The history of contemporary Iran is fundamentally linked to its oil resources[1]. The first Westerners to take an interest were the British. In May 1901, William Knox D’Arcy (1849-1917), a wealthy English investor, acquired a sixty-year concession from the Grand Vizier of Tehran and Shah Mozaffar-ad-Din (1853-1907). It was a huge territory, equivalent to twice the size of Texas. This was therefore an important victory for Britain over Russia in their attempts to claim ownership of the oil corridor around the Persian Gulf. It was also of great strategic significance for the British Empire. In 1911, Winston Churchill (1874-1965), the then First Lord of the Admiralty, oversaw the transition of the Royal Navy fleet from coal power to oil.  Possession of black gold became critical during the First World War. Fuel is as crucial as blood in the battles of the future: this expression of Georges Clemenceau (1841-1929), leader of the French government, is still famous. It appears in a letter he sent to US President Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) on 15 December 1918[2].

In the years after the Great War, the US Congress debated the issue of raw materials, and especially oil resources, given the difference between, firstly, the production and identified reserves of the United States and, secondly, the consumer needs of American society. The report by Under Secretary of State Frank L. Polk (1871-1943) which President Wilson delivered to the Senate on 17 May 1920, and which then received a great deal of media attention, revealed a notable anti-British sentiment concerning the restrictions imposed on US oil tankers in the British colonies. These restrictions also applied in other countries in which the English took care to secure resources and establish monopolies for their own benefit. The Polk report established that, in Persia, the Americans had been pushed out due to the fact that the Anglo-Persian Oil Companyhad exclusive rights over any oil concession for a period of thirty years from 1901. The report highlighted that this privilege had been strengthened by the Anglo-Persian agreement of 1918, which placed all the civil, military and financial authorities of the Persian State under the control of Great Britain. The negotiations between London and Washington were difficult, but over the following years British and American business interests and foreign ministries endeavoured to establish a formal understanding which exceeded both the ambition of a British hegemonic system and the vision of a transparent and enlightened capitalist world that was being advocated on Wall Street at the time.

On the threshold of the new global conflict, oil would become the British nightmare[3], as highlighted by the historian Ervand Abrahamian, Emeritus Professor at Baruch College and the University of New York.

1. Relations between Iran and the United States before the Islamic Revolution (1941-1979)

Whereas, at the start of the Second World War, the influence of Germany in Iran was tangible, the country represented a real challenge for the Allies, particularly after the German army attacked the USSR. At the end of August 1941, the Russians and British invaded Iran and divided it into two zones of occupation. The Shah Reza Khan Pahlavi (1878-1944), having been accused of Axis sympathies, was deposed in favour of his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1919-1980). The objective was to cut off the German’s route to the Gulf and India from the Germans and enable a direct connection, via the Trans-Iranian Railway in particular, to supply Russia while it was at war. The British also wanted to protect their oil interests: the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which had become the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, had existed in the region since the start of the century. It was the third-largest oil producer in the world, and 51% of its capital belonged to the British Crown[4]. 

While the Russians and British had a long-standing influence over Iran, especially in military and economic matters, it was at this point that the Americans entered the frame. It was also in Tehran that Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill held their first joint conference, from 28 November to 2 December 1943. All three affirmed their desire to maintain the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran[5]. At the end of the conflict, the American presence grew, particularly through the support of the new Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to whom the Allies handed control of the army[6], even if this presence was obstructed for a while by the nationalism of Mohammad Mosaddegh (1881-1967).

With a Doctorate in Law from the University of Neuchâtel, Mosaddegh was an Iranian deputy and founder, in 1949, of the Jebhe Melli (National Front of Iran)[7]  which tried to unite the right and left in a national project. This included the ambition – and therefore a threat for the British – of nationalising the oil resources from which Iran benefited very little. Appointed Prime Minister in 1951, he achieved this objective through a proactive policy which included significant land reform and social policies. However, the actions of Mosaddegh, who, during the so-called Abadan crisis, nationalised the British refineries and created the National Iranian Oil Company, resulted in thousands of British technical experts leaving Iran. As Iran lacked expertise in oil production and processing, production was halted. The British, who regarded this nationalisation as outright plunder, sought to discredit Mosaddegh, threatened Iran militarily, imposed an embargo and brought actions, unsuccessfully, before the International Court of Justice in The Hague and the United Nations. The following years, which also saw the rise of Nasserism in Egypt, gradually led to chaos in Iran. Firstly, Mosaddegh’s position became more radical, despite US mediation efforts and financial support for Iran and, secondly, relations between the Iranian authorities themselves – the shah, the Prime Minister, Parliament and the clerics – deteriorated. At a time when the world was divided by the Cold War between the Soviets and the Atlantic powers, and the influence of the communist Tudeh Party of Iran was increasing, Mosaddegh approached the Russians in an attempt to compensate for the departure of the British technical experts. This decision followed the refusal of France and the United States to make up for the British desertion. New economic agreements were signed with Moscow in June 1953. The power struggle between Mosaddegh and the Shah, who was supported by the Americans, was won by the latter, after a genuine coup d’état on 19 August 1953. General Fazlollah Zahedi (1892-1963) seized power in favour of the Shah and became Prime Minister. The CIA and MI6 played a crucial role in this operation. 

