Since the 1990s, the Israeli officials have consistently portrayed Iran as an “existential threat” to the State of Israel, to regional stability in the Middle East, and even international peace and security. In particular, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly warned of the alleged apocalyptic danger posed by Iran’s nuclear program throughout his political career. For instance in 2006, he declared in this stance that “it is 1938, and Iran is Germany,” drawing a parallel between Iran’s advancing uranium enrichment program. The Israeli rhetoric has extended beyond domestic political discourse aimed at building internal consensus regarding Tehran. Among its allies and more precisely the United States, Israeli leaders advocated for the tightening of economic sanctions and, beginning in 2009, increasingly raised the possibility of a “preventive” military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities[1].
According to historian Haggai Ram, Israeli representations of the Islamic Republic possess a distinctly “irrational[2]” dimension. The culmination of the Israeli-Iranian antagonism came with the implementation of threats that had been voiced for more than two decades, culminating in the military offensive launched jointly with the United States in February 2026. Yet the antagonistic rhetoric employed by both Iran and Israel conceals carefully crafted geopolitical strategies that extend beyond ideological confrontation alone. This article seeks to examine how Israel’s portrayal of Iran as its ultimate enemy was constructed over time and how this narrative has shaped regional dynamics, security perceptions, and strategic alignments across the Middle East.
Israel-Iran: from allies to ennemis
Allies under the Shah regime
Israeli-Iranian relations were far from hostile during the reign of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1941–1979). For nearly three decades[3], they took the form of a strategic partnership centered on military, security, and economic cooperation, including exchanges in the agricultural and energy sectors. Iran was regarded by Labour Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion (1948–1963) as a key Middle Eastern state within the framework of his “periphery doctrine.” Ben-Gurion, the founder of the Israeli state, promoted the idea of an ethnically and culturally plural Middle East in order to contain pan-Arabism and Islamic solidarities supporting the Palestinian cause. He therefore encouraged alliances with states on the region’s periphery, such as Turkey and Iran, to counterbalance Israel’s isolation in the Arab world.
Pahlavi Iran was firmly aligned with the Western bloc and deeply influenced by Western models of development and modernization. The Shahs embarked on ambitious modernization programs inspired in part by the reforms implemented by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey. While these policies produced notable achievements in terms of economic growth and social development, their overall legacy remains contested. In particular, Mohammad Reza Shah’s White Revolution, launched in 1963 to modernize Iran through reforms in agriculture, education, public health, and women’s rights, was implemented in a highly authoritarian manner. Although it introduced significant social and economic changes, it also disrupted traditional social structures and exacerbated existing tensions within Iranian society. Moreover, the Shah’s rule was characterized by pronounced elitism, widespread corruption, and a close alliance with Western powers. These factors fueled growing opposition among Marxist, nationalist, and Shiite movements, which increasingly viewed the regime as a vehicle for foreign influence and interference in Iranian affairs[4]. The 1953 Operation Ajax, orchestrated jointly by British and American intelligence services, remains one of the most striking examples of the economic and political interventionism associated with the Shah’s Western allies. The operation sought to overthrow Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who had been democratically re-elected that same year and had initiated the nationalization of Iran’s oil industry in 1951. Until then, Iranian oil production had largely remained under the control of the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. For many Iranians, the coup became a defining symbol of foreign interference and contributed to the deep mistrust of Western powers that would later shape the ideological foundations of the Islamic Revolution.
Cooperation with Israel fueled Iranian opposition to the Shah’s rule. The Shah recognized the State of Israel as early as 1950, breaking with the tradition of Islamic solidarity with the Palestinians. He forged close ties with Tel Aviv through the export of Iranian oil in exchange for Israeli military expertise and know-how. As a result, the Israeli intelligence service (the Mossad) contributed to the training of SAVAK, Iran’s domestic security and intelligence agency, which became notorious for its violent repression of political opponents.
Is the 1979 Revolution a turning point?
The winds of opposition to Iran’s monarchical regime began to gather force in the early 1960s. In 1963, in the Shiite holy city of Qom, Ayatollah Khomeini delivered a landmark speech that laid the foundations of his Third Worldist and Islamic-revolutionary political vision. Rejecting both capitalist and communist models and advocating the principle of “Neither West nor East,” he proposed Islam as an alternative path, calling for the unity of Islamic nations and support for oppressed peoples. Shortly after this speech, he was expelled from Iran in 1964[5] and remained in exile until his triumphant return in 1979. Protests against the Shah began in October 1977 and reached their peak during the winter of 1978, when they were violently suppressed by the regime’s security forces.
