[Ambrine El Massaoudi] The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been ongoing for years. Hamas having long been a key player, it is important to understand the movement properly. You are a specialist of Hamas. You have written a book called Hamas: Palestijns nationalisme en militant pragmatisme (in English, Hamas: Palestinian Nationalism and Militant Pragmatism), so your insight would be most relevant. First of all, could you elaborate on the circumstances surrounding the founding of Hamas in 1987?
[Joas Wagemakers] As I explain in my book, Hamas emerged out of a context marked by both Palestinian nationalism and a form of militant pragmatism. Its roots lie in the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, more specifically, the Gaza branch of the Brotherhood. At the time, this branch was relatively isolated and politically quietist. While the Muslim Brotherhood generally maintained a pragmatic stance, the Gaza chapter was particularly detached from political life. It did not engage in direct political activity regarding Israel and even cooperated with Israeli authorities in certain contexts. Although the Brotherhood viewed Israel as an adversary, their opposition was primarily rooted in religious, rather than nationalist, reasoning. In fact, Palestinian nationalism was not a defining feature of their early ideology.
This began to change in the early 1980s (particularly around 1983) when individuals with strong ties to Palestinian refugee camps and a deeply felt sense of Palestinian national identity began joining the Brotherhood. These new members were not only devout Muslims but also highly politicized Palestinians, and they gradually rose in influence within the organization. Their presence shifted the internal dynamics of the Gaza Muslim Brotherhood, pushing it toward a more nationalist agenda. By the time the First Intifada erupted in 1987, all major Palestinian factions, along with many unaffiliated individuals, were actively participating in resistance against Israeli occupation. The Muslim Brotherhood, however, remained largely on the sidelines. It was at this moment that some within the Gaza Brotherhood argued for the creation of a new organization—one that could participate more directly in the uprising. This led to the establishment of Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Resistance Movement, more commonly known as Hamas.
The decision to found Hamas was driven not only by the Brotherhood’s evolving political and nationalist orientation but also by strategic considerations. The leadership believed that if the Intifada proved successful, they could claim credit for having contributed through Hamas. Conversely, if it failed, they could distance themselves by framing Hamas as a separate entity–”it wasn’t us who failed, it was Hamas.” This dual logic–combining ideological evolution with political calculation–is why I describe Hamas as having been born out of a tradition of Palestinian nationalism and militant pragmatism. The founding of Hamas in 1987 reflects both the internal transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood and the broader context of the Palestinian struggle at the time.
[Ambrine El Massaoudi] I see, we can thereby say that the founding ideology of Hamas is nationalism. You briefly mentioned Palestinians outside the movement. Could you tell us more about the way Hamas’s image within the Palestinian population in Gaza, the West Bank and the diaspora has evolved since 1987?
[Joas Wagemarkers] Hamas’s image has, in many ways, both deteriorated and improved over time. It is widely perceived as an Islamist group, as a movement that uses violence–including, at times, terrorist tactics–and as a nationalist organisation. All of these characterisations are accurate, and depending on one’s perspective, they are viewed either positively or negatively. In that sense, public perception of Hamas has remained relatively consistent. Many Palestinians continue to see Hamas as a movement committed to resisting Israeli occupation through armed struggle, and this unwavering stance earns them admiration from a significant portion of the population. At the same time, others–also among Palestinians–hold Hamas responsible for the current situation. Some argue that if Hamas had refrained from launching the October 7, 2023, attacks–which, it’s important to note, were carried out not only by Hamas but also by other groups, though Hamas played the leading role–Israel might not have retaliated so severely, or the current war might not have erupted. So on one side, Hamas is still admired by many for continuing the armed resistance against Israel. On the other hand, it is increasingly blamed for the consequences of its actions. These opposing views now coexist.