The coup put an end to a degree of democratisation of the country in favour of strengthening the power of the Shah. The regime change enabled the Western companies, in particular, to resume their oil exploitation through a consortium in which the Iranians were not represented. The financial return from the oil exploitation remained fairly low for Tehran. It is clear that the altered role of the United States, from the mediator to the stakeholder, had tarnished Washington’s image among a section of Iranian opinion. At the same time, the strategic interest of the Western Allies was combined with that of the American oil companies, who at that time occupied an important place in the new consortium, the Iranian Oil Participants. The British only had 40% of the shares in this consortium, on a par with the Americans. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company disappeared and changed its name to British Petroleum, the company that markets its oil in Great Britain.

Although Mosaddegh had exercised caution regarding the Iranian Communist Party, which he had long kept at a distance, anarchy and the West’s refusal to help him pushed him, to a certain extent, towards the USSR, which in reality could do little for him. The influence of the United States became dominant from 1954, and, the following year, Iran joined the Baghdad pact (Central Treaty Organisation – CENTO), the American containment tool for the Middle East against the Soviet Union and the risks of communist expansion. Allen W. Dulles (1893-1969), former head of covert operations and then director of the CIA from 1953 to 1961, clearly explained the reasons for supporting the Shah, pointing out that Mosaddegh had come to power through normal government processes, with no real intention of creating a communist State, but that, from the American perspective, once he expressed the intention of steering Iran towards a communist State, it was legitimate for the United States to offer external support to groups whom Dulles described as loyal and anti-Communist. For the head of the CIA, by applying the law of force instead of the law in their international behaviour, the communists would leave no option other than countermeasures if vital American interests were at stake. In that case, he wrote, there would be little point in simply appealing to their best intentions or invoking the rules of international law[8]. This is particularly clear.

Nevertheless, during the 1960s, the Shah endeavoured to normalise relations with the USSR through various cooperation agreements, including through the purchase of military equipment. The Iranian leader also paid an official visit to the Soviet Union in 1968. However, US pressure on the Iranian government remained very strong during this period[9].

In the 1960s and 1970s, the modernisation of the country continued, notably through the White Revolution, which was full of good intentions but caused much resentment. At the same time, the Shah’s authority strengthened further over society which generally seemed to accept it, with the exception of certain intellectual circles, particularly students and the clerics whose powers were greatly weakened by the reforms. Opposition was harshly repressed, with Tehran University being closed on several occasions, The number of arrests, court cases and executions increased, including in response to assassinations such as that of the head of military justice in 1971. In 1975, the Shah ended the party system in favour of a single party: the Rastakhiz (the Resurgence Party). Thanks to its oil revenue, Iran became the fifth-largest military power in the world[10]: its armed forces were equipped by the United States and Great Britain. The country became increasingly westernised. In the eyes of the world, Iran was America’s policeman in the Gulf and its most faithful ally. These changes ran counter to both religious traditions and democratic thinking, and a large section of Iranian society rejected a governance model which had become very repressive. Islamic-progressive terrorist and Marxist movements emerged in the country, and were suppressed by SAVAK, the feared internal security organisation set up with the help of the FBI and Mossad[11]. 

2. The Islamic Revolution disrupts geopolitical stability and challenges relations between Washington and Tehran  

At the end of the 1970s, the political and social situation in Iran worsened and opposition became more widespread and gained ground, resulting in harsh repression such as that experienced in Qom in January 1978 and in Jaleh Square in Tehran in September 1978. As early as December 1978, concern had been expressed by certain American intellectuals and researchers, such as James A. Bill[12], Assistant Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Texas in Austin:

From the point of view of the American national interest, the time is long past to raise some fundamental questions about the future. The very importance of Iran to the United States suggests that Washington policymakers ought to be concerned about the attitudes toward America of any possible successor regime to the Pahlavis, and how to help shape these attitudes favourably. If time is not on the Shah’s side, is it prudent to continue to support him fervently to the very end? Is it politically wise to help him buy a few more weeks, months or even years of time? What has been American foreign policy toward Iran in the past and what might it be in the future?

