Introduction

Since the attack of 7 October 2023 led by Hamas, the Israeli state has entered into a regional confrontation that extends far beyond the Gaza Strip. This historic and historically decisive moment acted as a trigger for a strategic reorientation aimed at neutralizing the multiple threats posed by the various components of the axis of resistance, forged, shaped, financed, armed and directed by Iran. The Israeli approach now prioritizes the doctrine of pre-emption, what Americans at the beginning of this century defined as “preventive war[1]”, which consists in striking potential threats upstream, even if this entails expanding the theatre of operations beyond national borders.

This analysis revisits the eight fronts that make up the new security configuration: Gaza, Lebanon, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Iran and, now, Qatar, following the attack on Doha in September 2025. It highlights the military and political objectives, the means employed and the regional stakes, drawing on diverse and up-to-date data.

Gaza : Beyond the annihilation of Hamas, what Security approach?

The Gaza Strip remains the centre of gravity of the conflict. From the very beginning of the war, Israeli authorities set three priorities: destroying Hamas’s military infrastructure, neutralising its leadership, and securing the release of hostages. Tel Aviv thus launched Operation “Iron Swords” as early as autumn 2023 (the Prime Minister preferring the designation “War of Genesis [2]”), combining massive bombardment by the aviation with a ground offensive. The strategy seeks to segment the territory into zones, evacuate civilians to safe areas, and maintain a durable presence in conquered sectors in order to prevent the return of the Islamist movement. These operations have indeed destroyed a large part of Hamas’s military infrastructure and eliminated several layers of its command structure, but they have also generated a considerable human cost and widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure, prompting strong international condemnation.

Within this framework, Israel’s security strategy is embedded in a broader perspective: maintaining a land and maritime blockade in order to control arms transfers and deprive Hamas of the management of humanitarian aid, which Tel Aviv perceives as liable to be instrumentalized for military, economic and political purposes. The Israeli government thus signals its intention to establish a local authority hostile both to the Islamist movement and to the Palestinian Authority.

Today, despite the implementation of a ceasefire under the “Trump plan”, the second phase — the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip under the supervision of an international force — remains uncertain. By the end of 2025, the Gaza Strip has effectively become a laboratory for a multidimensional security approach: preventive operations, sustained territorial control, and international pressure on Hamas’s financial backers.

Lebanon : Hezbollah tested by the repercussions of 7 October

Hezbollah, like the other components of the “axis of resistance”, was not involved in the planning of the 7 October 2023 offensive. The Islamic Republic of Iran, which exerted predominant influence over several Arab countries, including Lebanon, objectively had no interest in engaging in a direct confrontation with a militarily superior Israel, at the risk of jeopardising not only its regional grip but also the very survival of its regime.

In this context, and in order to preserve its credibility among its social base, Hezbollah opted for essentially symbolic actions, carried out without coordination with other Lebanese actors. The organisation multiplied calibrated skirmishes along the border, without committing its special forces or engaging in massive rocket fire. It sought to capitalise politically on the Gaza war while avoiding a confrontation that could destroy its arsenals and compromise its position within Lebanon. This caution, driven by fear of further weakening internal consensus, opened a strategic window for Israel [3]. Taking advantage of even this limited involvement, the Israeli army launched a campaign of targeted strikes against Hezbollah infrastructure. According to some estimates, these operations destroyed nearly 80% of the movement’s rocket stockpiles and eliminated a substantial part of its military hierarchy, including Hassan Nasrallah, the organisation’s historic leader[4], and more recently, on 23 November 2025, its military chief Haytham Ali Tabatabaï.

