In recent years, Turkish and Israeli policies toward Syria have undergone a profound transformation. What once appeared as a convergence of interests—driven by a shared objective to overthrow Bashar al-Assad’s government—has gradually evolved into open divergence. The contrast between Ankara’s and Tel Aviv’s strategic outlooks on both the Syrian conflict and the Gaza war has sharpened tensions, giving rise to an increasingly confrontational discourse. This escalating rhetoric reflects not merely diplomatic friction, but the emergence of a deeper strategic fracture and a widening geopolitical rivalry between the two regional powers. Following the consolidation of control by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) over large swaths of northern and eastern Syria, Ankara placed the dismantling of the quasi-autonomous administration east of the Euphrates at the top of its national security agenda. Yet, the rapid evolution of the Syrian conflict soon transcended this narrow objective, transforming Syria into a vast geopolitical arena where Turkish and Israeli visions of the country’s political and security future now collide.
From Israel’s perspective, Turkey’s growing influence represents a strategic impediment to the concessions Tel Aviv seeks to extract from Damascus. Israel has thus sought to reshape both the political and media narratives to its advantage, portraying Turkey as the new threat supplanting Iran’s role in the Syrian theater. While this perception only partially aligns with the realities on the ground, it nonetheless serves as a potent rhetorical and strategic instrument—one that advances Israel’s broader regional and international objectives.
Conversely, Ankara perceives Israeli interventions as a direct challenge to its ambitions in Syria. Turkey’s approach rests on reinforcing the authority of the Damascus government, not as an endorsement of the regime itself, but as a means to prevent the emergence of federalism and to secure its primacy within the evolving Syrian political order. In doing so, Ankara seeks to redefine the balance of power in Syria—positioning itself as both a guarantor of sovereignty and a central arbiter of the post-war political landscape.
History of Turkish-Israeli Relations: From Cooperation to Tension
Historically, Turkish-Israeli relations have fluctuated between cooperation and tension. In 1949, Turkey officially recognized the State of Israel, becoming the first Muslim-majority country to do so. Over the following decades, the issue of genocide has been central to both countries: the Armenian genocide, in particular, is a defining event for contemporary Turkey, whose diplomacy aims to deny its reality and prevent its recognition. For its part, the Holocaust during World War II was a driving force that accelerated the creation of Israel in 1948.
In this context, Israel supported Turkey’s position denying the Armenian genocide and avoided provoking Ankara by recognizing it[1]. For example, the Israeli government put pressure on the organizers of the International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide, held in Tel Aviv from June 20 to 24, 1982 – the first major symposium in the field of genocide studies – due to the presence of files on the Armenian genocide, denied by Turkey. Ankara threatened that if the conference were held in Tel Aviv, it would close its borders to Syrian and Iranian Jews fleeing persecution, thus endangering their lives[2]. These threats prompted the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs to attempt to cancel the conference; the official Holocaust memorial in Israel, Yad Vashem, along with many prominent participants, withdrew[3].
In the 1990s and early 2000s, relations developed significantly: both parties established military and economic partnerships, including joint exercises and intelligence exchanges. This period, dubbed the “golden years,” saw a build up of mutual trust and an intensification of cooperation in free trade, military training, arms contracts, technology transfers, and intelligence sharing.
However, this positive momentum did not last. Political developments quickly generated new tensions. The “Mavi Marmara” incident in 2010 marked a negative turning point: ten Turks were killed aboard a flotilla attempting to break the blockade of Gaza. Tensions worsened due to Turkey’s growing support for the Palestinian cause and its harsh criticism of Israel’s policy in Gaza. Subsequently, the events of October 7 opened a new chapter of degradation, despite attempts ease tensions: restoration of diplomatic relations, exchange of ambassadors, and the visit of Israeli President Isaac Herzog to Ankara in March 2022, the first in fourteen years. According to Ankara, Israel’s pursuit of genocidal crimes in Gaza and its disregard for international appeals and decisions prompted Turkey, in August 2024, to formally request joining South Africa’s case before the International Court of Justice against Israeli leaders, marking a transition to a level of open legal and diplomatic confrontation. Furthermore, the fall of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024, created a power vacuum that Turkey and Israel sought to exploit, leading to the current situation. While Turkey supported opposition groups – foremost among them Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – after their takeover of Damascus, Israel focused on securing its borders and preventing the redeployment of hostile forces in its neighborhood, turning the Syrian crisis from a local issue into a multidimensional regional conflict.