Israeli perceptions of the Iranian Revolution are revealing in many respects. Israeli specialists on Iran closely monitored the unfolding protests, but a shift occurred in Israeli narratives as the popularity of the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini grew[6] and it became apparent that he might supplant the Shah. Ignoring the context behind the emergence of the Iranian Revolution and the aspirations of the demonstrators, Israeli experts described the revolution through a reductive and resolutely Orientalist lens, as the violent and irrational expression of Iranian masses opposed to modernity and manipulated by radical clerics[7] . In much the same way that Israelis denied the existence of Palestinian nationalism, reducing Palestinian resistance to the supposedly violent and anarchic nature of Arabs, Iranian revolutionaries were thereafter portrayed as regressive Islamists opposed to the Shah, who was elevated to the status of a “genius of the (modernist) revolution[8].” Historian Haggai Ram identifies in this process the roots of what he terms Israeli “Iranophobia[9],” which he analyzes as the product of a “moral panic[10]” reflecting an internal crisis within the Israeli state[11]. At the same time as the Iranian Revolution, Israel experienced the first electoral defeat of the secular left-wing Labour Party in 1977, replaced by the Likud, which formed a governing coalition that notably included the Haredi party Agudat Yisrael, paving the way for the emergence of religious actors as a significant political force. This transformation of the Israeli political landscape was driven in part by the massive support of Mizrahim (Jews of Middle Eastern and North African origin) for nationalist and religious right-wing parties.
The Mizrahim emerged as a major social and political force during the 1970s, a decade that witnessed the rise of the Black Panthers movement, composed primarily of Jews of North African and Middle Eastern descent. The movement demanded an end to discrimination and called for social justice and equality with Ashkenazi (European Jewish) citizens, thereby exposing what historian Yaron Tsur has described as Israel’s “ethnic problem[12].” These two developments profoundly challenged the secular and Western-oriented worldview of Israel’s Ashkenazi political elite. Indeed, the founders of the Israeli state had constructed their national identity around a Western frame of reference, envisioning Israel as an extension of Europe in the Middle East—a “villa in the jungle,” to borrow Ehud Barak’s famous expression[13]. Against this backdrop, the proclamation of the Islamic Republic in April 1979 resonated as a warning signal in Tel Aviv. On a socio-psychological level, the Israeli rejection of the new Iranian regime can be understood as an affirmation of Israel’s secular and Western identity, opposed both to the promotion of religious values perceived as backward and to the Eastern cultural heritage associated with the Mizrahim, which evoked similarities with those of Israel’s “Arab enemies.”
However, during the 1980s Israel did not yet perceive Iran as an existential threat, despite the anti-Zionist posture and belligerent rhetoric of Iranian officials. Upon coming to power in 1979, the Islamic Republic withdrew recognition of the State of Israel, which it labeled the “Little Satan,” and immediately replaced Israel’s economic mission in Tehran with a Palestinian diplomatic representation. It assumed a leading role in defending the Palestinian cause, conceived as an Islamic cause, and welcomed Yasser Arafat, then chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), as the first foreign political leader to visit post-revolutionary Iran. Yet although Tehran was regarded by Israeli officials as a Medinah Metorefet (“mad state”[14]), it was Saddam Hussein’s Iraq that posed the primary strategic concern for Israel. Consequently, during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), Tel Aviv discreetly supported Tehran in an effort to weaken the Iraqi military, then considered the most powerful army in the Arab world, by facilitating indirect arms transfers. Despite its anti-Zionist rhetoric, Khomeini’s Iran also pragmatically maintained certain patterns inherited from the pre-revolutionary relationship by continuing oil shipments to Israel.
The construction of Iran as an existential and regional threat
Is the Iranian nuclear power program a surface concern?
Several developments contributed to the emergence of Iran as Israel’s perceived existential enemy. These included the revival of Iran’s nuclear program, officially relaunched in 1984, and the Islamic Republic’s regional ambitions to export its revolution. These ambitions took the form of support for armed groups as well as the deployment of a revolutionary and proselytizing soft-power strategy targeting both states and Muslim diasporas. These developments coincided with Iraq’s weakening following the Gulf War (1990–1991) and the growing legitimacy of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a political actor after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. From a military and security perspective, Iran’s nuclear and ballistic programs have constituted a genuine strategic concern, one shared by the Sunni monarchies of the Gulf. Israeli officials have repeatedly claimed to possess evidence of the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear activities, warning as early as 1995[15] that Tehran was on the verge of acquiring a nuclear weapon. Such assessments were consistently challenged by segments of the American intelligence community. For its part, the Islamic Republic has maintained that its nuclear program is exclusively civilian in nature and intended for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) repeatedly criticized Iran’s lack of transparency throughout the 2000s. In its 2025 report, the Agency stated that Iran had reached the status of a nuclear threshold state, possessing uranium enriched to 60 percent.