At the same time, Israel reinforced its presence in southern Lebanon: the war devastated several localities, caused thousands of deaths and displaced more than one million people. The Israeli army continues to occupy at least five strategic points on Lebanese territory, in violation of the November 2024 ceasefire, and the near-daily strikes testify to the consolidation of de facto military control. This succession of victories has profoundly altered the balance of power. Israel now seeks to translate its military gains into political advantages : the gradual demilitarisation of the South, Hezbollah’s withdrawal north of the Litani River, and the conclusion of a security agreement under US auspices. Lebanon, undermined by institutional paralysis, struggles to defend its positions, while Hezbollah, weakened yet still deeply rooted, oscillates between preserving its remaining assets and the risk of a confrontation it neither initially sought nor anticipated.

The West Bank: A sensitive combination of territory, ideology and security

Unlike the other theatres—largely external (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Iran, Qatar) or strictly military (Gaza)—the West Bank constitutes an internal front, at the intersection of three intertwined dimensions: ideological, territorial and security-related. For part of the Israeli political elite, this territory corresponds to the country’s historical core, known as Judea–Samaria, endowing it with symbolic significance that far exceeds purely military considerations[5].

The West Bank is, first and foremost, a legally fragmented and politically hybrid space: it has been co-administered by Israel and the Palestinian Authority since the Oslo Accords (1993–1995), within an institutional framework that is now weakened and incapable of containing the rise of parallel dynamics. In practice, the Oslo arrangements (division into Areas A, B and C) have eroded, on the one hand due to the continuous expansion of Israeli settlements, and on the other because of the erosion of the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, deemed corrupt by 81% of Palestinians, while 75% demand the resignation of President Abbas[6].

The West Bank has thus become one of the most combustible fronts among the eight, owing to internal ferment fuelled by several converging factors: intensification of Israeli settlement activity : the number of settlers in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) now exceeds 737,332, and the coalition in power since 2022 intends to double this figure to reach one million[7]. Numerous new housing projects and outposts have been approved, breaking records despite international condemnation, thereby fuelling Palestinian resentment; de facto annexation of strategic sectors, entire swathes of the West Bank are subject to gradual integration into Israel. In 2020, the government even contemplated the formal annexation of 30% of the territory (notably the Jordan Valley and major settlement blocs) before suspending the plan under international pressure; multiplication of violence on the ground—clashes involving Israeli settlers and Palestinian civilians have increased dramatically. In 2023, settler attacks against Palestinians reached unprecedented levels, often perpetrated in the passive presence of the Israeli army. Conversely, Palestinian shootings targeting Israeli soldiers or settlers have intensified, making this region a locus of near-daily violence.

This endogenous instability opens growing space for external interference, which Iran seeks to exploit in order to weaken Israel. Tehran acts behind the scenes through several channels: arms smuggling, financing networks affiliated with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and structuring operational cells in the West Bank. Gradually, these efforts aim to transform the West Bank into a potentially high-intensity front. In October 2025, Israel announced that it had thwarted a large-scale Iranian operation to convoy weapons into the West Bank, seizing dozens of explosives, drones, anti-tank missile launchers, assault rifles and ammunition intended to fuel attacks against Israeli targets.

In the Israeli security imagination, the West Bank thus stands out as a pivotal front: neither external nor peripheral, but internal, central and decisive for Israel’s long-term stability. Its singularity lies in the superposition of an enduring ideological logic (nationalist and religious claims over “Judea–Samaria”), endemic daily conflict, and an exacerbated regional competition. As such, the West Bank represents one of the most sensitive and potentially most decisive spaces in the ongoing strategic reconfiguration of the Middle East. Its stability—or its conflagration—will weigh heavily on Israel’s future security, while conditioning the prospects for resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

