Until just a few years ago, observers and researchers kept exploring the European Union’s (EU) “normative power”. Tailor-made for the latter, this concept referred directly to the driving force behind European integration —transcending armed conflicts between member states through an interlocking web of mutualised interests translated into rights and obligations— as well as to the values the EU espoused in its founding texts and its discourse[1]. Regarding its foreign policy, Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union pledged to “advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law”.
Admittedly, European “normative power” has always suffered from significant shortcomings deriving, among other things, from internal divisions and divergences, as well as self-centered interests that for example, often favor supporting authoritarian regimes willing to cooperate on migration and counter-terrorism, over challenging them[2]. Nevertheless, European “declaratory diplomacy” was usually anchored in the law and used to invoke it even when it failed to actually comply with it. Yet, since the attacks carried out by the Palestinian Hamas in Israel on October, 7 2023, the EU and the majority of its members states have increasingly distanced themselves from the norms and values they champion —even at the rhetorical level— when it comes to conflict dynamics in Southwest Asia[3]. To the point where EU foreign policy is now unrecognisable, resembling a disorderly array of diplomacies condoning, in various ways and to varying degrees, the violations and crimes perpetrated here and there by their allies.
Blindness to Genocidal Dynamics [4] in Palestine
As the Palestinian Authority’s primary financial backer, the EU was well-placed to witness —particularly since the Second Intifada— the devastation wrought by creeping settlement of and the repression of Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, by the quasi-total embargo on Gaza that was regularly punctuated by heavily lethal Israeli “operations”. Despites these persistent violations and the recurring destruction of infrastructures funded by European taxpayers[5], the EU and its member states (MS) have consistently and unreservedly deepened their trade and all manners of cooperation with the State of Israel. Consequently, Israel has become the non-member state most closely integrated into the European fold, even though its practices in the Palestinians territories remain in total contradiction of Article 2 of the Association Agreement binding the two parties[6].
Despite their awareness not only of the violations perpetrated by Israel but also of the unbearable situation of the Palestinians, European leaders unanimously reacted to the deadly attacks of October 7, 2023 as if they had occurred in an historical vacuum. Admittedly, the initial emotion and solidarity with Israel stemmed from a rejection of violence. Yet, by de-contextualizing and de-historicizing the October 7 outbreak of violence —and by acquiescing to the all-out Israeli military reprisals through a lack of political resolve[7]— the Europeans have forsaken the values and norms that bind them under their own treaties and the obligations arising from various bodies of international law.
Many statements made by Israeli officials —which would later be cited to substantiate the genocide accusation brought by South Africa before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)[8]— have not elicited any significant European reaction. On the contrary, member states have evaded their obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, even after the ICJ determined in its January 2024 order that it was plausible that Israel was committing a genocide in Gaza[9]. Nor did they act upon the obligations stemming from the arrest warrants issued a few months later by the International Criminal Court (ICC); Hungary went so far as to “roll out the red carpet for Netanyahu”[10], despite him being the subject of a warrant. No concrete measures were taken by the EU and its member states regarding their relations with the State of Israel: the various dimensions of cooperation remained unaffected[11], both within the EU and in broader contexts such as Eurovision or sporting events. This stands in stark contrast with the multidimensional sanctions imposed on Russia following its aggression on Ukraine.
And yet, every day since October 8, 2023, violations of all the norms and values advocated by the EU in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union, have played out before the entire world in history’s first “live-streamed genocide”[12], exacting a human and material toll unparalleled in the recent decades: the killing of over 74.000 Palestinians, nearly 83% of whom were civilians[13]; the near-total destruction of the built environment in all its forms (homes, hospitals, schools and universities, places of worship and historical sites, sanitation and civil infrastructure…)[14]; an embargo that, depending on the period, has caused varying degrees of food insecurity or even acute famine[15]. The lives of virtually all Gazans have been irrevocably shattered; not a single family has been spared by the death and destruction. Israel has transformed Gaza into a landscape of ruins and despair, where nearly two million people are struggling to survive in inhumane conditions[16]. In the West Bank and in East Jerusalem, where settlement, repression and settler violence have reached unprecedented levels, daily life is hardly bearable. Nearly a hundred Palestinian prisoners have died since October 7, 2023 in Israeli prisons[17], which were labeled as a “network of torture camps” by the Israeli organisation B’Tselem[18].