In reality, Israel’s principal concern may be the prospect of losing its regional monopoly on nuclear weapons. Developed discreetly beginning in 1956 through cooperation first with France and later with the United Kingdom, Israel’s military nuclear program became public knowledge in 1986 following revelations published by the British press based on information provided by whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu. A technician at the Dimona nuclear facility, Vanunu was subsequently sentenced to eighteen years in prison by Israeli authorities for treason. While maintaining a policy of deliberate ambiguity regarding its nuclear arsenal, Israel has never signed the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Paradoxically, it has remained particularly vocal regarding Iran’s nuclear activities[16]. By emphasizing the military potential and progress of Iran’s nuclear program, Israel contributed to the adoption of international sanctions against Tehran and to the spread of regional anxieties regarding the so-called Iranian threat, presenting Iran as a danger not only to Israel but to international security more broadly[17].
The Israeli vision of a potential Iranian nuclear Armageddon has often found resonance within Republican administrations in the United States. In 2002, President George W. Bush included Iran in his “Axis of Evil,” despite efforts by the reformist Iranian President Mohammad Khatami to initiate dialogue with Western countries, particularly the United States, on the nuclear issue. Under President Barack Obama, however, negotiations eventually led to the signing of the Vienna Agreement in 2015, which provided for the gradual lifting of economic sanctions in exchange for limitations on Iran’s nuclear program. Yet this period of rapprochement was interrupted in 2017. President Donald Trump revived much of the rhetoric employed by his Republican predecessor, declaring during his highly symbolic visit to Riyadh in May 2017 that Iran was the principal sponsor of terrorism and extremism in the region and that a struggle between “good and evil” was necessary to ensure Middle Eastern stability. At the regional level, Iran gradually constructed what became known as the “Axis of Resistance.” Support for Shiite armed groups across the region has largely been coordinated through the Quds Force, the external operations branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), whose mission includes the recruitment, training, mobilization, and arming of allied militias. Initially active in Lebanon, the Quds Force subsequently expanded its operations into Iraq and Syria. Iran has also provided support to Palestinian Hamas and Yemen’s Houthi movement. However, the nature of these relationships varies considerably, ranging from ideological allegiance to Iran’s Shiite clerical establishment to more flexible and pragmatic partnerships.
Beyond these very real military considerations, Israel has, in a certain sense, consistently relied upon the existence of an existential enemy. This role was successively occupied by Nasser’s Egypt, Arafat’s PLO, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and, more recently, Iran and its nuclear and ballistic programs. Israeli national identity has historically been shaped in opposition to its Arab and Islamic regional environment. From this perspective, Israel’s campaign against Iran serves two strategic objectives. First, it diverts attention from Israeli policies toward the Palestinians. By portraying the Islamic Republic not only as an existential threat but also as a major obstacle to regional stability and peace, Israel shifts focus away from criticisms directed at its expansionist policies, settlement activities, system of apartheid, and alleged war crimes in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). Second, the existence of a regional adversary committed to Israel’s destruction helps justify the country’s security doctrine, substantial military expenditures, and extensive military operations. Following the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023, for example, Israeli officials repeatedly pointed to Iran’s direct responsibility for the events.
Furthermore, Iran’s anti-Israeli rhetoric, combined with its recurring social, economic, and political crises, provides fertile ground for Israeli and American narratives hostile to the Islamic Republic. Both allies have at various times expressed hopes for internal political transformation in Iran. The country’s plutocratic economic system, the violent repression of recurring—though socially and geographically fragmented—protest movements, and severe restrictions on public freedoms have frequently been invoked to portray Iran as a destabilizing actor and to justify its diplomatic isolation on the international stage.
Sunni Monarchies and the fear of internal unrest
Israeli advocacy against Iran has served as a powerful catalyst for Israeli-Arab rapprochement. The Sunni monarchies of the Gulf—particularly the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain—share Israel’s perception of the Iranian threat. Their pre-existing tensions with Iran intensified throughout the 2000s. Despite longstanding cultural ties across the Gulf, population mobility, and extensive commercial exchanges, ideological divisions and geopolitical rivalries between Iran and the Arab monarchies have remained pronounced, contributing to persistently strained relations. Several territorial disputes continue to fuel these tensions. Abu Dhabi and Tehran remain at odds over the islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa, which are currently controlled by Iran. In Bahrain’s case, historical sensitivities remain particularly acute. Having been incorporated into various Persian empires throughout history, notably under the Safavids, Bahrain is still occasionally referred to by some Iranian officials as a territory historically linked to Iran. Periodic provocative statements questioning the legitimacy of Bahrain’s independence continues to generate concern among Gulf leaders. In 2004, Jordan’s King Abdullah II famously articulated these fears through his warning about the emergence of a “Shiite Crescent” stretching across the Middle East. Qatar, by contrast, has pursued a more cautious approach toward Iran. While remaining aligned with its Gulf partners on many strategic issues, Doha has maintained cordial relations with Tehran, frequently offering mediation services and seeking to prevent regional escalation.