Yemen : Containing Houthi ballistic projection

Houthi-controlled Yemen (Ansar Allah), backed by Iran, is a major actor within the axis of resistance. This Zaydi movement emerged in the 1990s before asserting itself as a significant force during the Yemeni civil war. After seizing control of the capital Sanaa in 2014, the Houthis faced, from 2015 onwards, an Arab military coalition led by Saudi Arabia seeking to restore the internationally recognised Yemeni government. The war in Yemen caused tens of thousands of deaths and a severe humanitarian crisis, but in recent years appeared to be moving towards de-escalation. A fragile truce emerged from 2022, followed by intensified diplomatic efforts. In March 2023, the Beijing agreement restoring relations between Riyadh and Tehran paved the way for direct negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis. The equation changed radically after 7 October 2023. In response to the war triggered by Hamas’s attack on Israel, Houthi leader Abdel-Malek al-Houthi warned as early as 10 October that if the United States intervened alongside Israel, Yemen would retaliate militarily. Ansar Allah then openly aligned itself with the axis of resistance and announced on 31 October its direct participation in the conflict in support of Palestinians in Gaza. The Houthis claimed responsibility for launching a significant number of drones and ballistic missiles towards southern Israel, threatening to continue these strikes as long as the assault on Gaza persisted.

Israel’s response was swift. The IDF deployed its Arrow anti-missile systems to intercept Houthi projectiles over the Red Sea. At the same time, the Israeli air force carried out preventive strikes to destroy launch pads and weapons depots in Yemen, notably targeting the strategic port of Hodeidah and Sanaa airport. The United States supported these efforts: its navy repeatedly shot down drones and missiles originating from Yemen, and Western airstrikes targeted Houthi bases in early 2024 to secure navigation in the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia shares this concern and supports international monitoring of the maritime corridor, as the rebels have demonstrated their capacity to threaten commercial traffic transiting the region.

This preventive posture by Israel and its allies reflects fear that Yemen could become a forward operating base for long-range strikes orchestrated by Tehran. The Houthis, while claiming to act independently, possess an arsenal largely supported by Iran: during a military parade in September 2023 in Sanaa, they displayed Iranian-designed missiles capable of reaching Israeli territory. By neutralising these ballistic and naval threats emanating from Yemen at an early stage, Israel seeks not only to reduce the strategic depth of Iranian influence but also to protect crucial international maritime routes transiting the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

Syria : Preventing a sunni threat and turkish entrenchment

After thirteen years of war, Bashar al-Assad’s Syria constituted the main artery linking the Shiite axis of resistance from Tehran to Beirut via Baghdad and Damascus. This corridor enabled Iran and its militias to transfer weapons, funding and advisers to Lebanese Hezbollah; Deir ez-Zor, on the Euphrates, formed the key land bridge of this “highway[8]”. The survival of the Assad regime thus afforded Tehran strategic depth and a means of consolidating its influence in the Levant. For Israel, this Iranian presence in Syria represented a direct threat: the expansion of bases, weapons depots and affiliated militias placed hostile forces at the gates of the Golan Heights. Israel’s response was to engage in a campaign of systematic strikes against arms depots, convoys and Iranian and Hezbollah positions in Syria. This strategy aimed to eradicate Iran’s projection capabilities and deprive Hezbollah of its logistical lifeline. The objective was not only to deter Tehran but also to prepare the conditions for the collapse of the Assad regime, whose survival depended on Iranian support. Indeed, Israel’s priority in Syria was to prevent the establishment of a strategic Iranian military infrastructure; since 2017, the IDF has intensified strikes against such sites.

The collapse of Assad in December 2024, however, opened a new chapter. Power was taken by Ahmed al-Sharaa, former leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), previously known as Abu Mohammed al-Julani. After breaking with the Islamic State (2013) and then with al-Qaeda (2016), HTS exercised a more “pragmatic” Islamist administration in Idlib. Al-Sharaa traded his fatigues for a suit and proclaimed himself president of the new Syria. This normalisation does not erase his jihadist past, but it has been accompanied by a shift in alliances: the new administration seized arms shipments destined for Hezbollah and announced the end of strategic cooperation with Iran. The departure of Iranian forces thus deprives Hezbollah of its supply route through Syria. For Israel, the Shiite threat is therefore in the process of being eradicated, but another concern emerges: the construction of a Sunni Islamist regime on Israel’s doorstep, whose internal stability remains fragile and whose long-term intentions are uncertain.