Despite these realities — which Donald Trump’s “Peace Plan”[19] and ceasefire have barely altered— the European Union and the vast majority of its member states have to date failed to firmly condemn these massive violations of the most fundamental human rights, let alone adopting any decisive measures, whether collectively or at the national level[20]. On the contrary, European leaders have sought to counter all efforts aimed at holding them to the legal obligations arising from European and international instruments. Thus, despite the dire situation in Palestine, German Foreign Affairs minister, Johann Wadephul, has continued to justify his country’s blocking if any European measures against Israel in April 2026 by asserting: “We must discuss crucial issues with Israel”, but “this must take place within a critical and constructive dialogue with Israel; that is what we advocate”[21]. Moreover, European ties with Israel —spanning the business, armament[22], cultural, educational or research sectors[23]— continue to prosper, even as the life of every Palestinian in the Occupied territories is effectively put on hold. Furthermore, the vast majority of European countries have adopted repressive policies against those who support the Palestinians —in direct contradiction of the fundamental principles of the rule of law— and have condoned, or even promoted, strategies aimed at silencing such such voices[24].
Carte blanche for the crushing of Lebanon
Acquiescence to Israeli policies in Lebanon is just as much at odds with international law.
There was a time where Europeans offered steadfast support to Lebanon —a country mired in a so-called “civil” war that nonetheless had countless regional ramifications[25]. That support, however, never went so far as to contest the dual occupation that persisted at the end of the war in 1990: Israeli forces in the south, and Syrian forces in the north and east. Nevertheless, Europeans —and France in particular— remained at Lebanon’s bedside; this was evident, for instance, in the support provided when Shimon Peres, serving as interim head of the Israeli government following Rabin’s assassination, decided to launch Operation “Grapes of Wrath” — an operation that was particularly deadly… by the standards of the time[26]. The tone began to shift when Israel decided to withdraw unilaterally from Lebanon in 2000, against the backdrop of a stalled peace process regarding the Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese tracks. Although the withdrawal resolved nothing other than the military occupation of southern Lebanon, the international community —led by the Europeans— treated it as a fresh start, ignoring all the abuses suffered during nearly 22 years of occupation[27].
Against a regional backdrop shaped by the Second Intifada and the invasion of Iraq by the United-States, the international community —led by the United States and France— seized the opportunity presented by the first presidential elections following the Israeli withdrawal to press for Syria’s withdrawal and the disarmament of Hezbollah —the only militia authorised to keep its weapons after the war in 1990 to resist the Israeli occupation. This led to the UN Security Council Resolution 1559[28], which imported the region’s escalating polarisation into Lebanon and triggered a resurgence of violence, including political assassinations —most notably that of former Prime Minister Hariri in February 2005[29]— as well as government paralysis and protests… In early July 2006, echoing the events unfolding between Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah captured Israeli soldiers at the border; Israel’s response was all-out: a blockade and intensive nationwide bombardments targeting all types of civilian infrastructure, along with the massive destruction of Beirut’s southern suburbs. Once again diplomats —notably Europeans— reacted swiftly, and a solution was reached through the adoption of Resolution 1701[30]. This resolution called for the strengthening of UNIFIL, with three European countries —France, Spain and Italy— committing to provide substantial troop contingents[31]. This force succeeded in stabilising the situation for 18 years, despite a volatile and violent regional climate, marked by, among other things, the acceleration of Israeli settlement expansion; the conflict in Syria which became a new theater for the standoff between Israel and Hezbollah; the turmoil in post-US-invasion Iraq; and the war in Yemen[32]. However, no diplomatic initiative has addressed the resolution of the conflict between Israel on the one hand, and Palestine and Lebanon on the other.
In the wake of the attacks launched by Hamas in Israel, Hezbollah opened a “support front” aimed at preventing Israel from concentrating its entire military might on Gaza. A cycle of attacks and reprisals ensued along the Israeli-Lebanon border. Initially, Hezbollah’s strikes were highly calibrated, targeting military positions in territories occupied by Israel and claimed by Lebanon. For nearly a year, Israel drove the escalation: from the very first weeks, civilians, journalists, and rescue workers were killed by Israeli fire. Targeted drone assassinations and air strikes became increasingly frequent. A critical threshold was crossed in January 2024 with the assassination of the senior Hamas official Al-Arouri in Beirut’s southern suburbs[33]. Throughout this period and up until the autumn, Israeli strikes accounted for nearly 80% of cross-border exchanges and were 25 times more lethal[34].
