[Lyna Ouandjeli] The events that have occurred before and after October 7, 2023, have profoundly altered the equilibria in the Middle East. This regional upheaval has had contrasting repercussions: some states have found themselves further weakened, while others, like Saudi Arabia, have returned to the forefront with renewed vigour. Lebanon, for its part, remains a battered country. Despite the many crises it is going through, whether they are economic, sectarian, or security-related, it is nevertheless trying to regain its place on the regional stage. This attempt at recovery however, remains severely hampered by internal structural factors, as well as persistent border tensions in the south of the country. My first question will focus on the political-economic aspect of the country and how you analyse Lebanon’s political-economic collapse: is it the outcome of a long process of structural weakening, or the result of a series of more recent shocks (port explosion, banking crisis, institutional deadlocks)?
[Christian Taoutel] Of course, Lebanon reached a breaking point in 2019, marked by a tragic financial collapse which continues to affect the country’s population and economy profoundly. It would, however, be simplistic, perhaps even naïve, to attribute this crisis solely to recent events such as the Beirut port explosion, the Covid-19 pandemic or protests, sometimes wrongly labelled as a “small revolt”, that took place the same year. The roots of this collapse are much older and go back to the implementation of the Taif Agreement in the 1990s, which brought an official end to the civil war while also laying the foundations for a Pax Syriana. This framework led to the consolidation of an economic system based on clientelism, with a division of the country between the former warlords, now reconverted into political or economic players. In this context, an actor like Hezbollah has obtained a semi-official status along with an arms monopoly, despite the opposition of a silent majority within the population. This legitimisation was achieved through a series of agreements supported, or at least tolerated, by the Syrian trusteeship, a presence that oscillated between gentle influence and real occupation.
Alongside this, the economic model was structured around clientelist capitalism. The country’s reconstruction, instead of enhancing national projects, was entrusted to private initiatives in the hands of influential figures. The city centre of Beirut, for instance, was redesigned by a private company, Solidere, which belonged to Rafic Hariri. The south of the country also saw private firms leading reconstruction projects. In other words, the post-conflict redeployment benefited a selected few, often the winners of the war, with Syria’s blessing. This model rested on an architecture of the banking sector based on 1960s-1970s Switzerland, characterised by rigid bank secrecy, ripe for corruption, money laundering and an opacity which suited many actors, including some Lebanese. The interest rates offered by the banks were particularly attractive – 10%, 12%, sometimes even 15% – which encouraged massive deposits. This system would allow the middle and working classes to live beyond their means through payments by instalments: cars, trips, consumption goods. But this money was often nothing more than a writing game, with no tangible reality in the vaults.
This arrangement also benefited neighbouring powers. Multiple businessmen from the Gulf invested in the country through the purchase of beaches, hotels, restaurants, without any tax liability in their countries of origin. Lebanon thus became a regional platform for money laundering, strengthening an economy based on rents and privileges. This led to a massive debt with an amount close to $90 billion. Added to this is the destruction caused by successive conflicts, the 1996 War, the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, the 2006 War, and the tensions that continue to this day. Each war meant reconstruction, often overpriced: for instance, a tunnel leading to the city centre of Beirut is said to have been covered with fractured tiling costing several thousands of dollars per metre. These projects allowed a political-economic elite to increase their wealth while redistributing the benefits to their support bases in a clientelist, fragile manner. It is in this systemic context that the 2019 collapse took place. Of course, the port explosion, the global health crisis, international pressures all exacerbated the situation. But originally, it is a profoundly corrupt and unequal governance structure which led to the country’s bankruptcy. When the state found itself unable to reimburse its debts, it drew directly from the population’s savings, blocking or seizing banking assets. Today, citizens do not know who to talk to: the banks blame the state, while the latter denies any implication. This is Lebanon’s current situation.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] What conditions would be required to get the Lebanese people to trust the state and its institutions again? This question is important as we cannot ignore that in the south of the country, Hezbollah has undertaken the role of the state and (this interview took place in April 2025) is attempting to make a comeback to maintain its influence. Joseph Aoun is trying to rebuild the country and “re-unite” it.