Another important dimension to consider is the shift in Hamas’s role after 2006. Prior to that year, Hamas functioned primarily as a political, militant, and social organisation. However, after winning the 2006 elections in both Gaza and the West Bank, and following the internal power struggle that culminated in 2007 with Hamas assuming control of Gaza, the movement began to be perceived differently. Over time, Hamas developed a reputation for authoritarianism—being accused of abusing its power and suppressing civil liberties. To be fair, Hamas has argued that many of these abuses were carried out by individuals acting independently rather than by the government itself, and there is some truth to this. For instance, Hamas has never officially implemented Sharia law in the Gaza Strip. Nonetheless, its consolidation of power in Gaza, coupled with the marginalisation it experienced in the West Bank at the hands of Fatah and the Palestinian Authority, has contributed to this perception. All in all, it is difficult to deny that Hamas has become more authoritarian and repressive over time. In some respects, it has come to resemble other regimes in the Arab world in its intolerance toward dissenting views. This growing authoritarian character is another reason why public opinion of Hamas has become more negative in certain circles.
[Ambrine El Massaoudi] Since its inception, Hamas has been in direct confrontation with Israel, both militarily and politically. How would you describe the evolution of this conflictual relationship over the years?
[Joas Wagemakers] The relationship between Hamas and Israel has undeniably become increasingly violent over time–something that likely comes as no surprise. Hamas was founded during the First Intifada. At that time, Palestinian resistance was largely non-military: people threw stones, engaged in protests, strikes, and civil disobedience. It was not an uprising defined by suicide bombings or large-scale attacks. That changed over the years. In 1994, Hamas carried out its first suicide bombing against Israeli civilians—a major turning point that marked the beginning of a new, more violent phase in the conflict. Since then, the number and intensity of attacks have waxed and waned, with a dramatic escalation through the October 7, 2023 attacks. But this increase in violence has not only come from Hamas. Israel, too, has increasingly relied on military responses, including targeted assassinations of Hamas leaders and the current war in Gaza, of course.
Another important aspect of this evolving relationship is ideological. Over time, Hamas has shown signs of coming to terms with the existence—though not the legitimacy—of the State of Israel. This does not mean Hamas is ready to formally recognise Israel’s right to exist, but it has increasingly accepted its presence as a fait accompli. Even as early as 1988, just a year after its founding, Hamas co-founder Mahmoud al-Zaharreportedly reached out to Israel to propose some form of long-term ceasefire. Since then, many Hamas leaders have reiterated that they would be open to a hudna—a truce or temporary agreement—based on pre-1967 borders. This position has been echoed repeatedly and was formally reflected in Hamas’s 2017 political document. Unlike the original 1988 charter, which was rife with antisemitic rhetoric and conspiracy theories and rooted in the ideological and religious vision of the Gaza Muslim Brotherhood, the 2017 document marks a significant evolution. While it stops short of recognising Israel or endorsing a two-state solution explicitly, it expresses willingness to accept a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, provided there is national Palestinian consensus. This idea has always existed to varying degrees but has been increasingly formalised over time. Nonetheless, Hamas continues to reject the idea of Israel as a legitimate state, primarily because it considers Israel to occupy 78% of historical Palestine—recognition, in their view, would imply justification.
On the Israeli side, the approach to Hamas has been more inconsistent—marked by cycles of tolerance and hostility. When Hamas first proposed dialogue in 1988, Israel dismissed the group as insignificant. In fact, during the late 1980s, Israel even allowed Hamas to function relatively freely, before Hamas began its attacks. Once the violence started, Israel cut off all ties and designated Hamas a terrorist organisation. Interestingly, there were also periods of indirect accommodation. For example, in the years leading up to October 7, 2023, Israel allowed Qatari funds to flow into Gaza and support Hamas’s administration. The intention, from the perspective of the Israeli government, was strategic: to demonstrate to the international community that while Hamas governed Gaza, Israel still lacked a viable Palestinian peace partner. This undermined the momentum of the peace process—an outcome that suited Israel’s leadership at the time. That dynamic, however, was irreversibly altered by the events of October 7. Since then, Hamas has come to be viewed in Israel with a level of revulsion and fear comparable to how the United States perceived Al-Qaeda after 9/11.
