The situation in Iraq is evolving. The United States (US) is now faced with increasingly intense attacks by pro-Iranian Shiite militias, who have been regularly targeting their bases in Iraq and Syria since October 2023. Wishing to avoid a hasty departure from the country under pressure from the militias, in a catastrophic repetition of the August 2021 walloping in Afghanistan, Washington has therefore chosen to negotiate with Baghdad a programmed withdrawal of its forces. On January 25, 2024, the US and Iraq announced that negotiations would begin shortly to establish a roadmap and schedule to conclude the mission of the international coalition fighting the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL). As a reminder that Washington has had to face an official request from the Iraqi government for the coalition forces’ departure, which have been deployed since 2014 at Baghdad’s invitation, including those from France.
It’s worth noting that US-led forces invaded Iraq and toppled the former ruler Saddam Hussein in 2003. They withdrew in 2011 but returned in 2014 to fight the Islamic State as part of this international coalition. Currently, the United States has around 2,500 troops deployed in the country.
- Is Daesh back in Iraq?
The Iraqi government insists that Daesh has been definitively defeated in Iraq, while Western chancelleries continue to warn of the ongoing threat. The whole partnership between Iraq and the coalition’s member countries is therefore being questioned. Iraqi authorities assure that there is no longer any danger of a Daesh resurgence, while the Americans claim the opposite. US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken emphasised that Iraq is “extremely important” for the stability of the region, and stated that Daesh “remains a real threat”. He added, “despite the very good work that we’ve done over the years in dealing with that threat and mitigating it significantly, we’re reminded by the horrific attack outside of Moscow just a few days ago that ISIS remains a potentially potent force and one that we have to continue to deal with”.
- What is the exact situation ?
Five years after the fall of Baghouz, the Islamic State’s final stronghold on the Syrian-Iraqi border, jihadists no longer hold any territory in Iraq. However, nearly 4,000 fighters persist in carrying out sporadic attacks in the region, where the risk of the group’s resurgence remains, according to the United Nations statements (UN).
The Islamic State has recently suffered significant losses in its leadership ranks. Indeed, between February 2022 and April 2023, three different ISIS leaders were killed in Syria. Following the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in a US raid on October 27, 2019, the group was successively led by Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, then Abu al-Hasan al-Qurashi and finally Abu al-Hussein al-Qurashi. These leaders are not related – the nom de guerre “al-Qurashi” indicates a connection with the Quraysh tribe of Mecca, from which Prophet Muhammad descended.
In addition to its leaders, ISIS has also lost several key commanders, especially in Syria and Iraq, mainly due to strikes by the US-led coalition.
Since ISIS proclaimed itself a “caliphate” in June 2014, it has consistently referred to its leaders as “caliphs”, with al-Baghdadi being the first. In August 2023, ISIS introduced a new leader, Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi. However, little is known about him and he has not yet issued a leadership message. The ISIS “caliph” plays a symbolic role, unifying diverse local contexts. Through territorialisation, the use of the caliphate’s single flag has been a significant key to success, enabling them to occupy vast territories, while decentralising power to local actors.
However, both territorialisation and the caliphate have now disappeared, reducing the Islamic State to the status of just another terrorist group. Nonetheless, ISIS operations now span from Al-Anbar province to Diyala, passing by Tikrit and Mosul. The largest Daesh fighters pool is currently located in refugee camps. While the al-Hôl camp in Syria has become famous, there are also Syrian refugees in the Arbat camp near Sulaymani in Iraqi Kurdistan. In an attempt to support its optimistic vision, the Iraqi government is encouraging refugees from the Syrian camps to return to Iraq by offering them the sum of 3,000 euros.
In general, the Islamic State no longer has the means to unite disparate groups with a single objective. Moreover, the excessive confessionalisation of society, accompanied by crimes committed by the various militias, has led to a massive rejection of the blending of the confusion between politics and religion. There is a widespread but growing desire to “shield religion from politics”. While this feeling is mostly prevalent among Shiite populations, Sunni Arab communities also share a similar rejection.
The majority of Sunni Arabs have formed new clientelistic relationships with their political elite, as illustrated by the career of M. Halbûsi, the former Speaker of the Assembly. However, this allegiance is essentially based on corruption. Consequently, a resurgence of support for Daesh among these neglected populations is utterly possible.
