European Institute for Studies on
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Choosing war to resolve the iranian nuclear question ?

Mostafa Meraji, Freeway 7 (Iran) or the Persian Gulf in Iran, 2011. Source : Wikimedia Commons. Licence : CC0 1.0 Public Domain Dedication.

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Israel’s attack on Iran on 13 June was justified by the Jewish state as a ‘preventive war’ in response to the ‘existential threat’ posed by Iran’s access to nuclear weapons. This attack took place outside any legal framework, as the concept of ‘preventive war’ is not recognised by international law. It comes at a time when there is no evidence that Iran has decided to build an atomic bomb. But above all, this attack also has the effect of interrupting the negotiations between Iran and the United States that began in April 2025 with the aim of reaching an agreement that would guarantee that Iran does not move towards acquiring atomic weapons.

It seemed, however, that these negotiations, despite numerous obstacles, could be successful. On the one hand, Donald Trump, while regularly threatening to bomb Iran if no agreement was reached, repeatedly stated that he wanted to avoid war with Iran at all costs, a goal that seemed consistent with his election promise to end the United States’ ‘endless wars.’ On the Iranian side, there was a genuine willingness to negotiate, motivated by the Islamic Republic’s weakened position due to the loss of influence of the ‘axis of resistance’ since 7 October 2023, as a result of the near-disappearance of Hamas, the blows suffered by Hezbollah and the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria[1]. Another decisive factor was the profoundly deteriorated socio-political environment in Iran. The legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran was affected by the 2022 protests linked to the death of Mahsa Amini. In addition, with inflation averaging 30% since 2012, according to the World Bank, due to sanctions, the population is exhausted, as evidenced by protests in recent years by many social groups such as nurses, teachers, retirees, etc. Iranian leaders saw these negotiations as an opportunity to lift a number of US sanctions. An agreement with a Republican president could lead to a more lasting agreement than in 2015, as the Republican-majority Congress could approve the lifting of a number of sanctions[2]. After five rounds of negotiations, organised with the mediation of the Sultanate of Oman, the main obstacle to an agreement concerned Iran’s right to enrich uranium. The American position was that Iran should eliminate all its uranium enrichment capabilities, believing that this possibility facilitates the acquisition of nuclear weapons. On the Iranian side, they were prepared to limit their nuclear programme to provide guarantees that it would not become military, while insisting on their right to enrich uranium.

Israel, which had been opposed to these negotiations from the outset, therefore decided to launch a military attack on Iran. The United States subsequently joined in this attack during Operation Midnight Hammer, bombing the nuclear sites at Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan. A ceasefire was then secured by the United States after twelve days of war. What conclusions can we draw today from this conflict? Iran suffered a military defeat, which is not really surprising because, due to sanctions, it only has old fighter jets that are unable to compete on equal terms with the Israeli air force. Furthermore, its air defence system was unable to effectively counter Israeli attacks. However, it should be noted that Iran was able to respond to Israeli attacks with ballistic missiles that reached Israel despite its missile defence system, known as the Iron Dome. On the other hand, it is not certain that Israel won this war, since its two objectives—the destruction of Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities and, the other, invoked after the war began, to achieve ‘regime change’ by calling for an uprising of the population—were not achieved. The director of the IAEA believes that these bombings will delay Iran’s uranium enrichment programme by several months. Furthermore, in Iran, despite internal political tensions, there has been noticeable public support for the government due to a sense of ‘resistance nationalism’ in the face of external aggression. 

The question that was still central yesterday was whether negotiations between Iran and the United States could really resume and succeed. On the Iranian side, a deep sense of betrayal prevails: many believe that Donald Trump allowed the Israeli attack to take place even though discussions were underway in Tehran. Despite this tense climate and under pressure from an ultimatum from the United States and its allies, Iran nevertheless agreed on Monday 21 July to enter into new negotiations on issues related to its nuclear programme. A first meeting is scheduled for Friday 25 July in Istanbul. 

However, this openness does not necessarily mean a change of policy on Tehran’s part. The Iranian authorities will likely continue to demand their right to enrich uranium for civilian purposes, particularly for electricity generation. Domestically, the debate remains heated, with the most radical factions strongly opposed to any compromise with Washington. Some political leaders are even going so far as to suggest a possible Iranian withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), evidence of growing internal tensions. Furthermore, at the end of June 2025, the Iranian authorities suspended their cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which they accuse of having lost all impartiality in recent months.  

Therefore, even though a framework for negotiations is now in place, one question remains unanswered: will Donald Trump be willing to show flexibility, particularly on the issue of uranium enrichment? Nothing is less certain. In case this new round of talks fails, the risk of a military escalation remains very real.

Notes

[1] Cf. Thierry Coville, « Chute de Bachar El Assad en Syrie ; quelles conséquences pour l’Iran ? », IRIS, 11 décembre 2024 (Chute de Bachar Al-Assad en Syrie : quelles conséquences pour l’Iran ? – IRIS)

[2] A large part of the sanctions currently imposed on the Iranian economy are sanctions passed by the US Congress.



To cite this article: “Choosing war to resolve the iranian nuclear question ?” by Thierry Coville, EISMENA, 22/07/2025, [https://eismena.com/analysis/choosing-war-to-resolve-the-iranian-nuclear-question/].

The information and opinion contained in the articles on the EISMENA website are solely those of the author(s) and do not engage the responsibility of the institute.

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