The belated efforts of the Shah to liberalise the regime failed to prevent the rise of all kinds of opposition groups, embodied by the figure of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989), a long-standing political adversary living in exile in Iraq and then France. The revolutionary movement accelerated in early 1979 with the return of the religious leader to Iran and, as a result, the exile of the Shah to Egypt. The Shah had lost the support of the United States and was seriously ill. The Islamic Republic was proclaimed after the referendum of 31 March 1979. This was the result of a complex combination of nationalism, political populism and religious radicalism. It brought to an end a 2500-year-old Persian monarchy.

The stated ambition of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Republic was to establish an egalitarian society founded on religion, the Unity of God and the Universe, as would have existed at the time of Muhammad and Ali. Some observers, therefore, such as the Le Monde journalist André Fontaine (1921-2013), claimed that the Iranian Revolution was the most important political phenomenon since the Russian Revolution of 1917[13]. Masoud Kazemzadeh regarded this Islamic fundamentalism as a reaction to modernity, encapsulating the notion of a return to an idealised, mythologised golden age. Kazemzadeh, a political scientist and professor at the University of Houston, compared it to European fascism. Above all, it involved the establishment of a theocracy. But far from representing a return to the Middle Ages, the Islamic Republic was actually a revolutionary institution which transformed the role of the Shiite clerics in society, giving them a crucial political role[14]. Through its spiritualism, this revolution directly impacted the capitalist and communist models by exalting social austerity and equality and, at the same time, denouncing the imperialism of Washington and Moscow. Khomeini, as the Comintern had done previously, also called on all Muslim peoples to rise up against their governments, which were deemed corrupt and tyrannical. In fact, liberties were rapidly restricted in Iran: the religious leaders re-established Sharia law and abolished the family law which protected women against polygamy and repudiation. They also banned both jazz and pop music. However, by adopting some very egalitarian social measures, even though these were sexist to the detriment of women, and by sharing out confiscated goods, Khomeini won support among the large numbers of ordinary people[15].

Relations with Israel and the United States became strained when the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat (1929-2004) visited Tehran. Tensions between revolutionary political groups arose and then erupted in clashes. The Revolutionary Guard Corps emerged around Khomeini and became the bulwark of the regime. Whilst the Iranian Kurds tried to secede, the Shah’s departure for the United States provoked an anti-American campaign. It was clear that Washington had greatly underestimated the consequences of welcoming Pahlavi in the USA. This inept decision led, on 4 November 1979, to the attack on the United States embassy in Tehran by Islamic students. With Khomeini’s backing, they took around fifty hostages and demanded that, in exchange for their freedom, the United States should hand over the Shah so that he could face Iranian justice. An intercession for their release from United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim (1918-2007) was met with intransigence from Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council.

The intervention of 50,000 Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan on 27 December 1979 created a dramatic backdrop to an already drastic situation, adding a new episode in the Cold War in that part of the world to religious fundamentalism. When, with the aim of calming the situation, US President Jimmy Carter (1924-2024) stated that there were no fundamental differences between Tehran and Washington in an attempt to normalise relations between the two countries, neither the President of the Islamic Republic nor the European envoys nor the UN were able to make the Islamic student hostage takers back down. The failure of the American attempt to free the prisoners by force on 24 and 25 April 1980 resulted in the deaths of eight American soldiers and only served to worsen the situation, heaping humiliation on humiliation.

But the situation changed. In September 1980, the Iraqi Saddam Hussein (1937-2006) sent his troops into Iran. As the major powers’ strong man, whose role was to contain the Islamic revolution, he was financed by the Arab oil monarchies and had access to the most sophisticated weapons, supplied by the Americans and the French among others[16]. The change in the situation was also marked by the death of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in July 1980 and the end of the presidency of Jimmy Carter, who was replaced by Ronald Reagan (1911-2004). The remaining 52 American hostages, who had become problematic, were freed in January 1981. Nevertheless, the impassioned ideas and rhetoric of an Iranian Islam which claimed to be universalist had been proclaimed to the world from the American embassy in Tehran for 444 days and had spread powerfully throughout the Muslim world. Their impact was particularly felt in the Shiite communities and wherever Iran’s forward defence strategy was beginning to be established, especially in Lebanon[17].

Rather than an ideological, strategic or economic clash, the difference between the United States and Khomeini’s Iran appeared to be civilisational and constitutes structural hostility[18]. But perhaps we can also talk in terms of ideologisation of religion. Nevertheless, the Islamic Revolution had a considerable economic and military heritage at its disposal. The Iraqis learned this to their cost until 1988, in the bloody war they unleashed on the Shatt-al-Arab. 

