Editor’s note: This article was written few days before the October Israeli Elections.
Introduction
“A burden that humanity can no longer bear” was how Hakan Fidan, the minister of foreign affairs of Türkiye, described Israel following its decision to recognize the Armenian Genocide (Times of Israel Staff, 2026). Fidan urged the international community to condemn Israel, calling it a global “problem.”
Historically, Israel and Türkiye have shared ties dating back to 1949, when Türkiye alongside Iran became one of the first Muslim-majority nations to recognize Israel (Grigoriadis & Nisidou, 2025; von Hein, 2025). As a Western-aligned NATO member during the Cold War, Türkiye had functional ties with Israel at a time when many Soviet-backed Arab states had deeply hostile stances (Athanassopoulou, 2025). As the alliance’s first member from outside Western Europe, Türkiye served as a geopolitical bridge between Europe and Asia and a central actor in confronting Soviet threats during the Cold War. However, the AKP’s rise to power in the 2000s reshaped Turkish foreign policy, placing greater emphasis on solidarity with the Muslim world and more outspoken support for the Palestinian cause (Grigoriadis & Nisidou, 2025). Their relations have gone further down the line in recent years, largely driven by Türkiye’s intensifying criticism of Israel following October 7 (Abramson, 2026). This diplomatic fallout has exposed deep structural fault lines across the Levant and the Eastern Mediterranean, where both regional powers now compete for regional influence.
This collapse raises a realpolitik question: Why did the Israeli government, after 111 years of strategic ambiguity and deliberate parliamentary suppression, choose to officially recognize the 1915 Armenian Genocide?
It is worth mentioning that, in 2018, a bill to recognize the Armenian genocide was introduced in the Israeli parliament; however, the Knesset rejected it by a vote of 41 to 28 (Chernamoryan, 2018).
Jerusalem has once again decided to raise the issue of the genocide to strike back at Ankara. By using history as influence, Israeli leaders inflict real political pain on Türkiye while protecting their own strategic assets. This fallout is part of a competition for influence across the Levant, the South Caucasus, and the Eastern Mediterranean. While the measure was never formally enacted due to the dissolution of the Knesset, Israel used this outcome to keep the threat of permanent recognition hanging over Ankara while preserving its diplomatic flexibility.
Türkiye–Israel Relations: The End of a Strategic Partnership
As the two primary military powers in the Eastern Mediterranean, Türkiye and Israel are currently in a confrontational dynamic, including a personal hostility. The Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, an “antisemitic dictator” (Bronner, 2026).
Türkiye’s support for Palestine, along with Israel’s claims that Ankara hosts and funds Hamas leaders, has increased tensions between the two countries (Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2026). But other, deeper changes have also pushed the relationship further apart. For instance, the collapse of the Assad regime fundamentally disrupted the Levantine balance of power, creating an “army of regional factions” and triggering deep ambiguity over sovereignty. As Anouti (2026) mentions, regional powers are actively maneuvering to reshape the post-Assad order. Ankara seeks a unified, stable Syria to secure its southern border, while Tel Aviv sees Turkey’s expanding military presence near its northern border as a threat. This flared up especially following the Israeli jets that struck northwestern Syria’s Abu al-Duhur Air Base on August 18, 2026 (Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2026). Tel Aviv said it launched the raid to stop an imminent Turkish military deployment. The attack shows that tensions between Israel and Türkiye have gone beyond political disputes. They now compete directly over Syria’s airspace. Israeli security officials increasingly describe Erdoğan’s Türkiye as a “New Iran,” a major threat that they believe is trying to surround Israel across the Levant (Ben Aharon, 2026). Additionally, Israel’s deepening energy and trade trilateral with Greece and Cyprus effectively isolates Türkiye from Eastern Mediterranean energy architecture (Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2026).
Before the recent development, Israel and Türkiye’s relationship from 1948 to 2010 was characterized as “even when fruitful, never simple” (Lindenstrauss, 2025). During the Cold War, interactions were low-profile and guided by Türkiye’s commitment to U.S. and Western security interests. By the 1990s, Türkiye wanted a stronger regional and pro-Western footprint, marked by a decade of close defense, intelligence, and economic cooperation. This alignment continued into the early 2000s under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which initially valued ties with Israel to reinforce its Western standing and position itself as a Middle Eastern mediator. However, following Operation Cast Lead in 2008–2009 and the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010, Turkish policy pivoted decisively away from strategic partnership with Israel to prioritize regional leadership across the broader Muslim world (Athanassopoulou, 2025, p. 325).
Azerbaijan-Israel Relations and the Broader South Caucasus.
