In Sudan, Militias Have A Long History

Since independence on January 1, 1956, the Sudanese government has relied on the same defense system in every conflict in the peripheral regions of the vast Sudan[1]: the creation of local militias as counter-insurgency forces. Recruited on a community or clan basis, often led by a military officer from the same background, these forces compensated for the army’s lack of manpower.

The long war of independence of South Sudan has led to the first big wave of auxiliary militias of the Sudanese army. During the 1980s, the Sudanese government armed multiple militias against separatist rebels. In southern Darfur and Kordofan, bordering rebel zones, it established Arab militias composed of Misseriya, Rizeigat, and others. In rebel-held areas, the government also formed African tribal militias composed of Bari, Mandari, and Murle, hostile to the separatist movement led by the Dinka. In 1989, the Sudanese government legalized and organized all these tribal militias by creating the Popular Defence Forces, defined as “paramilitary forces” under the command of the Chief of Staff of the Sudanese army and serving to support the established army[2].

During the Darfur conflict (2003–2005), the Sudanese authorities employed the same defense system. They armed and equipped the Janjaweed, Arab militias, to fight the rebels of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Given the lack of infantry in the Sudanese army, the Janjaweed militias became the spearhead of the war in Darfur. Their attacks against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa populations of Darfur were often coordinated with Sudanese air force bombings.

The success of the Janjaweed led to the expansion of their recruitment to numerous Arab tribes in western Sudan and to the formalization of their existence. Baptized the Rapid Support Forces in 2013 (RSF), they became an official force in 2017, with a military structure and a commander (Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemeti) designated no longer by the army’s Chief of Staff but by the President himself[3]. Responsible for guarding borders and providing mercenaries in the war between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, the RSF became a second army, with larger manpower than the established one, proper financial resources, and independent command. President Omar al-Bashir rewarded them by appointing their commanders to various official positions and relied on this praetorian guard to maintain his hold on power, even against his own army. However, the RSF was unable to prevent the president’s removal by the army, and, after the Chief of Staff (General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan) and the RSF leader neutralized the transitional government in 2021, Sudanese politics turned into a tense standoff between the army and the country’s main paramilitary force. The tension crystallized around the integration of the RSF into the regular army, demanded by General al-Burhan. This issue is at the root of the war that has raged since April 15, 2023.

Toward the Militia State

With this new war, which exceeds previous ones in scale, the militia’s militarization has reached a new stage. Whereas militias were previously concentrated in the troubled peripheries of Darfur and Kordofan, they grew in number and geographic extend, appearing in regions where they were absent before the war, such as the north (River Nile State) and the east (Red Sea State) of the country.

Given the country’s vastness, since the beginning of the conflict, each camp has pursued a policy of alliances with local militias and has created its own war coalition to control as many states as possible. At the beginning of the conflict, the RSF was joined by the Sudan Shield Forces of Abu Aqla Kikal, based in Gezira State in central Sudan, whose numbers are estimated at between 35,000 and 75,000 militiamen. Likewise, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North faction led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu fights alongside the RSF in South Kordofan. The army, on the other hand, is supported by armed groups such as the United Popular Front (an eastern militia), JEM and SLA (Minni Minawi faction), two Darfurian militias opposed to the RSF, and an Islamist militia (the al-Bara’ Ibn Malik Brigade)[4].

On the battlefield, some of these militias play a strategic role. For the past two years, the RSF’s siege of El-Fasher, the only city in Darfur they do not control, has failed due to the resistance of JEM and SLA. To control the Eritrean border without weakening the front, the Sudanese army has relied on a new militia called the Eastern Cohort[5]. Similarly, at the beginning of the conflict, the Sudan Shield Forces contributed to the RSF’s conquest of Gezira State, considered Sudan’s breadbasket.

Yet these local forces have their drawbacks. On the one hand, they weaken war coalitions by easily switching alliances. Abu Aqla Kikal’s Sudan Shield Forces defected in October 2024 and now fight alongside the army. The army seeks to attract other militias allied with the RSF by warranting them amnesty and integration into its ranks. On the other hand, given their community-based origins, they prioritize their own agendas (intercommunal conflicts, territorial conquests, looting, etc.) and operate autonomously. They obey their own leaders more than the army or RSF command. Thus, after joining the army, the Sudan Shield Forces committed massacres against civilians[6]. To prevent looting and violence that would turn public opinion against the army, after retaking Khartoum, General al-Burhan asked the militias that had assisted him to leave the capital. He is attempting to regain control of these militia forces by announcing their integration into the army[7].

The ongoing war has led to widespread militia activity, further fragmenting Sudan. The policy of using militias as auxiliary forces threatens national unity. Sudan is not merely divided between the RSF and the army but also among numerous largely autonomous armed groups[8]. These forces exacerbate intercommunal tensions and intend to obtain territories and official positions after the war. The militia state risks being torn apart by its own militias.

Notes

[1] Sudan is a federal republic made up of 18 states, with a territory of 1.8 million square kilometers.

[2] Jago Salmon, A paramilitary revolution: The Popular Defence Forces, Small Arms Survey, Genève, 2007. Popular Defence Forces Act, République du Soudan, 1989

[3] Rapid Support Forces Act, République du Soudan, 2017.

[4] Zeinab Mohammed Salih, “Militia aligned with Sudanese army accused of executing men in Khartoum”, The Guardian, 19 décembre 2024.

[5] “Militia’s arrival in eastern Sudan raises fears of wider conflict”, Sudan Tribune, 2 novembre 2024.

[6] “Sudan: Armed Group Allied to the Military Attacks Village”, Human Rights Watch, New York, 25 février 2025.

[7] “Sudan’s Military: Burhan integrates allied forces into the army”, Middle East Monitor, 18 août 2025.

[8] Mat Nashed, “Sudan’s competing authorities are beholden to militia leaders, say analysts”, Al-Jazeera, 23 juillet 2025.