3. 1980-2026: a complex chain of events that spreads violence and causes war  

It seems impossible to trace a linear process of development between the events of the 1980s and those of 2026. A recurring theme in some sections of the media is the humiliation experienced by the Americans during the 1979 hostage crisis. It is described as an open wound and, nearly 50 years later, an honourable reason for instigating a new conflict. It seems that Donald Trump himself remains scarred by this event, as a tweet of 4 January 2020 shows… 

3.1. Is Iran central or peripheral to the conflicts in the Middle East? 

It is, however, questionable whether the dispute between the United States and Iran is at the heart of the conflicts experienced by the Middle East since the end of the 20th century. It is important to remember that the Persian Gulf region has suffered a series of wars involving the United States. First, there was the Iran-Iraq war of 1981 to 1988 which resulted in nearly a million deaths, and during which diplomatic relations between the Americans and the Iranians were broken off. The tension reached its climax in April 1988 with a direct confrontation between US and Iranian marines and, in July 1988, with the destruction by the US Navy of the Iranian Airbus Iran Air 355 which was on a scheduled flight from Bandar Abbas to Dubai with 290 people on board, along with the clashes that have taken place in the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran had claimed, and was still claiming in 2022, that this conflict between the Iraqi Baathist dictatorship, supported by the Western powers, including Russia, and the Arab states, affected and would continue to affect relations with those countries for decades to come. There is little doubt that this war, waged in the name of the sacred defence of the Persian homeland, bolstered the Islamist regime[19].

Next, in 1990, when Saddam Hussein tried to take over Kuwait, his army was crushed by a Washington-led coalition. Then came the Shiite-influenced uprising in the Iraqi provinces, which was violently suppressed by the Republican Guard of the Iraqi leader with the backing of the United States and the Coalition[20]. The Kurds obtained a form of autonomy and Iraq was then placed under supervision. During this period, bloody attacks were perpetrated in which the hand of Iran could be seen through its proxy forces such as Hezbollah Al-Hejaz. For example, one of the most spectacular attacks was carried out by the allies or representatives of Iran against the Americans in the Middle East in Khobar (Saudi Arabia) in 1996.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States were directed by the Saudi Osama bin Laden (1957-2011). Iran had no direct responsibility in these events, but that did not prevent George W. Bush from including it in the Axis of Evil in opposition to the civilized world. Afghanistan, an al-Qaeda refuge, was attacked by Washington and its allies, resulting in a conflict that raged for over twenty years – the longest war the Americans had waged in their history. In 2003, Iraq was then once again drawn into conflict. The Baathist regime – and therefore the whole country – was punished and devastated by a new coalition, without any international legitimacy and under the pretext of possessing weapons of mass destruction. Even though Tehran denounced the aggression, it was in fact a blessing and a strategic gift in favour of Iran, which saw its primary threat disappear[21]. The way to jihadism was therefore opened up by the third Gulf War, the emergence of the Islamic State in 2006, and the coalition of 22 countries against Daech in 2014. Amid this chaos, Iran seemed to be a stabilising factor on a number of occasions when Daech, as an extremist Sunni actor, threatened the Iranian Shiite regime and its allies in Iraq and Syria. The Revolutionary Guards took action against Daech and the Islamic State (IS) from 2014 onwards by supporting the Shiite militia with manpower and financial and military resources. The Iranian general Qasem Soleimani (1957-2020), commander of the Quds force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, embodied this undertaking. In Syria, he supported Bashar al-Assad and mobilised battalions of his Lebanese ally Hezbollah. He was assassinated by an American drone strike in response to the attack on the United States embassy in Baghdad, during the US-Iranian crisis of 2019-2020.

Along with the 9/11 attacks, there were, according to Adel Bakawan, director of EISMENA, two other major factors that contributed to the disintegration of the Middle East[22]: the Arab Spring, the trigger from 2010 onwards of popular uprisings that were initially hopeful – like any spring – but which ultimately gave way to new authoritarian powers and violent clashes, from Tunisia to Syria and Yemen. Then, on 7 September 2023, came a further tipping point: the unleashing of violence on the initiative of the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas, which was then pursued in return by the Israeli government of Benyamin Netanyahu (Likud) and Bezahel Smotrich (Religious Zionist Party). The axis of resistance, constructed by Tehran to respond to the US speech on the Axis of Evil  and to counter Western and Israeli influence in the Middle East, was then blamed. It was attacked on the external borders of Israel, but also in Iran itself on the initiative of Washington and Tel Aviv. This approach appeared all the more surprising since, in the spring of 2023, and for the first time since the 1990s, Saudi Arabia and Iran had begun a diplomatic rapprochement under the influence of China[23].