[Christian Taoutel] Listen, there is obviously still a lot to be done to get Lebanon out of the current deadlock. But if we had to simplify the answer, two conditions are of fundamental importance. Without them, there cannot be any recovery, whether it’s economic, financial or even psychological. The first condition is stability from a political and security perspective. Lebanon will never be able to bounce back as long as the south of the country remains under Israeli occupation, as long as Israeli drones continue to fly daily above national territory and bomb positions identified as belonging to Hezbollah. At the same time, no stability can be achieved as long as two armies coexist on Lebanese soil, one of which – Hezbollah – operates on the margins of the state legal framework. Sooner or later, this parallel force will need to surrender its weapons and be integrated within the institutional apparatus or, at least, within Lebanese society in a pacified manner.
The second condition is financial: it is a matter of trust. To take a personal example, I will not deposit a penny in a Lebanese bank until I have retrieved all the money that was seized from me in 2019. I have worked my entire life to establish savings, and all that was taken from me overnight. Even if a prestigious institution like the Vatican Bank opened a branch in Beirut, I would not place my money there unless past losses have been made up for. Trust cannot be decreed: it has to be won back. In a nutshell, two elements are absolutely essential to hope for a sustainable reconstruction of Lebanon: on the one hand, security and political stability; on the other, the restoration of financial trust. And this starts very simply with a judicial gesture: the state must give its citizens their money back.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] It is a fundamental element, and I think the banks can play a key role in the restoration of trust. Can we therefore speak today of a “refoundation from the bottom up”, carried by local, economic, educational or cultural initiatives, that prepare for the future despite general collapse?
[Christian Taoutel] It is important to highlight that in Lebanon, the private sector, whether we are talking about schools, hospitals or even the hotel industry, has managed to keep up working, and this despite the extremely difficult conditions the country is experiencing. This resilience is considerable. However, to restore a minimum amount of trust between the citizens and the state, a fundamental measure needs to be taken: the restitution of seized funds. A first step, elementary but essential, would consist of offering a reimbursement mechanism over a reasonable period of time, for instance five and ten years, but not beyond that. If the state put in place such a reimbursement plan, trust would probably start being restored and some, myself included, would consider progressively investing in the country again. In the absence of any concrete solution, it is unrealistic to hope for a massive return of investments, whether they originate from the inside or from the Lebanese diaspora. These potential investors, often high in capital, will not take the risk of committing their resources in a country that is not offering any guarantees, neither on the financial side, nor on the security one.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] Given growing tensions on the southern border, especially since October 7, 2023, to what extent is Lebanon threatened by military escalation with Israel? Is such escalation contained or in an extension process? Some elements allow us to consider both leads, especially with the violations of different ceasefires.
[Christian Taoutel] With the arrival of a new president and a new Prime minister, a more promising dynamic seems to be settling in within the Lebanese government. The state is doing its best to avoid a renewal of the conflict. But an essential question still needs to be answered: is it really up to Lebanon to decide whether it is going to war? The last cycle of violence has exploded independently of Lebanon’s actions or wishes. There is broad consensus today that the fighting that has occurred in the south of the country is governed by a logic of confrontation between Iran and Israel. Lebanon, in this configuration, is merely a sound box in which great powers – Iran, the United States, Saudi Arabia – exchange messages and adjust positions. When diplomatic rapprochement is underway, tensions on the field find themselves intensified to increase weight in the negotiations; on the contrary, in times of relaxation, hostilities subside. In other words, the decision to kick off the violence is not in the hands of the Lebanese government, not even the hands of the national armed forces who do not wish for war to return. Today, those who hold the real capacity to rekindle the conflict are, on the one hand, Israel with a political leadership pursuing internal goals, such as keeping Prime Minister Netanyahu in power, who is seeking military victories in Gaza and Lebanon to avoid legal proceedings; on the other, Hezbollah. Although its members are Lebanese, that does not mean it represents the will of the Lebanese nation. It is still strongly linked to Iran, which could exert pressure to renew confrontation in the south. That being said, it is still difficult to this day to assess to what extent Hezbollah is truly ready, or even capable, to start a new full-scale war.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] Hezbollah has been weakened by the beeper attacks, the destruction of its HQ and the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah. I will therefore ask two questions at the same time. How do you assess Hezbollah’s position today in the Lebanese landscape, both as a political actor integrated within the system and as an autonomous armed force? Is its role stabilising or blocking a dynamic of national refoundation?