The following events heightened tensions: in August 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recognized the Armenian Genocide in a radio interview – a first in Israel, although no official Knesset decision endorsed it. This gesture was perceived as an escalation toward Turkey, especially given Ankara’s political support for Hamas and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which de facto controls Damascus, in the face of Israeli plans to reconfigure Syrian geopolitics and fragment the territory. Under the effect of accumulating tensions, and due to Israel’s pursuit of policies contrary to Turkish interests in Syria and its alleged crimes in Gaza, Ankara announced the closure of its airspace to Israeli aircraft (including military and governmental aircraft) and decided to break off commercial relations with Tel Aviv. This measure, a genuine escalation in bilateral relations, is likely to have far-reaching economic repercussions, especially since Turkey is going through a difficult economic period and the pressure on Israel would be strong if fully applied: trade between both countries reached approximately $7 billion in 2023; Turkey was Israel’s fifth-largest supplier; Israeli exports to Turkey were between $1.5 and $1.6 billion; and Turkish goods represented about 6% of Israel’s total imports.
Looking back at the historical evolution of Turkish-Israeli relations, it appears that the Palestinian factor has not been the decisive determinant, although it has had a notable influence. However, the entry of Syria into the Turkish orbit of influence introduces a new and more complex dimension to these relations, potentially with profound political repercussions on their future nature.
Recent Developments
After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government, the Syrian scene underwent a series of developments clearly revealing the depth of the Turkish-Israeli dispute. Among the most significant were the intensification of Israeli military operations, with more than 950 airstrikes conducted against various sites in Syria since the collapse of the Syrian government, and the occupation of new areas in the south of the country, with over 450 ground violations of Syrian sovereignty. With the outbreak of clashes between Bedouins and Druze and the attempt of Syrian forces to intervene in Suweida, Israel intensified its operations in inland Syria. On July 16, 2025, it conducted raids targeting several areas, including government installations in the heart of Damascus. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu justified these operations by asserting that Israel was “determined to prevent harm to the Druze in Syria, based on the deep fraternal alliance that binds us to our Druze citizens in Israel.”
Conversely, the Turkish position has become more firm: Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated on the local channel NTV that “Turkey has warned that it would intervene to prevent the partition of Syria, after noting that some groups are exploiting what happened in Suweida.” In the same spirit, Defense Minister Yaşar Güler announced, at the beginning of the Assad government’s collapse, his country’s willingness to provide military support to Syria. With the escalation of retaliatory acts on the Syrian coast, the continuing fighting between Druze and Bedouins in the south, and the SDF’s persistence in maintaining control of their areas with direct US support, the need for closer security and military cooperation between Ankara and Damascus became imperative.
However, the reality on the ground shows that the Syrian army faces heavy challenges: poor training, collapsed institutions, lack of a professional structure, not to mention the ideological allegiances and radical ideas dominating the armed groups that replaced the regular army. All this makes it difficult to restore security and control the borders, placing an additional burden on Turkey in its efforts to build Syrian forces capable of operating institutionally. Simultaneously, Israel has intensified its intervention in Syria, whether through political and military support to the Druze or by potentially opening channels with Kurdish forces in the north, in addition to the continuation of air strikes, which have become the main threat to the unity of the Syrian state. This intervention relies on a discourse of “protecting minorities against extremist groups,” used to justify Israeli expansion in the region, as demonstrated by the events in Suweida. This intervention became clearer on August 28, 2025, when Israeli forces bombed Syrian sites after the discovery of Israeli espionage devices in Jabal Mana’, near Damascus, and around Masyaf, causing a new military escalation. Simultaneously, on August 13, 2025, the Syrian and Turkish Ministries of Defense signed a security agreement. In light of the chronology of events and Turkish declarations, the acceleration of Israeli interventions has not hindered the Syrian-Turkish rapprochement, but has rather pushed Damascus to further lean on Ankara as a strategic option to counterbalance the pressures.
Under this security agreement, Ankara has effectively begun training Syrian forces. Reports published by Middle East Eye indicate that Turkey trained approximately 300 Syrian agents in a first phase and plans to soon extend the program to over 5,000 personnel, signaling a shift in Syrian-Turkish relations from simple political coordination to the building of direct security and military partnerships. The Israeli bombing of Doha can be considered as a message also addressed to Turkey: the Turkish-Israeli dispute is now intertwined from the Palestinian scene to the Syrian front. From Israel’s perspective, the main goal is to neutralize any threat emanating from Syria or Palestine. Even after this bombing, leaks in Israeli media suggested that Tel Aviv had initially considered striking Hamas leaders in Turkey. These developments illustrate the expansion of Turkish-Israeli competition, especially in Syria, which has become a major theater of the regional conflict between the two countries.