3.2. The issue of control of the Iranian nuclear programme and its effects

The issue of the Iranian nuclear programme, together with the development by Tehran of a fearsome ballistic capability, underpinned the motives stated by the United States and Israel for attacking Iran. The problem of uranium enrichment had been highlighted since the start of the century on the initiative of Iranian opposition members. Since at least 2002, a chaotic dialogue had existed with the international community on controlling Iran’s nuclear activities[24]. Iran’s nuclear programme goes back a long way: it was launched in the 1950s by the Shah with the support of the United States and Europe and even became a point of friction between the Shah and Washington after 1974. At the time, as was the case in 2006 – when the UN, after being alerted by the IAEA, imposed international economic sanctions – and twenty years later, the Tehran authorities’ defence was to claim that it was a civilian programme and that, unlike Israel, India and Pakistan, Tehran had ratified the 1968 nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The Iranians therefore complained of discrimination against their country. However, it is not merely naive to recognise that Iranian efforts to obtain nuclear weapons would not be absurd if they were not legitimate under the treaty. As highlighted by French historian Thomas Gomart, this ambition reflects above all Tehran’s desire to ensure its security in respect of the United States, Saudi Arabia and Israel[25]. In addition, as stated back in 2009 by Ariel Ilan Roth, a researcher at John Hopkins University, Tehran’s profound dislike of the Jewish state notwithstanding, it is unlikely to attack Israel with a nuclear weapon because Israel’s atomic arsenal is orders of magnitude larger than whatever infant capability Iran could muster in the foreseeable future. Moreover, Israel is believed to possess a secure submarine-based second-strike capability that could devastate Iran. 

In 2015, on the initiative of American President Barack Obama, the JCPOA deal was signed with Iran in Vienna[26], enabling the lifting of sanctions on Iran in exchange for specific guarantees on the limitation by Tehran of its uranium enrichment. Although this deal was signed by the United States, China, the United Kingdom, Russia and France, President Donald Trump, who was obsessed with both Iran and President Obama, withdrew from the accord in May 2018 and took steps to apply maximum pressure on Tehran[27]. However, the Europeans and the IAEA considered that Iran had complied with its commitments in nuclear matters[28]. After 2021, and contrary to expectations, President Joe Biden did not re-establish the JCPOA, maintaining the firm strategy towards Tehran initiated by his predecessor. It was only when the Iranians accelerated their uranium enrichment programme that the White House resumed negotiations. On 10 June 2025, Vali Nasr, Professor of International Relations at John Hopkins University, wrote that:

Of course, U.S. negotiations with Iran may stall, and Washington could return to a more confrontational course with Tehran. Such an outcome would likely prolong regional conflict and foreclose any possibility of further Arab-Israeli normalization in the near term. But if a deal can be reached, the Gulf states have an opportunity to become the pivot of a new regional order, with axes running through them to Iran, Israel, and the United States. After years of war and turmoil, that might finally offer a real chance to bring stability to the region. 

Three days later, on 13 June 2025, Israel launched fresh bombardments against Iran, as it had done in April and October 2024. On 21 June, the Israeli operation was boosted by the initiative of the American president to bomb three Iranian nuclear sites in what would come to be called the 12-Day War. Donald Trump then claimed that the Iranian nuclear sites had been completely obliterated by his B2 bombers[29]. Not only did a number of experts, including some Americans, doubt his claim, but they also felt that the principal result was that Tehran would make its nuclear programme even more opaque, thus increasing uncertainty within the international community regarding proliferation. It should also be noted that, according to the opinion issued on 10 March 2026 by Julia Masterson, Defence Analyst at Rand Corporation, Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile did not present an immediate threat of militarisation: it was stored as a gas and would need to be enriched further and converted into metal to be used in a nuclear weapon.

The economic sanctions imposed on Iran have certainly had a huge impact on the country: it has experienced a prolonged recession, causing discontent among the population and calling into question the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic, particularly among the younger generation. This is the objective of such sanctions, of course. Public demonstrations have resulted in bloody suppression on numerous occasions – 2009, 2017, 2019[30] – and again from December 2025 to February 2026. The most recent demonstrations were invoked in Washington to call for regime change. But it is questionable whether these events were the motive for American intervention. The aims of the war launched by Donald Trump are still unclear, as is the exit strategy for the war, given that the statements from the White House and US administration officials appear confusing and contradictory.

