When the Assad regime collapsed on December 8, 2024, a day Syrians had awaited for over fourteen years after more than half a century of authoritarian rule by the Assad family, it became clear that Syria’s new rulers were inclined to offer general amnesty to former members of the Syrian army and intelligence services. In several cities that the regime had vacated, hundreds of these former personnel were seen leaving their military sites, walking through the streets in tattered civilian clothes. For years, they had served as soldiers in Assad’s war machine, fighting on his frontlines and bombing opposition areas.
The scenes were unfamiliar, even to the soldiers themselves. Many chanted “Allahu Akbar” each time a rebel military vehicle passed by, not out of conviction, but out of a desire to mimic the dominant discourse of the new authorities, whom they perceived to be Islamists. For them, these were the very groups they had long been told were terrorists, an image embedded not just through battlefield encounters, but through years of regime propaganda that equated dissent with extremism.
Syria’s Military Forces (2011–2024)
According to approximate estimates, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) at the onset of the 2011 uprising consisted of around 230,000 active-duty personnel and approximately 300,000 conscripts. The army was structured into four main corps with distinct geographic and operational mandates. In the following years, especially after Russia’s direct military intervention in 2015, a fifth corps was established under Russian supervision. This new formation served as an umbrella for various pro-regime militias, including the National Defense Forces (NDF), and several former rebel factions that had agreed to reconciliation deals. These deals, often brokered by Russian military police and Syrian regime negotiators, emerged in the aftermath of widespread territorial losses by the opposition. One prominent example is the faction led by Ahmad al-Awda in Daraa, which later evolved into the so-called Eighth Brigade under the Fifth Corps’ command.
According to the latest statistics from Global Firepower, by 2024, the final year of Assad’s rule, the Syrian military had declined to an estimated 270,000 military personnel in total, including around 170,000 active-duty soldiers. This sharp decrease, compared to pre-war figures, highlights the extent of attrition suffered by the Syrian Armed Forces over the years of conflict. Factors contributing to this decline include battlefield losses, widespread defections, structural disintegration, and the growing reliance on allied militias and foreign-backed units.
Post-Assad Settlement Initiatives
Following the collapse of the Assad regime, hundreds of “status settlement centres” were established across various Syrian provinces by the new authorities to process former army and intelligence personnel and offer them a path toward reconciliation. While complete up to date national data is missing, local reports indicate a substantial turnout. In Latakia province alone, one of the biggest strongholds of Assad in the past, over 27,000 former regime soldiers reportedly submitted settlement requests.
The process required applicants to appear in person at the centre, present their military identification, surrender their weapons, and sign a document acknowledging their role in fighting on behalf of the Assad regime. The document also included a written pledge not to engage in any similar military activity in the future. These settlements were presented as a formal mechanism for turning the page on the past, though in practice, they offered no accountability, nor any investigation into prior misconduct.
Assad Loyalists Reemerge After Regime Collapse
However, not all former Assad soldiers underwent the settlement process. Those with known involvement in direct war crimes and human rights abuses under Assad largely avoided official channels, instead opting for alternative survival strategies across different regions. Many sought safety in the forests and mountainous regions of Syria’s coastal areas, where some started to form new, localized armed groups. On the other hand, Iraqi officials confirmed that nearly 3,000 Syrian soldiers and officers crossed into Iraq during the regime’s fall. They were disarmed and temporarily accommodated in military facilities in Anbar province. However, Iraq has stated it will not provide asylum and is waiting for arrangements to repatriate them. So far, Iraq has already transferred 1,905 former Assad soldiers to the new authorities on December 19.
The remnants of Assad’s forces, who had gone into hiding along Syria’s coastal regions, adopted guerrilla tactics and staged ambushes in the months following the regime’s fall. This culminated in a direct military confrontation on March 6, 2025, when they launched a coup attempt, not to overthrow the new central government in Damascus, but to seize control of the coastal strongholds historically associated with the Alawite community, which Assad had long portrayed himself as the protector of. Within less than 24 hours, Assad’s loyalists managed to take over Latakia and Tartus, inflicting heavy casualties on the newly established public security and military forces. Though the coup attempt was eventually suppressed with the arrival of reinforcements from all across the country to fight Assad remnants, it came at a high cost, particularly for Alawite civilians, who suffered a significant death toll in the clashes.
Still, the brief success of the offensive revealed the continued military and logistical capacity of Assad’s former command structure. These forces have been operating under a newly formed military council led by some of the most notorious commanders from the ousted regime:
Ghiyath Suleiman Dalla: Head of the “Military Council for the Liberation of Syria” and commander of the “Al-Ghaith Forces,” a powerful Fourth Division unit once following Maher Assad.
Muqdad Fteihah: Commander of the “Coastal Shield Brigade.”
Mohammad Mahrez Jabir: Leader of the Russian-backed “Desert Hawks” militia.
Suhail Al-Hassan: Former head of Air Force Intelligence in northern Syria, one of the most well-known leaders in Assad’s army.
The clashes in Syria’s coastal region continued intensively for more than four days, mainly fueled by fighters from Assad’s remaining forces who had declined post-regime reconciliation out of concern for arrest related to crimes from the previous administration. However, subsequent investigations revealed a more alarming truth: some combatants had formally reconciled and promised not to engage in military operations again. Yet, in spite of these commitments, they took up arms once more on behalf of Assad.
Subsequent reports indicated that the deposed president, Bashar al-Assad, along with key members of his former regime, were far from being only passive observers. In fact, they were reportedly aware of the planned coastal insurrection, which was orchestrated with backing from both Russia and Iran. The Iraqi militias affiliated with Iran had served as a safe haven for several militia leaders, most notably Mohammad Mahrez Jabir, who lives today between Iraq and Russia, and later appeared in a televised interview openly admitting his role in coordinating the military campaign. His admission underscored the depth of international entanglement and exposed a broader betrayal of the post-regime reconciliation process. Rather than a spontaneous or isolated act of resistance, the coastal conflict emerged as a deliberate and strategically supported counteroffensive, challenging the legitimacy and stability of Syria’s new order.
Reconciliation or Reconfiguration?
Among all of this, the new Syrian authorities have yet to take concrete steps toward transitional justice, despite growing public pressure, particularly from victims’ families and civil society, demanding accountability and the exclusion of individuals directly implicated in Assad-era crimes.
Among the most controversial figures is Fadi Saqr, a former commander in the National Defense Forces and a documented perpetrator of the infamous Tadamon Massacre. Saqr today plays the role as an advisor within the new state-run “National Reconciliation and Social Peace” initiative. He was recently seen in Latakia engaging with local communities, and, more provocatively, made a government-escorted visit to the Tadamon neighborhood itself, where he once oversaw mass executions.Similarly, Ammar Bilal, who formerly headed the Prosecutor General’s Office at the Anti-Terrorism Court under Assad, a body notorious for its role in political repression and for coordinating closely with intelligence branches, was photographed shaking hands with the new Syrian Minister of Justice, Mazhar Al-Wais. The image sparked outrage, as many believe Bilal belongs in prison after the many decisions he directly took, resulting in the death of Syrians, not near the center of the country’s post-Assad justice system.