For decades, Israel’s security doctrine relied on building partnerships with non-Arab, Muslim-majority nations on the Middle East’s periphery to counter regional adversaries. This doctrine, known as “Peripheral Diplomacy,” found its most successful expression in Baku. In the late 1990s, Israel secured vital energy supplies by tapping into Azerbaijan’s offshore deposits, routing oil through the Turkish transport hub of Ceyhan to bypass Iranian infrastructure (Debre, 2023). Over time, this energy link evolved into a robust security alliance. Today, Baku supplies 40% to 60% of Israel’s oil imports while relying on Tel Aviv for 69% of its major arms supplies, making Azerbaijan a vital strategic partner (Ismayilova, 2026).
This relationship functions as a mutually beneficial exchange. High-tech Israeli defense systems, including drones, loitering munitions, air defense, and AI integration, provided Azerbaijan with the decisive technological edge needed to recapture Nagorno-Karabakh. The logistics behind this alliance run deep. A March investigation by daily Israeli newspaper Haaretz revealed that Azerbaijani military cargo planes made 92 flights to Israel’s Ovda airport between 2016 and 2020, with flight numbers spiking whenever fighting broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Armenia’s Reaction: The Pragmatism of “Real Armenia”
For Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Israel’s decision did not represent a diplomatic success for Armenia. He warned against using the Armenian Genocide as a political tool in Israel’s conflict with Türkiye. “We see no need to respond,” he said, because avoiding the “weaponization of the Armenian Genocide” serves Armenia’s interests (Armenpress, 2026).
Pashinyan’s response follows his “Real Armenia” policy. This policy places the Republic of Armenia, within its internationally recognized territory of 29,743 square kilometres, at the centre of national policy (Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, 2025). It prioritizes state sovereignty, peace with Azerbaijan, and normalization with Türkiye. From this perspective, the government seeks to avoid regional disputes that could undermine these goals.
This position does not mean that all Armenians viewed Israel’s decision in the same way. The Armenian Assembly of America welcomed Israel’s decision as an affirmation of historical truth (Armenian Assembly of America, 2026). The Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem, meanwhile, criticized the removal of the planned Knesset vote and called on Israel to complete formal recognition (PAN.am, 2026).
These responses show a tension between historical justice and immediate state interests. Pashinyan’s government gives priority to normalization and security, while other Armenian voices place greater emphasis on recognition and accountability. Israel’s decision therefore created not only a dispute between Israel and Türkiye, but also a debate among Armenians about the value of genocide recognition when it takes place within wider regional rivalries.
What’s Next?
On June 28, 2026, Israel’s cabinet unanimously approved Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s proposal to recognize the Armenian Genocide. Sa’ar announced the decision to the Knesset two days later and described it as a formal act of recognition by the Israeli government (Knesset, 2026).
The decision not to bring the measure to a parliamentary vote appears to have resulted from Azerbaijani pressure, more than from the election alone. According to an Israeli source cited by Haaretz, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu blocked the vote after the Azerbaijani counterparts contacted the Prime Minister’s Office to express Baku’s objections (Rozovsky, 2026). Sa’ar’s office denied that Netanyahu’s intervention caused the cancellation, but it did not offer another explanation for why the measure was removed from the Knesset agenda (Ghazanchyan, 2026). This further supports that the Israeli officials leveraged the issue primarily to pressure Ankara, only to abandon full legislative enactment when the effort threatened critical security dependencies in Baku.
The Knesset dissolved on July 17, 2026, and Israelis will elect the 26th Knesset on October 27. Because the current Knesset did not vote on the resolution, any further parliamentary action will depend on the next government and the new Knesset. Israel’s relationship with Azerbaijan will likely remain central to that decision. Azerbaijan supplies a significant share of Israel’s oil imports and maintains close security ties with Israel, while Israel has provided Azerbaijan with major defence support (Abramson, 2026). These interests help explain why Netanyahu’s government may have been unwilling to allow a parliamentary vote that could damage relations with Baku.
Conclusion
Israel’s decision to recognize the Armenian Genocide shows how much its relationship with Türkiye has changed. Israel now sees Türkiye as a regional rival, especially because of Türkiye’s growing role in Syria. The decision also gave Israel a way to put political pressure on Ankara.
But the issue is not only about politics. In Israel, the Holocaust is central to the country’s history and identity. Because of this, Israeli leaders have often been careful about recognizing other genocides. They worry that such recognition could raise difficult questions about the Holocaust’s unique place in Israeli public memory. This is one reason why earlier attempts to recognize the Armenian Genocide did not succeed.