Conclusion: the questioning of US international leadership

Far from being part of a clear, fluid process, made up of clearly identified causal links, the research subject that is the Middle East appears to be a shifting and particularly unstable system. Its frameworks and structures, resulting from colonisations, wars, partitions and treaties determined long ago by the politics of the Blocs and the Cold War, are collapsing and being replaced by a multitude of emerging realities. In the Middle East, all phenomena are linked, and the relationship between the United States and Iran is the result of Washington’s ties with Israel and Saudi Arabia, Pierre Guerlain, Professor of American Civilisation at the University of Paris X Nanterre, has observed. It is hard to see how this non-linear system might stabilise of its own accord in the short or medium term and, even more so, be calmed through the intervention of external forces.

Listening to successive US presidents claiming that their strategic priorities are in the Pacific and towards China, then seeing them constantly returning to dabble in the waters of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, is a genuine paradox[31]. There is reason to think that it is the thirst for oil that continues to attract them after nearly a century. One might also point to the lack of understanding of Iranian affairs among decision makers in Washington[32]. In any case, as we have seen, the United States has, rightly or wrongly, been sustaining theatres of war in the Middle East for decades. 2026 does not, therefore, seem fundamentally different to what has happened in the Gulf since 2003, despite the haphazard, chaotic and contradictory messages emanating from the occupant of the White House. As was the case during his first term, Donald Trump has not ended wars: he has pursued them, without even managing to explain clearly why or how. As was highlighted in an open letter from Belgian ambassadors published on 21 March 2026, this war against Iran was initiated partly for domestic political reasons by an Israeli Prime Minister subject to an arrest warrant, and by a United States president who attributes no priority to democracy or the rule of law (…) with total disregard for the United Nations Charter and all the rules of international law[33]. Although Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu has often stated that his army has been fighting on seven fronts for more than two years, he says that he can see the hand of Iran behind all these fronts. The most plausible hypothesis is that the United States has allowed itself to be drawn by the Israeli Prime Minister into a war of annihilation against Tehran, with the ambition – constantly repeated for 25 years – of remaking the Middle East[34]. Isolating Iran is consistent with the Abraham Accords signed at the White House in 2022[35]. It is therefore possible to fear the worst in humanitarian terms since, as confirmed by the Institut français des Relations internationales(IFRI), two years of intensive bombardments by the Israelis in Gaza have not eliminated Hamas, even at the cost of at least 50,000 mainly civilian Palestinian deaths[36]. The same devastating logic has definitely been in evidence both in South Lebanon and across the Tehran conurbation in March 2026.

What future can we expect for the new conflict? Unlike previous confrontations, Iran is fighting directly against the United States and Israel, which jointly attacked it and assassinated its supreme leader Ali Khamenei (1939-2026), aged 86. Thus, by forcing a change of leadership under extremely difficult circumstances, the war undoubtedly strengthened the most radical elements of the regime[37]. The international community is conscious of the need to reduce tension in the region. Everyone knows the scale of the risk from seeing so many ships, aircraft, missiles and drones in action in such a small area, bearing in mind that a 9/11-type event could always occur which would destabilise the world even further for several decades.

What is clear is that this crisis directly calls into question the global leadership of the United States which, through the action of its president, Donald Trump, appears to have become the principal troublemaker. Thus, in January 2026, Daniel W. Drezner and Elizabeth Saunders, professors at Tufts and at Columbia, took the view that, during the first year of his mandate, the US president had eroded the very instruments of American power, causing a decline in the hegemony of the United States and transforming it into a revisionist power which is injecting aggression into the international system.

The anarchy that is emerging under Trump, in other words, is more chaotic. It is closer to the more primitive anarchy of the political philosopher Thomas Hobbes — a world of “all against all,” where sovereign power cannot be challenged either domestically or internationally. In this Hobbesian order, driven by a leader who rejects any constraints on his ability to act and who is emboldened by technology to move at a whirlwind pace, anything goes. Order may well eventually emerge from this anarchy, but that order is unlikely to be led by – or to benefit – the United States.

The reckless, unilateral military actions that have been taken in the Middle East threaten not only international security but also global trade. As highlighted by Roxana Niknami from the University of Tehran, each week that the Strait of Hormuz is closed or each one-point increase in the price of Brent above 100 dollars provides arguments for anyone who thinks that American hegemony is no longer a guarantee of reliable stability for the global economy. We must also remember that leadership is expressed not only through power and force of action, but above all through the ability to develop and maintain quality relations with allies, partners and interlocutors in general.

As the allies and partners of the United States have already broadly distanced themselves from the actions of the White House, our conviction is that it might only be the wisdom and initiative of the American people that can restore the equilibrium – albeit precarious – that formerly prevailed in the world.

Notes

[1] This analysis is derived from an interview given to the newspaper Pro-Deo, a publication of the General Student Assembly of the University of Mons Law School, on 10 March 2026.

