strategies of co-optation by the modern state.
The Great Arab Revolt, begun in 1916, laid the groundwork for the establishment of the Emirate of Transjordan in 1921 under British supervision. Under Hashemite prince Abdullah, the new entity achieved formal independence in 1946, yet remained closely tied to its tribal communities and to British political and military support. According to the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), “since the Hashemite Kingdom’s origins, Jordan has always been seen as an island of stability in an otherwise unstable neighbourhood[9]”. Yet this image obscures the authoritarian foundations on which it rests.
What appears as organic resilience is the product of a carefully engineered system of coercion, co-optation, and performed legitimacy. The tribal and military elements have played a primary role in manufacturing Jordan’s performative stability. Ghassan Elkahlout and Alaa Hadid confirm that “since the inception of the state, Jordanian tribes in the state have been the main backers of the monarchy, with a clear interest in the survival of the Jordanian state[10]”. The Jordanian state was simultaneously a modern territorial entity and a tribal confederacy, and this ambiguity was not a failure of state formation but its most distinctive achievement. Tribal leaders co-operated with the monarchy, enjoyed its hospitality, and became gradually involved in local and national politics[11].
Integration was achieved through the implementation of a relatively low level of coercion. The regime manufactured compliance by giving tribal communities a material and political investment in the existing order: “this reduces the danger of rebellion from the citizenry, as tribal leaders are capable of mobilizing tribe members to support the regime. […] Their resources are used in line with the ruling elite’s demands[12]”. The regime further institutionalised tribalism as the defining feature of national identity and order. The process of Jordanisation “centered East Bank, tribal, and Bedouin identity in the official national narrative[13]”. However, the tribal-state alliance is also a system of structured exclusion. Indeed, it is imperative to remark that today Palestinians constitute approximately 60% of Jordan’s population.
Despite their majority, they have suffered and still suffer “discriminatory exclusion from state-related work, from the military to the government, making many feel like second-class citizens[14]”. This political exclusion was not left uncompensated. As Curtis Ryan observes, “over the years, Palestinians became dominant in the Jordanian private sector, while East Bankers came to staff the bulk of positions in the public sector, armed forces, bureaucracy, police and intelligence services[15]”. Selective economic liberalisation was deployed as a political tool to strengthen this division, extending the regime’s coalition beyond its tribal base without altering the fundamental configuration of political and military power. The final result is a divided population in which both communities have been given material reasons, however asymmetric, to sustain the existing order: East Bankers through security, patronage, and political representation; Palestinian Jordanians through economic access and private sector opportunity.
Liberalised Autocracy in Practice: Managing Reform, Performing Modernity
The tribal-state alliance provides the social foundation of Jordan’s manufactured stability, but it does not exhaust it. A second and equally significant mechanism has been the regime’s management of political liberalisation, instrumentalised by the monarchy to produce a democratic façade while preventing its substance. As Dr. Mohamed Chtatou observes, since 1989 the Hashemite monarchy has managed “a distinctive strategy of incremental political opening – selectively expanding participation, periodically revising electoral laws, tolerating a circumscribed civil society, and presenting measured reform as proof of democratic intent[16]”. Driven by the pressures arising from the economic crisis and the global wave of democratisation, the Hashemite regime turned political liberalisation into what Mehran Kamrava defines as a “survival strategy[17]”.
Following the economic crisis of 1989 and the bread riots that accompanied imposed austerity from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), King Hussein restored parliamentary elections suspended since 1967, legalised political parties through the 1992 National Charter, and partially lifted restrictions on the press. Yet this was, in practice, “a deliberate move to consolidate Hashemite authority[18]”. Electoral laws were designed to fragment opposition: districts over-represented loyal tribal constituencies, and the one-person-one-vote system introduced in 1993 systematically disadvantaged organised political movements, “creating strong incentives to vote along narrow family and tribal lines rather than for party lists or ideological platforms[19]”.
Civil society was subjected to the same logic, and it is here that the sophistication of the regime’s strategy becomes most visible. By the early 1990s, civil society organisations (CSOs) across the Arab world had become increasingly active, and these openings were initially welcomed by Arab regimes as “a means to improve their standing with Western donors and with international financial institutions at a moment of fiscal crisis[20]”. However, the growth of CSOs soon became a threat. In the case of Jordan, rather than suppress them, the regime put forward a strategy of containment. Jordan’s 1996 Law on Associations and Foundations embedded NGOs within a web of bureaucratic controls, ensuring organisations could operate only within limits the regime itself monitored. This has made CSOs “more an instrument of state control than a mechanism of collective empowerment[21]”.
Conclusion
Jordan’s stability is one of the most celebrated and least interrogated facts of contemporary Middle Eastern politics. When it is interrogated, what appears as organic resilience reveals itself as a carefully engineered political achievement produced through authoritarian means rather than genuine democratic governance. Two interlocking mechanisms sustain it. First, the tribal-state alliance transformed pre-existing tribal authority into an instrument of regime reproduction, binding East Bank communities to the existing order through patronage, security and political representation, while Palestinian Jordanians are politically marginalised but economically accommodated through selective access to the private sector. Second, managed liberalisation deployed controlled political openings that perform the vocabulary of democratic reform while systematically foreclosing its substance, neutralising opposition without open repression, while the performance of modernity has projected an image of progressive, reforming governance to Western partners and international institutions.
This has allowed the regime to secure material support and diplomatic legitimacy which it could not generate through domestic consent alone. Both mechanisms owe their effectiveness to the specific historical and colonial conditions examined in this article: a state built on tribal confederacy, demographic division and external patronage that made co-optation structurally available as a governing technology from the outset. Thus, Jordan has maintained internal stability not despite its authoritarian character but because of it.
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