Iran’s Strategic Outlook on U.S. Relations in a Shifting Middle East

Iranian negotiating team headed by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi For negotiations with the United States, and these negotiations were held indirectly in Muscat, Oman. 26,April,2025///FARNOOD_sipa.0622/Credit:BERNO/SIPA/2504280644

Author

The relationship between the United States and Iran remains rooted in mutual hostility, strategic distrust, and ideological divergence. Yet, today’s regional and international dynamics are pushing both sides toward a cautious recalibration, favouring indirect diplomacy over open confrontation. Tehran continues to view Washington through the lens of a containment policy, executed through sanctions, military presence, and regional alliances. However, shifting Middle Eastern alliances, such as the Abraham Accords of 2020, Saudi-Iran rapprochement[1], and the broader trend of de-escalation, have created a more fluid geopolitical environment. Within this context, Iran is seeking to position itself as a central regional actor navigating a recalibrating multipolar Middle East. 

The post-October 7, 2023, environment marks a notable evolution in U.S.-Iran dynamics. Where once their tensions were defined by clear bilateral flashpoints, they are now embedded in more complex multipolar tensions. The weakening of traditional Iranian allies such as Hezbollah, after the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah and the destruction of their Headquarters in September 2024[2], and Syria, after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, has accelerated Tehran’s internal reassessment. These developments underscore Iran’s recent strategic pivot: less reliance on regional proxies and greater focus on internal stability and controlled external engagement. 

Diplomatic overtures are increasingly routed through quiet channels. Formal diplomacy like the JCPOA negotiations, has stalled, replaced by backchannel communications facilitated by neutral actors such as Oman and Qatar. The legacy of successful informal talks, such as the 2013 Oman discussions leading to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), highlights the importance of Track II diplomacy. Recent U.S.-Iran exchanges in Muscat similarly reflect mutual “strategic fatigue,” a concept articulated by Seyed Hossein Mousavian, as both sides recognize the unsustainable cost of unchecked escalation. High-profile incidents, such as the January 2020 assassination of Qassem Soleimani, still shape red lines but have also contributed to a shared desire to avoid direct conflict. 

Domestically, Tehran faces mounting challenges: economic stagnation, currency devaluation, rising public dissatisfaction, and the unresolved question of Supreme Leader Khamenei’s succession. These pressures incentivize external stabilization and reduce the appetite for regional adventurism. Meanwhile, Iran’s strategic priorities are increasingly shaped by economic aspirations, notably energy exports and trade partnerships with China, Russia, and neighboring states. Regional shifts, such as Turkey’s assertiveness in Syria and the recalibration of Russia’s regional focus, are further shaping Iran’s strategic calculations.  Washington, for its part, seeks to maintain a delicate balance. With military retrenchment underway in the Middle East and crises in Ukraine and Taiwan demanding attention, the U.S. is recalibrating its approach to Iran, not through appeasement, but mainly through calibrated deterrence and managed dialogue. Even if Tehran views U.S. support for Israel as deeply biased, it recognizes that Washington plays a crucial role in preventing escalation, especially as it pressures Tel Aviv to exercise restraint amidst heightened tensions. 

The Biden administration’s dual strategy (diplomatic engagement paired with strategic pressure) has involved Gulf intermediaries issuing warnings to Tehran while encouraging indirect dialogue. This echoes Cold War-style conflict management, relying on signaling, tacit rules, and third-party mediation to prevent open warfare. The recent Muscat discussions indicate that both Pezechkian’s government and Trump’s administration prefer ambiguity and informal arrangements over public commitment, allowing space for testing proposals and gauging intent without the constraints of formal diplomacy. Furthermore, regional fragmentation is reshaping the “Axis of Resistance.” Hezbollah’s weakening, the fall of Assad and the rise of Sunni leadership in Syria under Ahmad al-Sharaa, and Hamas’s losses have forced Tehran to reassess its regional leverage. Iran’s inability to guarantee Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon or Assad’s regime in Syria represents a sharp decline in Tehran’s strategic reach, providing Washington with stronger negotiating leverage. 

Despite these vulnerabilities, Iran is unlikely to abandon its ideological foundations. However, it appears increasingly willing to engage in limited, transactional diplomacy that serves national interests. This includes cooperation on humanitarian issues, prisoner swaps, and potentially, nuclear safeguards. For the U.S. and the European Union, this opens the door for issue-specific agreements that avoid the pitfalls of overambitious, all-encompassing deals. Ultimately, today’s U.S.-Iran dynamic is not one of normalization, but of managed hostility. Both countries recognize the dangers of miscalculation. The absence of formal diplomatic ties increases the risks of escalation—but also makes third-party mediation and backchannel diplomacy all the more critical. The survival of this fragile détente depends on each side’s ability to maintain restraint, avoid provocation, and leverage informal tools of engagement.