[2] If the Allies are not to lose the war, then, at the moment of the decisive German offensive, a fighting France must have petrol, which is as essential as blood in the battles of tomorrow. Note du Président Clemenceau pour le Président Wilson, 15 décembre 1917, in Francis DELAISI, Le Pétrole, p. 143-144, Paris, Payot et cie, 1921. – Matthieu AUZANNEAU, Or noir, La grande histoire du pétrole, p. 107, Paris, La Découverte, 2015.

[3] Ervand ABRAHAMIAN, A History of Modern Iran, p. 100, Cambridge UK – New York, Cambridge University Press, 2018. – For a general overview of the Iranian issue, one might start by referring to Touraj ATABAKI ed., Iran in the 20th Century. Historiography and Political Culture, London/New York, I.B. Tauris, 2009.

[4] M. AUZANNEAU, Or noir…, p. 230-231.

[5] Herbert FEIS, Petroleum and American Foreign Policy, p. 23-24, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1944.


[6] E. ABRAHAMIAN, A History of Modern Iran…, p. 101.

[7] Masoud KAZEMZADEH, The Iran National Front and the Struggle for Democracy: 1949–Present, p. 8sv, Berlin, De Gruyter Contemporary Social Sciences, 2024.

[8] Allen DULLES, La technique du renseignement (The Craft of Intelligence), p. 288 et 301, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1964.

[9] Robert MANTRAN, L’Iran, enjeu ou partenaire, in Encyclopaedia Universalis, vol. 9, p. 99, Paris, 1968.

[10] E. ABRAHAMIAN, A History of Modern Iran…, p. 128.

[11] E. ABRAHAMIAN, A History of Modern Iran…, p. 129.

[12] James A. BILL, Iran and the Crisis of ’78, in Foreign Affairs, December 1, 1978.

[13] Kenise MOURAD, Iran, L’an I de la révolution islamique, dans Universalia 1980, Les événements, les hommes, les problèmes en 1979, p. 286, Paris, Encyclopaedia Universalis, 1980. – In 1981, Robert Gilpin, Professor of International Affairs at Princeton University, wrote: It would be foolish to suggest, for example, that the great revolutions of the twentieth century (the Russian, Chinese and perhaps Iranian) have not had a profound impact on world politics. R. GILPIN, War and change in World Politics, p. 203, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981.

[14] Stéphanie ROZA & Amirpasha TAVAKKOLI, Lumières et antilumières en Iran, Un siècle de lutte politique, p. 231, Paris, PUF, 2026. – Jean-Pierre DIGARD, Bernard HOURCADE et Yann RICHARD, L’Iran au XXe siècle, Entre nationalisme islam et mondialisation, Paris, Fayard, 2007.

[15] Jean GUEYRAS, Iran, Une lutte impitoyable pour le pouvoir, in Universalia 1981, Les événements, les hommes, les problèmes en 1980, p. 283-286, Paris, Encyclopaedia Universalis, 1981.

[16] Pierre-Jean LUIZARD, Les racines du chaos, Irak, Syrie, Liban, Yémen, Libye, Cinq États arabes en faillite, p. 55, Paris, Tallandier, 2022.

[17] Bernard HOURCADE, Iran, in Yves LACOSTE dir., Dictionnaire de géopolitique, p. 814, Paris, Flammarion, 1993.

[18] Clément THERME, Téhéran Washington, 1979-2025, Le Grand Satan à l’épreuve de la Révolution islamique, p. 208 et 216, Paris, Maisonneuve & Larose – Hémisphères, 2025.

[19] Christopher DE BELLAIGUE, What Iran Wants, The Roots of the Islamic Republic’s Conflict, in Foreign Affairs, March – April 2025, February 25, 2025. – Vali NASR, Iran’s Grand Strategy, A Political History, Princeton University Press, 2025.

[20] Adel BAKAWAN, L’Irak, Un siècle de faillite, De 1921 à nos jours, p. 119, Paris, Tallandier, 2021.

[21] Maya KANDEL, Les Etats-Unis et le monde, de George Washington à Donald Trump, p. 161, Paris, Perrin, 2018. – Mahan ABEDIN, L’Iran en Irak, Vers l’hégémonie ?, in Thierry DE MONTBRIAL & Dominique DAVID, RAMSES 2021, Le grand basculement ?, p. 162, Paris, Dunod, 2020. – Cl. THERME, Téhéran Washington, 1979-2025…, p. 222.

[22] Adel BAKAWAN, La décomposition du Moyen Orient, p. 11-13, Paris, Tallandier, 2025.