In sum, the trajectory of the Hamas-Israel relationship has been shaped by two key trends: a steady increase in reciprocal violence, and an ideological evolution within Hamas toward pragmatic acceptance of Israel’s existence (though not its legitimacy), contrasted with an increasingly hardened, rejectionist stance from Israel, especially in recent years.
[Ambrine El Massaoudi] That leads me to my next question: how have Hamas’s attacks on October 7 marked a turning point in Israel’s internal politics, foreign policy and security strategy?
[Joas Wagemakers] It really depends on whom you ask. The current Israeli government is composed of officials who are firmly committed to destroying Hamas. However, I don’t believe this is a realistic objective. Hamas is too deeply embedded in Gaza, in Palestinian society, and in the broader context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to be dismantled without addressing those underlying issues. Israeli society today is overwhelmingly united against Hamas. Many now view the destruction of Hamas as a higher priority than the return of hostages, believing that unless Hamas is eliminated, similar attacks will happen again. From this perspective, eliminating the group is seen as the only way to prevent future threats. I’m not a military expert, so I can’t speak in depth about security strategy. But it’s clear that the trauma of October 7 has created an unprecedented level of consensus in Israel on the need to confront Hamas.
Even protests against the Israeli government today tend to focus not on Palestinian suffering, but on domestic issues–such as the government’s judicial reforms–and especially on the demand to bring back the hostages. These are not pro-Gaza demonstrations; they are centered on Israeli concerns. The grief and anger following October 7 are so overwhelming that they leave little room for broader reflection on the humanitarian situation in Gaza or the actions of the Israeli army there. Only a minority continues to focus on what is happening to Palestinians, maintaining a critical eye on the unfolding situation in Gaza.
[Ambrine El Massaoudi] We know that Hamas has been helped by different countries, Iran, for instance. To what extent do regional actors support Hamas’s armed capabilities?
[Joas Wagemakers] This is partly a military matter, and I don’t have definitive answers on that front. What is clear, however, is that Iran has long supported Hamas and the broader Palestinian cause. After the 1979 revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini established Quds Day (or Jerusalem Day), as an occasion for Muslims worldwide to express solidarity with Palestinians and to protest the Israeli occupation. Since then, the Iranian regime has consistently positioned itself as both pro-Palestinian and pro-Islamist. Qatar has also supported Islamist movements, especially during the Arab Spring. While many regimes–such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia– turned decisively against Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar (alongside Turkey) remained one of the few regional powers that continued to back these groups. As for the extent of financial or military support Qatar or Iran has provided to Hamas, I cannot say with certainty. Those details remain unclear.
Ambrine El Massaoudi: The situation of Hamas in Gaza is also weakened. To what extent can Hamas be described as experiencing organisational fragmentation in Gaza?
[Joas Wagemakers] That’s a very good question, but I don’t think we can speak of clear internal divisions within Hamas today. Historically, the movement has always included both hawks and doves. While all factions support the use of violence against Israel and see it as justified, they differ in how readily they resort to it. Some believe that peace with Israel is unattainable and that armed struggle is the only viable path. Others are more pragmatic, advocating for temporary ceasefires to provide relief for the population, even if they still endorse the broader goal of resistance. Yahya Sinwar, the former leader of Hamas in Gaza, and his brother Mohammed Sinwar, who succeeded him, are examples of hardliners who represent the more aggressive, militaristic faction within the group. But overall, the differences within Hamas are more about tactics than strategy. All members share the core belief that Israel is occupying Palestinian land, and that violent resistance is a legitimate response. While many Hamas members have been killed in recent months and have been replaced by recruits, there is no evidence of significant internal transformation. The movement’s ideological foundation and overall strategic direction remain largely unchanged, both internally and externally.
[Ambrine El Massaoudi] Can we not say that there is a loss of centralised control within Hamas?