Armenia evaluated Israel’s decision through the lens of state survival rather than moral victory. By weighing Tel Aviv’s geopolitical motives against its strategic partnership with Baku, Yerevan recognized the maneuver as a tactical move in a wider regional rivalry. Ultimately, this proves that the genocide recognition was an act of historical justice, but as a live instrument of hard power, national security, and diplomatic leverage.
Reference
Armenian Assembly of America. (2026, June 29). Israel joins 32 nations in affirming the Armenian Genocide. https://www.armenian-assembly.org/post/israel-joins-32-nations-in-affirming-the-armenian-genocide
Abramson, S. (2026, August). Why Israel’s government voted to recognize the Armenian genocide. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/why-israels-government-voted-recognize-armenian-genocide
Armenpress. (2026, June 29). Pashinyan says no response needed to Israel’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide. https://armenpress.am/en/article/1254286
Athanassopoulou, E. (2025). Turkey’s Relations with Israel: The First Sixty-Two Years, 1948–2010. Routledge.
Al Jazeera Centre for Studies. (2026, July 19). Turkey and Israel: Temporary tensions or a clash of major interests? https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/policy-briefs/turkey-and-israel-temporary-tensions-or-clash-major-interests
Anouti, H. (2026, July 28). Rebuilding the Levant: Inclusive state-building post October 7 (Issue Brief). Middle East Council on Global Affairs.
Armenpress. (2026, August 24). Pashinyan calls for end to weaponization of Armenian Genocide. https://armenpress.am/en/article/1258726
Ben Aharon, E. (2026, July 20). Israel’s “New Iran”: What’s really behind the Armenian Genocide recognition vote against Turkey. PRIF Blog. https://blog.prif.org/2026/07/20/israels-new-iran-whats-really-behind-the-armenian-genocide-recognition-vote-against-turkey/
Bronner, L. (2026, August 23). Israel-Turkey tensions expose personal, strategic rivalry between Netanyahu and Erdogan. Le Monde. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/08/23/israel-turkey-tensions-expose-personal-strategic-rivalry-between-netanyahu-and-erdogan_6744883_4.html
Butun, K. (2026, June 29). Armenia opposes ‘weaponisation’ of 1915 events after Israeli recognition. TRT World. https://www.trtworld.com/article/f343c42ea413
Chernamoryan, A. (2018, February 14). Israeli parliament rejects Armenian Genocide bill. Azatutyun. https://www.azatutyun.am/a/29039644.html
Debre, I. (2023, October 6). Israeli arms helped Azerbaijan retake Nagorno-Karabakh, to the dismay of Armenians. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2023-10-06/israeli-arms-quietly-helped-azerbaijan-retake-nagorno-karabakh-to-dismay-of-armenians
Grigoriadis, I. N., & Nisidou, E. (2025). Indispensable enemies: The shifting dynamics of Israeli–Turkish relations (Policy Paper No. 189/2025). Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy. https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Policy-paper-189-Grigoriadis-Nisidou-1.pdf
Ismayilova, A. (2026, March 26). Azerbaijan–Israel relations represent middle power consolidation. The Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/azerbaijan-israel-relations-represent-middle-power-consolidation/
Lindenstrauss, G. (2025). The First Six Decades of Turkey-Israel Relations: Even When Fruitful, Never Simple. Strategic Assessment, 28(2).
Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia. (2025, February 19). The ideology of the Real Armenia: The statement of the Prime Minister in address to the nation. https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2025/02/19/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech/
PAN.am. (2026, July 27). Jerusalem Armenian Patriarchate criticizes Genocide vote removal. https://www.pan.am/en/335383
Rozovsky, L. (2026, July 19). Pressured by Azerbaijan, Israel removed recognition of Armenian Genocide from Knesset’s agenda. Haaretz. https://www.haaretz.com
Sa’ar, G. [@gidonsaar]. (2026, June 28). It’s never too late to do the right thing. I thank @IsraeliPM Netanyahu for his support, and the government ministers for [Post]. X. https://x.com/gidonsaar/status/1806654872911229045
The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia. (2025, February 19). The ideology of the Real Armenia: The statement of the Prime Minister in address to the nation. https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2025/02/19/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech/
Times of Israel Staff. (2026, July 3). Sa’ar accuses Turkish FM of ‘incitement to genocide’ for saying humanity ‘cannot bear’ Israel. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/saar-accuses-turkish-fm-of-incitement-to-genocide-for-saying-humanity-cannot-bear-israel/
Von Hein, S. (2025, June 13). Why are Iran and Israel sworn enemies? Deutsche Welle.