[23] Clément THERME, L’Iran et ses voisins, Rivalités et rapprochements, in Thierry DE MONTBRIAL & Dominique DAVID, RAMSES 2025, Entre puissances et impuissances, p. 76-79, Paris, Dunod, 2024.

[24] Philippe BOULANGER, Géographie militaire et géostratégie, Enjeux et crises du monde contemporain, p. 249-252, Paris, Armand Colin, 2015. – Ariane TABATABAI, Maximum Pressure Yields Minimum Results, Trump’s favorite foreign-policy doctrine has failed, in Foreign Policy, March 6, 2019.

[25] Thomas GOMART, L’affolement du monde, Dix enjeux géopolitiques, p. 256, Paris, Tallandier, 2020. – Voir aussi André FONTAINE, L’Iran met en avant l’ambition de voir son “rang” reconnu, Monsieur Ahmadinejad ne peut ignorer l’énormité des représailles s’il ouvrait les hostilités contre Israël, dans Le Monde, 18 mars 2009. Au nom de quoi exclure l’hypothèse qu’il cherche plutôt, prenant exemple non seulement sur de Gaulle, mais aussi sur Israël, l’Inde et le Pakistan, à faire reconnaître à son pays, en se dotant de la bombe, le rang auquel il a rarement cessé de prétendre depuis que Cyrus s’est proclamé, au VIe siècle avant J.-C., roi des “quatre coins du monde” et qu’il a repris Jérusalem à Nabuchodonosor pour la rendre aux Hébreux ?

[26] JCPOA: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. – Dorothée SCHMID, Faillite de l’accord nucléaire iranien, Un grave échec pour le multilatéralisme, dans Th. de MONTBRIAL et D. DAVID, Ramses 2019, p. 174-177, Paris, IFRI – Dunod, 2018.

[27] Maya KANDEL, Les Etats-Unis et le Moyen Orient, Entre obsession et éloignement, in Th. de MONTBRIAL & D. DAVID, Ramses 2020, p. 206-209, Paris, IFRI – Dunod, 2019.

[28] Olivier ZAJEC, Une nouvelle ère ?, Défense et stratégie des Etats-Unis après la première année de l’administration Trump, dans Politique américaine, 2018, n°31, p. 115.

[29] Confirmed in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 1 : In Operation Midnight Hammer, we obliterated Iran’s nuclear enrichiment capacity. And, p. 28 : Iran – the region’s chief destabilizing force -has been greatly weakened by Israeli actions since October 7, 2023, and President Trump’s June 2025 Operation Midnight Hammer, which significantly degraded Iran’s nuclear program. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, White House, November 2025

[30] Azadeh KIAN, Le processus révolutionnaire en Iran, De profonds impacts sur la société in Thierry DE MONTBRIAL & Dominique DAVID, RAMSES 2024, Un monde à refaire, p. 268-271, Paris, IFRI – Dunod, 2023.

[31] Damien CAVE, Choe SANG-HUN, Javier C. HERNANDEZ & Eric SCHMITT, Mideast war could help China and change Asia, US shift of military assets to the region means less of a focus on the Pacific, in The New York Times International Edition, March 14-15, 2026, p. 5.

[32] In other words, the politicisation of Iranian issues is proportional to the difficulty of gaining a deep and detailed understanding of matters of concern to Iran (military capabilities, sociological developments, internal struggles within the Iranian regime, nuclear activities, human rights). Cl. THERME, Téhéran Washington, 1979-2025..,, p. 31-32 et 231.

[33] Our translation. Ceci n’est pas notre guerre, in La Libre Belgique, samedi 21 et dimanche 22 mars 2026, p. 34-35.

[34] Dana SOUL, America and Israel’s War to Remake the Middle East, The Perils for the Region – and the Alliance, in Foreign Affairs, March 4, 2026. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/america-and-israels-war-remake-middle-east – – Mark MAZZETTI, Julian E. BARNES, Edward WONG and Ronen BERGMAN, Israël looked for revolt in Iran, It didn’t happen, in The New York Times International Edition, March 24, 2026, p. 5.

[35] Solène LECLERC, Les accords d’Abraham, Vers un nouvel ordre régional de sécurité ? in Thierry DE MONTBRIAL & Dominique DAVID, RAMSES 2023, L’Europe dans la guerre, p. 264-267, Paris, Dunod, 2022

[36] Denis BAUCHARD, Le Moyen-Orient après le 7 octobre, Vers l’embrasement ?, in Thierry DE MONTBRIAL & Dominique DAVID, RAMSES 2026, Un nouvel échiquier, p. 214-217, Paris, Dunod, 2025.


[37] Ilan GOLDENBERG, America has no good options in Iran… in Foreign Affairs, March 23, 2026.