Morocco, despite its geographical distance from Iran, has also developed a contentious relationship with the Islamic Republic. Moroccan authorities view the spread of Shiism as a challenge to the kingdom’s religious and national cohesion. Over the past two decades, thousands of Moroccans, including members of the diaspora, have reportedly converted to Shiite Islam. Rabat went so far as to sever diplomatic relations with Tehran between 2009 and 2014[18] and again from 2018 onward, accusing Iran of supplying weapons to the Polisario Front through its embassy in Algeria[19]. Morocco’s increasingly vocal opposition to Iran appears closely linked to its alignment with the policies of its Gulf allies as well as broader Israeli-American strategic objectives. To counter Iran’s regional ambitions, the Gulf monarchies have actively promoted anti-Iranian narratives throughout the Middle East. Arab media outlets, particularly Saudi-owned Al Arabiya, have frequently portrayed Iran as a destabilizing and anti-Sunni actor, presenting the Islamic Republic as both a geopolitical and sectarian threat. At the same time, Gulf states have significantly expanded their military capabilities, strengthened their integration into the Western security architecture, and encouraged a deeper American military presence in the region as part of a broader deterrence strategy.
In this context, opposition to Iran became a central pillar of the strategic rapprochement between Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Israel under the auspices of the Trump administration. Beginning in 2017, President Donald Trump pursued a strongly pro-Israeli Middle East policy centered on a tripartite transactional alliance linking Israel, the United States, and key Arab partners. This strategy ultimately culminated in the signing of the Abraham Accords in the autumn of 2020. Among the principal strategic objectives of Arab-Israeli normalization was the creation of a regional security front aimed at containing Iran. Although no formal military alliance was publicly established, an informal Atlantic-oriented security framework gradually emerged in the Middle East, characterized by intelligence cooperation, joint military exercises, and the acquisition of Israeli defense technologies by several Arab states.
Conclusion
Israeli representations of Iran reveal deeper political and societal tensions within the Israeli state itself. While grounded in genuine security concerns, Israeli discourse on Iran has often amplified these threats in ways that serve broader strategic objectives, including diverting international attention from Israeli policies toward the Palestinians and from its military actions in the region. This perception of Iran is increasingly shared by the states that have joined the Abraham Accords framework, reflecting a broader alignment with the Middle East policies pursued by successive U.S. administrations, particularly under Donald Trump. As a result, security cooperation between Israel and several Arab states has deepened considerably. Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi, for example, have recently strengthened their strategic partnership through the establishment of joint defense initiatives designed to improve protection against Iranian missile threats.
Notes
[1] Leslie, Jonathan, Fear and Insecurity, Israel and the Iran Threat Narrative, Oxford University Press, 2022
[2] Ram, Haggai, Iranophobia the logic of an Israeli obsession, Standford University Press, 2009
[3] Leslie, Jonathan, Fear and Insecurity, Israel and the Iran Threat Narrative, Oxford University Press, 2022
[4] Ram, Haggai, Iranophobia the logic of an Israeli obsession, Standford University Press, 2009
[5] Leslie, Jonathan, Fear and Insecurity, Israel and the Iran Threat Narrative, Oxford University Press, 2022
[6] Ram, Haggai, Iranophobia the logic of an Israeli obsession, Standford University Press, 2009
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Tsur, Yaron, « « Problème ethnique, Traduction commentée par Yann Scioldo-Zürcher Levi ». L’Atelier du Centre de recherches historiques Revue électronique du CRH, no 26, 2022
[13] Ram, Haggai, Iranophobia the logic of an Israeli obsession, Standford University Press, 2009
[14] Ibid.
[15] Dieudonné, Jérémy, « Guerres et narratifs : comment Israël justifie ses actions à travers la menace iranienne », Le Rubicon, 9 avril 2025
[16] Leslie, Jonathan, Fear and Insecurity, Israel and the Iran Threat Narrative, Oxford University Press, 2022
[17] Ibid.
[18] Officially out of solidarity with the Bahraini emirate, which was designated as the 14th Iranian province in February 2009 by an Iranian official. Yet none of the Gulf monarchies had severed ties with Iran following that incident.
[19] Morocco has not provided evidence of this accusation, which is denied by Iran.