A second danger stems from Turkey’s growing grip over Syria. Ankara was a decisive supporter of the insurgency that overthrew Assad and maintains strong control in the country’s north. This Turkish military presence, combined with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s support for Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, deeply worries Israel, which fears the establishment of Turkish bases in Syria and sees in this ambition a potential source of friction, both in Syria and on Mediterranean projects[9]. Aware that Turkey remains a NATO ally and that a direct confrontation would be perilous, Israelis and Turks reopened a communication channel through US mediation to avoid escalation.

Confronted with these two risks (a Sunni power emerging from jihadist circles and Turkish entrenchment), Israel favours a pragmatic security diplomacy. Accordingly, Israel is negotiating with Damascus a security agreement aimed at establishing a mechanism to suspend strikes and guarantee the protection of the Druze minority. Discussions focus on demilitarised zones and the maintenance of freedom of aerial action in the event of new threats. At the same time, US mediation seeks to contain Turkish ambitions and prevent a direct showdown; Washington and Tel Aviv aim to define red lines in Syria with Ankara, while working with al-Sharaa to stabilise the country’s south. The agreements under preparation reflect a logic of front management: they seek to neutralise the Shiite axis, prevent the emergence of a jihadist emirate at the heart of the Levant, and limit Ankara’s influence, so that the Syrian theatre does not once again become an active threat within the mosaic of eight security fronts facing Israel.

Iraq : The silent battle against pro-Iranian militias

Since 7 October 2023, Iraq has become a silent front in the confrontation between Israel and the axis of resistance. The coalition of pro-Iranian militias grouped under the label Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed a growing number of attacks against Israel: 35 strikes in September 2024 and 47 in October, using drones and missiles and causing military losses. These actions aim to demonstrate solidarity with Hezbollah and to prove their ability to strike installations in Galilee and the port of Eilat. Israel responds through discreet operations and stands ready to neutralise logistical centres and senior figures within these groups, multiplying targeted strikes. On the ground, the IDF focuses on decapitating militia leadership. On 21 June 2025, a raid attributed to Israel killed Haider al-Musawi, head of security of the Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada brigade, as well as a senior Lebanese Hezbollah cadre, as they crossed the Iranian–Iraqi border[10]. This elimination illustrates the Israeli strategy of targeting militia leaders in order to disrupt their networks and hinder arms transfers. Such blows to the hierarchy of the Iraqi resistance are compounded by sabotage and clandestine operations aimed at preventing these groups from opening an overt front. A Shiite leader confirmed to the author of this article, on 18 November 2025 in Iraq, that while Israel has not yet entered into an open war with Iraq, it nonetheless strikes silently, and almost daily, the leadership of Iraqi militias.

In this context, Baghdad seeks to avoid Iraq becoming an open battlefield. In March 2025, Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein acknowledged that his government had received several messages signalling Israel’s intention to launch attacks against Iraq, but that through dialogue with Washington and other capitals, it had succeeded in preventing such strikes. He emphasized that Iraq’s priority is to remain outside the conflict despite its geographical proximity to Iran and confirmed that cooperation with the United States continues. Iraq’s vulnerability also stems from its geography and political history. In 2023, the border guard command recalled that Iraq secured approximately 1,500 km of shared border with Iran. This configuration has not prevented Tehran, since 2003, from establishing itself as the predominant actor in Iraq, drawing on this territorial continuity as well as long-standing religious and political ties. Iranian influence has progressively penetrated the political, security and economic spheres, while support for militias and Shiite parties has enabled the latter to occupy strategic positions and, in part, substitute themselves for weakened national institutions.

This grip has gradually transformed Iraq into a veritable militia-state, where formal governmental structures are subordinated to Shiite armed formations aligned with Tehran. No president, no government is appointed without their assent; executives succeed one another, but the militia-state endures. Under these conditions, Iraqi national identity erodes in favor of sectarian affiliations, while the national army struggles to rival the organizational and coercive power of paramilitary groups. Iraq, thus dominated by its militias, constitutes a central pillar of the axis of resistance. Israel therefore seeks to neutralise these networks and prevent the potential opening of a new direct front emanating from Baghdad.