Joas Wagemakers: Hamas has always shown a high degree of unity ideologically, practically, and strategically. While its leadership is not centralized, it functions through several parallel structures: one based in the West Bank, one in the Gaza Strip, another among members in Israeli prisons (who are regularly consulted), and an international leadership that has included figures like Khaled Mashal and, until his assassination in 2024, Ismail Haniyeh. Local leadership also exists with its own hierarchies. Despite this decentralization, Hamas has remained remarkably coherent in its messaging and objectives. This cohesion is grounded in a long organizational history, rooted both in the Muslim Brotherhood and in shared ideological principles. These include Islamic thought—particularly the concept of dar al-Islam—which sees the existence of a Zionist Israeli state as illegitimate, as well as anti-imperialist and anti-colonial frameworks that view Israel as a colonial entity. All factions within Hamas agree on the justification of violent resistance. Tactical disagreements do exist, but the overarching strategy has remained consistent.
For example, around fifteen years ago, when Hamas governed Gaza and sought to maintain calm by stopping rocket fire into Israel, some radical Salafi-jihadi groups opposed this approach. In response, Hamas used its governing authority to suppress them. A few members of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s military wing, disagreed with this restraint and defected to more extreme groups. But these tensions were limited to the armed wing; the political leadership remained firmly in control and unified. There have also been earlier debates within Hamas–such as whether to participate in formal politics–but even these were ultimately resolved internally. Overall, the differences within Hamas have been tactical rather than strategic, and relatively minor. That internal discipline is one of the reasons the organization has not fractured.
[Ambrine El Massaoudi] Do you think a credible political future is possible if the movement abandoned armed struggle?
[Joas Wagemakers] That is a difficult question. Hamas is unlikely to abandon armed struggle, as it sees this as its foundational purpose. From Hamas’s perspective, Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) gave up armed resistance too early and, as a result, secured nothing in return. For Hamas, maintaining military capacity is the only effective way of putting pressure on Israel to withdraw its troops and provide Palestinians with a state of their own. While Hamas rejects disarmament, it has consistently shown openness to a long-term hudna (truce). Ceasefires of ten, twenty, or even fifty years have been proposed, as long as the status quo is acceptable to Hamas.
Looking ahead, if the current war ends with a lasting ceasefire, Hamas is likely to remain a central actor in Palestinian political life. It could participate in future elections and retain significant public support, particularly in Gaza, where it is deeply embedded. Even if the organization re-emerges under a different name –what some might call “Hamas 2.0” — it is unlikely to disappear as long as the core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remain unresolved.
[Ambrine El Massaoudi] So this goes to my last question, to what extent do you think a sustainable truce between Israel and Hamas is conceivable?
[Joas Wagemakers] A sustainable ceasefire appears unlikely. As seen in January, past ceasefires have been short-lived due to fundamentally opposing objectives. Hamas’s primary goal is to end the war. From its perspective, the October 7 attacks already achieved their aims: international visibility, renewed focus on the Palestinian cause, and increased global solidarity. With little left to gain militarily, Hamas sees the hostages as its last bargaining chip—one it is willing to trade only in exchange for a total cessation of hostilities.
While Hamas may show flexibility on issues like the number of prisoners released or the pace of Israeli withdrawal, it remains firm on the core demand: a permanent end to the war. This is precisely what Israel refuses. During the last truce, both sides adhered to phase one, but Israel rejected phase two and three, which required military withdrawal and a permanent ceasefire. For Hamas, those phases were the reward; for Israel, they were unacceptable. The Israeli government, particularly Prime Minister Netanyahu and far-right ministers like Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, has politically tied itself to the goal of destroying Hamas. Any ceasefire perceived as falling short of that risks bringing down the governing coalition. Netanyahu’s current political strength—bolstered by recent confrontations with Iran and Hezbollah—also gives him little incentive to compromise. Even with American pressure, a ceasefire may only hold temporarily. As long as one side demands the war’s end and the other seeks the destruction of its opponent, a durable agreement remains out of reach.