[Christian Taoutel] Your question is complex because it covers several major issues simultaneously. What needs to be understood is that Hezbollah lags behind the Taif Agreement by 35 years. All militias that had taken part in the Lebanese civil war were dissolved in 1990, laid down their arms, or were integrated within the national armed forces. All… except Hezbollah. We are today at a tipping point: a decision needs to be made. If this decision were truly up to Lebanon, Hezbollah would have surrendered its weapons a long time ago, perhaps even sold or dismantled its arsenal. But again, this choice does not depend only on Lebanon’s will. What proof do we have of this? Recently, the Iranian ambassador in Beirut made a declaration in complete contradiction to that of the Lebanese Republic. He was summoned by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to explain himself. This shows that Iran acts alone, without consulting with Lebanese authorities, and instrumentalises the territory for purposes that are not those of Lebanon.
At the same time, Israel is maintaining constant pressure on Lebanon, through daily aerial flyovers, drones and even sometimes targeted strikes. This presence, visible, audible and humiliating, is the source of permanent provocation. When one walks on the streets in Lebanon and hears these drones over their heads, it is a humiliation, psychological violence. And until a foreign power, whether it is American, European or something else, intervenes to bring the heat down, there is a real risk for escalation. We are at a pivotal moment: Hezbollah has to choose. Either it decides to become a true political party like all the others registered in the Lebanese Constitution, and accepts the rules of the democratic game, including elections, or it remains outside the national frame, marginalised, with all the associated consequences. Because unfortunately, by persisting down this road, Hezbollah is leading an entire community, the Shia community, to a form of isolation. The latter is being stigmatised, blamed, almost perceived as the nation’s “scapegoat”, while the majority of its members simply aspire to live in peace like any other citizen. Hezbollah, by refusing to integrate itself fully within the Lebanese system, is holding this community hostage.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] Finally, one of the major challenges for Joseph Aoun will be to successfully embody national unity and represent the entire Lebanese population. That implies, among other things, to integrate Hezbollah within the institutional frame but in a way that is clearly defined, with firm limits, far from the freedom it has benefited from in the margins until now. Do you think such an objective is achievable in the short term, or is it a perspective still too far away in the current context?
[Christian Taoutel] We will not be able to change the Lebanese political system in the years to come, and it is not the confessional system in itself that is the source of all woes. The problem is a larger one: it is the regional actors that have been holding the country hostage for decades. Israel, in the south, exerts constant pressure. For over 60 years, Syria dominated the Lebanese scene, an influence that has faded since the weakening of the Assad regime. But even Syrians today do not know what the future holds for them.
The last remaining actor is Iran, which is continuing to negotiate with the United States and leading proxy wars through Arab non-state actors like the Houthis, the Hashd al-Sha’bi, Hezbollah, or Shia militias in Syria which are, it is important to bear in mind, mainly made of Arabs. Today, these proxies are weakened, as you have mentioned, which means moving away from this regional logic and returning to a strictly Lebanese framework. Hezbollah, in this context, is fully invited to reintegrate the national political game. In the past, its ministers have been recognised as serious, including those running the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of the Environment. Some of its MPs have even initiated important laws for the country. It is therefore in the interest of Hezbollah to return to a national political logic, rather than locking itself in a military role that has become inefficient, as proved with the walkie-talkie (or also known as the beeper) attacks that you have mentioned: an attack that came from the inside, not the outside, demonstrating a serious security breach and potential infiltration. It is time for Hezbollah to reassess its role. The military option is not viable; political integration, on the other hand, can offer a beneficial path for everyone.