Iran : Open confrontation as a lever of regional domination

Since the proclamation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iranian leaders have elaborated an eschatological macro-narrative in which the Revolution presents itself as the vanguard of a final confrontation against the United States and Israel. Breaking abruptly with the Shah era, Ayatollah Khomeini relegated Israel to the rank of the Little Satan, with the United States as the Great Satan, and made the Jewish state the privileged target of a religious propaganda imbued with hostility. In this new revolutionary imaginary, the Islamic Republic sought to become the centre of the Muslim world by supporting all forms of resistance to Israel, from Lebanese Hezbollah to Palestinian groups. This discourse aims to present the eradication of Israel as the fulfilment of a divine promise and to mobilise Iranian society around an external cause that transcends internal cleavages.

The 7 October 2023 attack carried out by Hamas seemed to offer an opportunity to test this narrative. Pro-Iranian militias in Lebanon and Syria multiplied skirmishes against Israel, while Iran strengthened its support for the axis of resistance. But these peripheral confrontations ultimately led, for the first time, to a direct clash between Tehran and Israel. In early June 2025, the Israeli army launched a series of targeted strikes in response to Iran’s attack on Israeli interests; this cycle of hostilities, which ended after twelve days with a ceasefire, is now referred to as the Twelve-Day War. It marked the first open confrontation between the two states, breaking with decades of shadow warfare.

This twelve-day conflict was of unprecedented intensity. Israel targeted commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), nuclear programme scientists and missile launch sites; the offensive was followed by US strikes against the Fordo nuclear complex. By striking at the heart of Iran’s security apparatus, Israel sought to disrupt the regime’s projection capabilities and neutralise its ballistic threat. The elimination of around thirty commanders and nineteen scientists, the destruction of several missile depots and the neutralisation of command centres significantly weakened the networks of the axis of resistance. The failure of allied militias to alter the course of the war highlighted the vulnerability of these proxies and Tehran’s strategic isolation.

The twelve days of fighting exposed the limits of Iranian power, the fragility of its alliances and the gulf separating the state from society. The confrontation revealed that structural constraints linked to regime survival continue to restrain Tehran: Iran avoids escalations it cannot win, and its axis of resistance, which remained largely inactive, proved incapable of coming to the Islamic Republic’s aid[11]. Certainly, Iran lost significant military capabilities, but the Islamic Republic survived and its apparatuses remain in place.

Qatar : The attack on Doha and the expansion of the theatre of operations

For more than a decade, Qatar has hosted Hamas’s political bureau. This office was established in Doha with the agreement of the United States: Qatari officials have recalled to the press that the decision to receive Hamas leaders was taken at Washington’s request. The emirate thus plays a central mediating role in ceasefire negotiations and hostage exchanges between Israel and Hamas, a role recognized by Israel, Egypt and the United States. Doha is also a strategic ally of the United States and hosts the largest US military base in the Middle East, which adds an additional dimension to its diplomacy[12]. On 9 September 2025, Israel nevertheless decided to strike this diplomatic sanctuary. Israeli F-15 and F-35 aircraft launched missiles at a residential complex in Doha where members of Hamas’s political bureau were present. According to converging assessments, five mid-level militants were killed, as well as an officer of the Qatari security forces. The targeted leaders, including Khalil al-Hayya, escaped assassination. The strike was unprecedented: for the first time, a member state of the Gulf Cooperation Council was targeted, constituting a flagrant violation of Qatari sovereignty.

The attack prompted near-unanimous condemnation. The UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, described it as a “flagrant violation of Qatar’s sovereignty” and praised Doha’s “very positive” role in negotiations for the release of hostages. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other GCC members denounced an aggression liable to undermine the Abraham Accords and erode trust between Israel and its Arab partners. Capitals such as Cairo and Amman also expressed concern, considering that an attack against a neutral mediator undermined Israel’s credibility and jeopardised months of regional diplomacy. By striking Doha, Israel crossed a red line in the eyes of several allies, who are beginning to doubt the value of the security guarantees offered by Jerusalem.