In mid-September 2024, the Netanyahu government opted for a massive escalation: the remote detonation of pagers followed by walkies-talkies, the onset of “carpet bombing” across Shiite-populated regions of the country, and —starting October 1st— ground operations. While Hezbollah managed to carry out a few notable actions, the Israeli campaign in Lebanon proved devastating for the country[35]. Yet, the vast majority of Europeans —both Union and its member states— refrained from condemning the Israeli strikes, contenting themselves with calls for restraint or de-escalation[36]. Moreover, just as in Gaza, they acquiesced to an American monopoly over crisis resolution. Indeed, in late November 2024, a cessation of hostilities was negotiated by the outgoing Biden administration in consultation with Trump’s team[37]. On the surface, the terms of Resolution 1701 were being reinstated —this time with a firmer commitment from the Lebanese side to remove Hezbollah’s weapons from southern Lebanon. “Guaranteed” by an American-dominated “mechanism” involving France[38], the cessation of hostilities proved to be one-sided: the Israeli army did not stop its operations within Lebanese territory. Following its withdrawal from the bulk of occupied (and completely devastated) areas in February 2025, it intensified targeted killings, airstrikes across the country and more localised operations —including assassinations and abductions, the destruction of infrastructure (mostly civilian facilities), glyphosate spraying on farmland, strikes on border crossings… the list is long[39]. Thus, by the first anniversary of the cessation of hostilities, UNIFIL had recorded over 10.000 violations by the Israeli side, whereas Hezbollah had —for its part— almost entirely ceased its attacks[40]. It did not resume them even when Israel unilaterally decided to strike Iran in June 2025[41].
This was all the more problematic given that two figures strongly backed by the “international community” found themselves at the helm in Lebanon. Indeed, General Joseph Aoun—favored by Washington, Paris, and Riyadh—was elected President of the Republic in January 2025, while Nawaf Salam, a highly respected international figure, was appointed to lead the government[42]. Although both pledged to restore the Lebanese state’s monopoly on the use of force and implemented concrete policies to that end, their international backers refrained from exerting enough pressure to compel Israel to stop its attacks and allow the new leadership the necessary room to succeed[43]. Beyond undermining the credibility of Lebanon’s new leaders, this international passivity helped create a climate in which it became all the more easier for Hezbollah to join in the new war launched by Israel and the United States against Iran in early 2026.
On the morning of February 28, 2026, as the aggression against Iran began, the Israeli army “announced it was carrying out strikes on ‘Hezbollah infrastructure’ in southern Lebanon.”[44] True to its warning from February 25—stating that it would regard “any attack on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as a ‘red line'”[45]—Hezbollah responded to his assassination by stepping out of the unilateral cessation of hostilities and firing into Israel. In retaliation, Israel reverted to a strategy of total war. Evacuation orders were issued in rapid succession for villages and towns in southern Lebanon, as well as for neighborhoods not only in the capital’s southern suburbs but also in its city center. Massive strikes were launched across various regions of the country, resulting in 31 deaths and 139 injuries[46] on the very first day. In European capitals, only “concerns” were voiced. While “Hezbollah’s decision to join Iran in the hostilities” was clearly condemned in a joint statement by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, Israel’s responsibility was nowhere explicitly mentioned; instead, the group merely assessed that “a large-scale Israeli ground offensive would have devastating humanitarian consequences and could lead to a protracted conflict. This must be avoided.”[47] The statement made by French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot following his tour of Lebanon and Israel in March 2026 vividly illustrates the inverted perceptions regarding chronology and responsibility that have become familiar in Europe; omitting any reference to the fact that Iran had been subjected to a military attack on February 28 by the Israeli-American duo, and that Hezbollah was breaking —after 15 months— a cessation of hostilities that Israel had not respected in the slightest, Mr. Barrot spoke of “the dramatic escalation in Lebanon, triggered by Hezbollah’s unacceptable and irresponsible decision —which we condemned in the strongest terms— to join in Iranian acts of aggression against Israel, thereby prioritizing support for the Tehran regime over Lebanon’s stability and security and dragging the country into a war that neither its authorities nor its population wanted.”[48]
Thus, Hezbollah’s retaliations were totally disconnected from the broader historical context —including Israel’s daily violations of November 2024 cessation of hostilities (and, by extension of Resolution 1701), and the military aggression launched by Israel and the United States against Iran —as well as from the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, a major figure in Shia Islam, which Hezbollah had declared a red line[49]. Furthermore, while Hezbollah was called upon to “lay down its arms,” no demand was made for Israel to cease its strikes. There was scarcely any mention of international law or the proportionality of Israeli reprisals, save for a cryptic call for “all parties to act in accordance with international humanitarian law”[50]. Although EU High Representative, Kaja Kallas deemed Israel’s response “brutal” and stated that it “should cease its operations”[51] she firmly affirmed that “Israel has the right to self-defense in accordance with international law,” mentioning international humanitarian law only in the same vague terms used by the various member states. Meanwhile, the death and injury tolls continued to mount[52]; nearly 18% of the population has been displaced[53], with the South emptying of its inhabitants; and the destruction —in southern Lebanon, the southern part of the capital, and many other areas— grew unfathomably. And all of this occurring in an environment already rife with vulnerabilities.