Israel’s Strategic Objectives in Syria
To understand the prospects of Turkish-Israeli rivalry, one must consider the strategic objectives of each party. The Israeli vision in Syria is fundamentally opposed to Turkey’s approach. This became clear during the meeting on August 28, 2025, in Galilee, between Benjamin Netanyahu and the spiritual leader of Israel’s Druze community, Sheikh Mowafaq Tarif, along with several Druze dignitaries, during which the Prime Minister outlined Israel’s priorities on the Syrian stage:
- Protection of Druze communities: This includes the province of Suweida and the areas extending from the Golan to the south of Damascus, with Israel seeking to present itself as the protector of minorities against sectarian violence.
- Creation of a demilitarized zone: Extending from the Golan Heights to Suweida, to prevent threats from approaching Israel’s border.
- Establishment of a humanitarian aid corridor: Linking Israel to Suweida, under American mediation, to provide relief and strengthen Israeli influence.
Netanyahu addressed the head of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Abu Mohammed al-Joulani: “I am not naive. I fully understand who we are dealing with and what we are facing,” assuring that “there will be a settlement,” and that any agreement must guarantee the security of the Druze. This language indicates a strategy aimed at transforming the South into an Israeli sphere of influence and buffer zone. Some observers see this as a stage of a broader project called the “David Corridor” stretching to the Euphrates; for now, efforts seem confined to Suweida, and the discourse of Druze protection lends legitimacy to these orientations. The indiscipline of the fighters of the “new Syrian army” and the crimes committed in the south and west of the country serve external agendas of interference in Syria.
Leaks concerning talks in Paris between Israel and Syria report Netanyahu’s demands in the context of a security agreement: military restrictions in southern Syria, prohibition of deploying heavy weapons and major equipment, prevention of massive rearmament of the Syrian army, freedom of operational action for Israel in Syria, and Syria’s renunciation of the Golan. Added to this would be an informal clause aiming to prohibit the establishment of Turkish military bases in Syria. It appears that Israel ultimately seeks to weaken Syria and turn it into a submissive and easily penetrable state, a “punching bag” that it can strike at will.
Turkey’s Strategic Objectives in Syria
Current data indicates that Turkish-Syrian relations are trending toward a higher degree of integration. The advisory support and training provided by Ankara could evolve into the establishment of military bases on Syrian territory. If the security agreement signed between Turkey and Syria is applied, Ankara would have a direct capacity to supervise the reform of the Syrian military institution and respond to threats such as the SDF. To date, Turkey exerts direct influence within Syrian security institutions; during the last training of 300 agents, a Syrian government spokesperson even indicated not having been informed, which reflects the extent of Turkish influence in the military machine. However, Turkish ambitions in Syria clash with Israel’s complex regional security calculations, whose approach is to prevent the strengthening of Syrian military capabilities. The construction of a centralized security apparatus in Syria therefore directly contradicts Tel Aviv’s strategic lines.
Furthermore, Turkey considers any entity with autonomy in northern Syria as a threat to its national security. The establishment of a Kurdish autonomy in Syria, alongside federalism in Iraq, could eventually incite the Kurdish society in Turkey to claim similar autonomy. In this regard, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, recalling the events between Druze and Bedouins in southern Syria, declared: “We warn any party against actions aimed at disintegration or partition. Many things can be discussed through diplomatic channels, and they already are with all groups and all parties. But if you cross these limits and resort to violence to divide the country and destabilize it, we will consider that a direct threat to our national security and act accordingly. Discuss what you want, your demands; we will provide all possible support in this regard, but if you cross these bounds, we will not tolerate any threat to our security.”
In the same vein, on September 13, 2025, Hakan Fidan renewed his warning against the exploitation of the Israeli intervention in Syria, stating: “We offer both Damascus and the YPG the opportunity to settle their issues by themselves; at the same time, we expect them to contribute to strengthening general stability in Syria and to address our security concerns.” It can therefore be said that, while opposing the partition of Syria, Turkey fears the emergence of a second autonomous Kurdish entity, in addition to Iraqi Kurdistan on its southern border, and seeks to establish a security influence allowing it to weigh on Syrian political decision-making.
The Balancing Role of the United States and Regional Dynamics
The United States plays a major counterbalancing role between Turkish and Israeli positions on the Syrian file. It seeks to reshape Syria according to its strategic interests through a dual approach:
- Imposing security conditions on Damascus: By aligning with Israeli demands to guarantee concessions.
- Offering Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s leadership a window of opportunity: By granting the Joulani “system” a “chance” conditioned by a Syrian-Israeli security agreement.
The American vision differs from the Israeli one, giving Washington the final say in guiding the policies of its allies. While Israel prioritizes security and expansion, the United States emphasizes broader regional stability. A key question remains: will Syria be restructured into a centralized state or adopt a federal model? The preferences of former US President Donald Trump and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan show some convergence on this point. The Turkish strategy is closely linked to the success of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham: its failure would undermine Ankara’s plans. In this context, Minister Hakan Fidan sought to mobilize support against the YPG (the core of the SDF) at the Munich Security Conference on February 15, 2025. Turkey had previously tried to do so through its forces and the Syrian National Army, then turned to “empowering” HTS as a military force. The results of this approach remain uncertain; if Trump’s support for Joulani waned or if a Syrian-Israeli agreement came into being, Turkey’s margin of maneuver would be reduced.