From both a military and political standpoint, the operation appeared to be a failure. Tactically, the strike missed its primary target: most Hamas leaders survived, and the sole success was the elimination of close associates of Khalil al-Hayya. Diplomatically, it provoked Washington’s anger. President Donald Trump denounced a “unilateral” and “counterproductive” bombing, stressing that striking an ally engaged in mediation served neither US nor Israeli interests. Upon departing Tel Aviv for Doha, Secretary of State Marco Rubio insisted that Qatar’s mediating role remained indispensable and urged Israel to prioritise diplomacy. The Qatari government, for its part, condemned a “cowardly attack” and affirmed that it would not prevent it from continuing its mediation.

This sequence concluded with an unusual gesture: under pressure from Washington, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu telephoned his Qatari counterpart to offer his apologies. This contrition, rare in Israel’s history, reveals the extent of the discomfort created by the Doha attack. Even if the Israeli government hopes to turn the page, the diplomatic scar remains: Gulf states, Egypt and Jordan are now more cautious regarding Israeli initiatives.

Conclusion

The examination of the eight fronts highlights a profound reconfiguration of Israeli security strategy after 7 October 2023. The Jewish state no longer confines itself to defending its borders: it conducts targeted offensive operations, strikes beyond traditional theatres and seeks to shape a regional environment more favourable to its interests. The doctrine of pre-emption, understood as the elimination of threats before they materialise, manifests itself through anticipatory strikes in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and even Qatar, as well as through direct confrontation with Iran. This orientation stems from a growing sense of isolation and the conviction that neither classical deterrence nor negotiation suffices in the face of a network of non-state actors backed by a hostile state. It nonetheless carries major risks: a regional escalation that is difficult to control, potential violations of international law, and increased diplomatic isolation. Fronts now tend to overlap in a war blending shadow and light, where preventive strikes, clandestine operations and diplomatic pressures interact.

The future will depend on the ability of regional actors and major powers to establish safeguards and to propose a credible political alternative to this conflictual dynamic, for ceasefires in Gaza, Lebanon and even Iran remain structurally fragile: they can at any moment collapse and allow war to resume.

Notes

[1] Steinberg, James B., Michael E. O’Hanlon et Susan E. Rice. The New National Security Strategy and Preemption, Brookings Institution, 2002.

[2]  Times of Israel Staff, « Mécontent du nom de la guerre – « Épées de fer » –, Netanyahu en propose d’autres », Times of Israel, 18 décembre 2023.

[3] Hanin Ghaddar, « Hezbollah Miscalculations and the Gaza War », Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 12 octobre 2023.

[4] Jonathan Spyer, « Israel’s Multi-Front War—and What Comes Next », Middle East Forum Online, 30 avril 2025.

[5] Hugh Lovatt, Tahani Mustafa, « Averting West Bank Collapse: How to Revive Palestinian Politics », European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 2023.

[6] Moran Stern, « Youth Frustrations, PA Legitimacy Crisis Are Amplifying West Bank Violence », The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2023.

[7] Hugh Lovatt, Tahani Mustafa, Op.cit.

[8] Omar Abu Layla, Iran’s Evolving Strategy in Eastern Syria, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2024.

[9] Gallia Lindenstrauss, Turkey Is Not Iran, but It Is a Threat, INSS — INSS Insight No. 2061, 2025.

[10] Michael Knights, Ameer al-Kaabi & Crispin Smith, « Tripling of Iraqi Militia Claimed Attacks on Israel in October », The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2024.

[11]   Ali Fathollah-Nejad, « The 12 Days of War That Didn’t Ignite the Middle East or the World », War on the Rocks, 2025.

[12]  Urooba Jamal, « The price of mediation? How Qatar could respond to Israel’s attack », Al Jazeera, 2025.