While the “official” Lebanon and certain segments of Lebanese society certainly align with the narrative portraying Hezbollah as an aggressor acting in a contextual void, many are outraged by the unilateralism evident in the European interpretation of events[54]. Behind it lies the elevation of Israel’s right to self-defense into something sacred — regardless of the price paid by its neighbors or the costs in terms of violations of various bodies of international law.
Amnesia regarding Iran
Nowhere is the schizophrenia of European leaders more apparent than their failure to name the actions of Israel and the United States on February 28, 2026. Yet, under international law, the attacks jointly launched on that day constitute nothing less than a “crime of aggression” as defined by UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of December 14, 1974[55], and incorporated into Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The latter defines this crime as “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations” (para.1). An act of aggression is defined, in turn, as “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations” (para.2)[56]. Furthermore, acts qualifying as acts of aggression include —under point (b)— “Bombardement by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State”; and —under point (d)— “An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State.”[57]
In light of these articles, the attacks carried out by Israel and the United States —as well as the decision by various states in the region to make their territory or airspace available to the United States (and sometimes Israel) for strikes against Iran— constitute acts of aggression. Yet, with the exception of Spain —whose Prime Minister clearly rejected war— no European state has condemned the Israeli-American attacks, let alone the assassination of senior Iranian political and military officials. Most, while ignoring the tens of thousands of Palestinians killed in Gaza —a verified figure— have referred to the “tens of thousands of deaths” allegedly caused by the regime —unverified figures— to legitimise Israeli-American action or, like the Belgian Foreign Minister, they have more or less directly blamed Iran for the failure of negotiations and suggested that the Israeli-American attacks served to “avert a security risk and widespread conflagration in the region.”[58]
These stances are all the more troubling given the responsibility borne for the deadlocks that led to the current situation. In this regard, it is essential to recall the involvement of European actors —specifically France, Germany, and Great Britain, as well as the EU through its High Representative Federica Mogherini— in the negotiations concerning Iran’s nuclear program[59]. These negotiations culminated in the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015, which strictly regulated Iran’s nuclear program and placed it under close monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)[60]. Furthermore, this agreement received unanimous backing from the UN Security Council in its Resolution 2231[61]. Addressing the IAEA Board of Governors on March 5, 2018, Director General Yukiya Amano stated: “To date, I can confirm that Iran is implementing its nuclear-related commitments.” While emphasising that it was “essential for Iran to continue fully implementing these commitments,” he also warned that “if the JCPOA were to fail, it would be a significant loss for nuclear verification and for multilateralism.”[62]
Yet, it was President Trump who, two months later, violated the agreement by unilaterally withdrawing from it. The attempts by French President Macron, German Chancellor Merkel and British Prime Minister Johnson to dissuade him carried little weight against Israeli influence[63]. In addition, Washington reimposed a raft of sanctions on Iran. Faced with this deliberate sabotage and despite Iranian demands, the other JPCOA signatories, particularly Europeans, did little to try to save the deal. Yet Iran did not begin to deviate from its obligations until much later, and then only gradually. A turning point in this regard was the assassination of Qassem Soleimani —one of the top leaders of the Revolutionary Guards— by the United States on January 3, 2020[64]. Two days later, Iran announced “that its nuclear program would no longer be subject to any operational limits’” though it “would continue to cooperate with the Agency ‘as in the past’”[65]. From that point on, Iran began incrementally rolling back its commitments. Rather than deploying their full diplomatic weight to convince the Biden administration to re-engage with Tehran, the Europeans blamed Iran for failing to meet its obligations —a complete inversion of responsibility regarding the trashing of the 2015 agreement.