The United States is currently working to organize a meeting between Syrian leader Ahmad al-Shar’a and Benjamin Netanyahu, with the participation of Donald Trump, on the sidelines of the upcoming UN General Assembly in New York. The planned implementation of the March 10 agreement between Ahmad al-Shar’a and Mazloum Abdi by the end of the year adds additional pressure, reflected in the more assertive tone of Erdoğan and Fidan. In front of the Turkish Parliament, Fidan denounced Israel’s expansion on the Golan and its provocations, affirming Ankara’s refusal to allow the exploitation of components of Syrian society. During the Manzikert celebrations on August 26, 2025, Erdoğan reiterated his commitment to protecting the Syrian people – especially the Kurds – under Turkey’s guarantee, stressing that the forces aligned with Ankara and Damascus would prevail.
On September 4, 2025, the Turkish Ministry of Defense warned the SDF that non-compliance with their commitment to integration into the Syrian army “constitutes a threat to the unity of Syria and to our national security.” The Turkish press suggests that Israel is using the Druze in the south and the PKK in the north. On several occasions, Turkey has threatened not to allow the fragmentation of Syrian unity, targeting autonomy in the north. However, the continuous support for the SDF by the US-led international coalition limits Ankara’s options as long as the balance of power does not change. Turkey is intensifying its efforts to compel these forces to satisfy its conditions, and pressures are expected to increase by the end of the year, depending on the orientation of American policy and the possibility of a Syrian-Israeli agreement.
Conclusion
Analyzing the Syrian arena in isolation from its broader regional context may suggest an inevitable collision between Turkey and Israel. However, a more nuanced examination of Turkish foreign policy reveals a multidimensional strategy grounded in balance, pragmatism, and strategic autonomy. Throughout the years of the Syrian crisis, Ankara has demonstrated a remarkable ability to sustain strong ties with Moscow, despite deep divergences over the Syrian dossier and severe tensions following the downing of a Turkish jet in 2012 and a Russian aircraft in 2015. Following the outbreak of the Russian–Ukrainian war, Turkey further consolidated its coordination with Russia in the fields of energy and regional security, while simultaneously maintaining its commitments as an active NATO member adhering to the principle of collective defense. At the same time, Ankara has preserved a considerable degree of independence in its external relations—engaging in enduring disputes with Greece, a fellow NATO ally, over maritime boundaries, and adopting policy positions that diverge from those of many Western partners, particularly regarding Cyprus.
Within this logic of equilibrium, the disagreements between Turkey and Israel over regional issues—including the Syrian question—fall short of direct confrontation. Their relations remain framed by strategic calculations and overlapping interests, as both sides continue to maintain channels of political and security dialogue to prevent open conflict. This delicate balance is further sustained by the United States’ role in Syria: Washington and Ankara converge on certain aspects of Syria’s future, notably in their shared interest in curbing Iranian influence and diminishing Hezbollah’s capabilities in Lebanon, partly through indirect support for the HTS as a counterweight to Tehran’s regional allies. Within this framework, each actor mobilizes its leverage in Syria to advance its own strategic agenda. Turkey seeks to strengthen the position of HTS and other armed groups it has supported in recent years through security assistance, while portraying itself as a guarantor of Syrian sovereignty in the face of recurrent Israeli interventions. Conversely, Israeli military operations have inadvertently afforded Turkey additional space to consolidate its own security presence in northern Syria.
For its part, Israel views the growing Turkish–Syrian security cooperation with apprehension, mindful of Ankara’s expanding military and technological capabilities, which could constrain the effectiveness of Israeli operations in Syrian territory. Consequently, Israel seeks to frame Turkey as an emerging regional threat, leveraging this narrative to influence U.S. policy toward Syria and secure greater strategic concessions. In this regard, Israel perceives the current phase as an opportunity to neutralize Syria’s residual military potential through a security framework that legitimizes continued Israeli intervention under the pretext of defending its borders.
Notes
[1] Bedross Der Matossian(ed.), Denial of Genocides in the Twenty-First Century, Nebraska : : University of Nebraska Press, 2023. P.130
[2] Eldad Ben Aharon, A Unique Denial: Israel’s Foreign Policy and the Armenian Genocide, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 42, No. 4 , 2015, pp. pp. 647–648.
[3] Israel W. Charny, . Israel’s Failed Response to the Armenian Genocide: Denial, State Deception, Truth Versus Politicization of History, Academic Studies Press, 2021