The future of U.S.-Iran relations will likely remain uncertain, shaped by elections, leadership transitions, regional shocks, and global power shifts. However, this moment, characterized by mutual fatigue, strategic recalibration, and indirect engagement, offers a narrow but vital opportunity to avoid the cycle of escalation that has defined the past two decades.

Notes

[1] Editor’s note: The Saudi-Iran rapprochement started in 2019 when the Saudi-led coalition gradually withdrew its military engagement in Yemen. It was further apparent when the diplomatic détente was brokered by China in 2023. Thomas McMullan, “Saudi-Iran Rapprochement Signals Shifting Regional Power Dynamics in the Middle East,” Australian Institute of International Affairs, November 25, 2024

[2] Editor’s note: On September 27, 2024, Israel attacked Hezbollah’s headquarters in Southwest Beirut. During this attack senior officials and Hassan Nasrallah were killed. “Au Liban, l’armée israélienne multiplie les raids aérien contre le Hezbollah,” Le Monde, December 28, 2024



To cite this article: “Iran’s Strategic Outlook on U.S. Relations in a Shifting Middle East” by Lyna Ouandjeli, EISMENA, 06/06/2025, [https://eismena.com/analysis/irans-strategic-outlook-on-u-s-relations-in-a-shifting-middle-east/].

The information and opinion contained in the articles on the EISMENA website are solely those of the author(s) and do not engage the responsibility of the institute.

Share this article

UNIFIL: a stabilisation mechanism whose withdrawal is a source of concern for humanitarian actors

Based on a field mission to Lebanon conducted by EISMENA in October 2026, this article examines the implications of the scheduled end of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), expected to begin in December 2025, and the uncertainties surrounding its gradual withdrawal. Drawing on observations gathered during the mission, several interviews with Lebanese interlocutors and international ones, and a discussion with L’Oeuvre d’Orient, it analyses the role of the UN force in maintaining security arrangements, as well as in facilitating humanitarian access to isolated border communities. The testimonies collected highlight a less frequently discussed aspect of UNIFIL’s mandate: its role as an operational intermediary in delivering aid to civilian populations. As international discussions on its replacement remain marked by disagreements, the article examines the security, humanitarian and institutional consequences of its departure, as well as the Lebanese state’s ability to effectively assume its responsibilities in the south.

Read More »

Trump, Putin and Xi: Real Diplomacy or Political Theatre?

Speaking on France 24 on 18 November 2026, EISMENA Director Adel Bakawan examines whether talks between Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping can break the deadlock over Iran. He argues that Tehran’s more assertive military strategy and competing US–Iranian restrictions around the Strait of Hormuz leave Gulf states, civilians and shipping exposed to further escalation. Meanwhile, Trump’s demands and expectations of a rapid agreement clash with Iranian priorities—and with Russian and Chinese interests.

Read More »

Unity of the Kurdistan Region: A Historic Initiative to Break the Deadlock Between the KDP and the PUK?

In an interview with Kurdistan 24 on 16 November 2026, Dr Adel Bakawan, Director of the European Institute for Studies on the Middle East and North Africa (EISMENA), firmly rejected any prospect of dividing the Kurdistan Region. As tensions between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) fuel concerns about the Region’s institutional future, he distinguishes media confrontations from the reality of political relations between the two parties. He maintains that their contacts remain daily and reveals the existence of a serious attempt to launch a historic political initiative to break the current deadlock.

Read More »

Related Articles

UNIFIL: a stabilisation mechanism whose withdrawal is a source of concern for humanitarian actors

Lyna Ouandjeli

Trump, Putin and Xi: Real Diplomacy or Political Theatre?

Adel Bakawan

Unity of the Kurdistan Region: A Historic Initiative to Break the Deadlock Between the KDP and the PUK?

Adel Bakawan

The Switzerland of the Middle East? Jordan’s Manufactured Stability and the Illusion of Reform

Alice Filiberto

The War Trump Dreams To Win

Hichem Karoui

Rewarded Either Way: Morocco, the EU and the Paradox of Border Externalisation after Ceuta

Amelia Aguirrezabal Ortega