- Who is most affected by the current war?
The acts of war are mainly between pro-Iranian militias and American forces, as evidenced by the American drone attack in eastern Baghdad on February 7, 2024. In response to the death of three US soldiers in Syria at the end of January, in an attack orchestrated by pro-Iranian militias, Washington did not go easy on its Iraqi ally by carrying out two series of deadly strikes in the country on February 2 and 7, with the latter striking the heart of Baghdad.
These American reprisals have strengthened the Iraqi authorities in their determination to terminate the international coalition’s mission against the Islamic State organisation. This exposes American bases and troops in Iraq and Syria to further attacks. Additionally, the prospect of regional peace has diminished following the inability of Israel and Hamas to reach a truce in the Gaza Strip.
- Toppling the system
The Islamic State’s best asset remains the failure of the existing political system. As a matter of fact, an emissary from Moqtada al-Sadr spent several days in Tehran negotiating with Iranian leaders to dismantle a militia-based political system that is condemning Iraq to bankruptcy and serving as a stepping stone for ISIS. The aim would be nothing less than to rebuild the Iraqi state on the basis of an agreement between three parties considered legitimate in the light of the last elections: Barzani for the Kurds, Halbûsi for the Sunni Arabs and al-Sadr for the Shia Arabs. These three groups are questioning the occupation of the seats left vacant by the Sadrists’ resignation in 2023 by people close to the Coordination Framework (Îtâr al- tansîqi الإطار التنسيقي) despite opposition from the Supreme Judicial Council (majlis al-qada’ al-a’la مجلس القضاء الأعلى). These three protagonists are calling for new legislative elections which should see the Sadrist majority emerge victorious. On the other hand, supporters of the Coordination Framework are calling for a new government to be formed without waiting for the elections.
Nevertheless, such a refoundation remains problematic as long as the joint authority of Ayatollah Sistani and Ayatollah Khamenei prevents the official rejection of the pro-Iranian Shiite militias. Their succession should, however, usher in a new era for the Shiite religious leadership, enabling it to pass on its legacy. The only person likely to enjoy sufficient authority from a religious point of view is Ayatollah Kamal al-Haydari, known for his opposition to the current regime in Tehran.
There is, however, an awareness on the Sadrist side that nothing can change without Iran’s backing, and on the Iranian side that the current system is doomed to failure and is the breeding ground for Daesh. Paradoxically, Daesh is ensuring that its enemy on the ground emerges victorious from the showdown with the Sadrists, aware of the advantage for the Salafi-jihadists of maintaining the current militia system, which is doomed to failure. On the Sadrist side, the aim is to rebuild the Iraqi state on the basis of the three legitimacies recognised as such.
The danger posed by Daesh in Iraq is therefore being exploited by both the Iraqi government, despite its official rhetoric, and the forces of the anti-Daesh coalition. The reality is probably somewhere between the two positions.
Iraq’s place, the birthplace of the Islamic State, suggests that, in the strategy and symbolism of the jihadist organisation, the reality is closer to the concerns of the anti-Daesh coalition than to the reassuring words of the Iraqi government. The spread of the Islamic State in the Sahel region and, above all, in Khorasan (Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan), does not mean that the city of Mosul, which was the seat of the “caliphate” for three years, has been abandoned. The attack in Kerman, Iran, on 3 January 2024, against the ceremony in memory of Pasdaran general Qassem Soleimani, killed by an American drone near Baghdad in January 2020, shows that ISIS is pursuing its anti-Shiite crusade and that it cannot be attracted by the short-term alliance of pro-Iranian proxies with Hamas in the Gaza war against Israel.
In the competition between Islamists (Muslim Brotherhood) and jihadists (ISIS, Al-Qaeda), the balance of power could change rapidly. The Islamist movement of the Muslim Brotherhood operates within the framework of existing states, whereas the Daesh jihadists are working to abolish borders. The collapse of several of these states (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, etc.) is an undeniable asset for the Islamic State. The Muslim Brotherhood’s failures in governance after free elections, whether in Gaza, Egypt, Tunisia or Morocco, provide arguments in favour of jihadists who are opposed to elections.