By the time of the October 7 attacks, Europe’s amnesia was total. This applied not only to the unbearable situation in occupied Palestinian territories —which largely accounts for why such an attack occurred— but also to Iran, now treated as a pariah state with no rights whatsoever in the face of escalations driven first by Israel and then by the United States. Consequently, the Europeans failed to clearly condemn either Israeli strikes on an Iranian consular building in Damascus in April 2024 or the assassination —in Tehran itself— of Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’s political bureau, during the inauguration of reformist President Pezechkian in July 2024[66]. However, whenever Iran is cornered and forced to retaliate, it draws widespread condemnation even though its reprisals are carefully calibrated and orchestrated as to avoid igniting a wider conflagration[67].
This inversion of responsibility is particularly evident in the context of the two attacks launched against Iran —first in June 2025 then starting in February 2026. In the first instance, while Tehran was engaged in negotiations with the United States regarding its nuclear program, Israel launched an extensive campaign of airstrikes and targeted assassinations[68]. For 12 days, Israel pounded the country in an effort to eradicate both Iran’s nuclear facilities and its ballistic missile program; at least 610 civilians —including children, rescue workers and medical personnel— were killed and more than 4,700 were injured[69]. Faced with this all-out war, Iran retaliated more severely than ever before, causing 28 civilian deaths and 3,238 injuries in Israel[70]. A ceasefire came to effect on June 24, after the United States had dropped its largest bombs on three Iranian nuclear facilities[71].
Europeans’ reactions to this episode were particularly murky. Far from condemning this act of aggression, most leaders reaffirmed Israel’s right to self-defense confining themselves to voicing “concern”[72]. The German Chancellor went as far as to say “It is the dirty work that Israel is doing for all of us”, noting that the Iranian regime had “brought death and destruction to the world through attacks, murders and massacres, involving Hezbollah and Hamas” as well as “the supply of drones to Russia”[73]. In a context where Israeli genocide in Gaza had already claimed over 55,000 deaths[74] —the vast majority being civilians— and famine was beginning to take hold, such a statement lays bare the scale of Europe’s normative disarray.
Rather than attempting mediation, the Europeans —contrary to their approach prior to 2015— opted for a coercive path. Ignoring the fact that Iran had been negotiating with the United States when it was attacked in June[75], dismissing the understandable crisis of confidence on the Iranian side, and disregarding the gestures of openness Tehran nonetheless demonstrated by accepting the return of IAEA inspectors, the “E3” (the United Kingdom, France and Germany) triggered in August 2025 a mechanism to reinstate the sanctions that had been lifted in 2015 under the JCPOA[76]. Taking effect in September, these sanctions aimed notably to bring the Iranians back to the negotiating table —a move also urged by US Secretary of State Rubio, who stated at that time: “diplomacy remains an option —a deal is still the better outcome for the Iranian people and the world. For that to happen, Iran must agree to direct talks, conducted in good faith, without stalling or obfuscation”[77].
In early February 2026, a new round of talks between Tehran and Washington got under way, against a backdrop of American threats taking concrete form through the deployment of a massive armada to the region[78]. Leaked information indicated that progress was being made —a point confirmed by the Omani Foreign Minister Badr al Busaidi, a go-between for the two sides, just hours before Israel—this time backed by the United States— launched large-scale attacks on Iran, assassinating Ali Khamenei among others[79]. This time, the Iranian response was swift: within hours, strikes targeted Israel and American military infrastructure scattered across the Gulf states[80].
Yet once again, the positions adopted by the overwhelming majority of European countries equate with a complete inversion of the situation. Far from denouncing the aggressors as defined under Article 8bis of the Rome Statute, these countries condemned Iranian attacks on Gulf states[81], ignoring the fact that one of the acts defined as aggression under that article is “The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it had placed at the disposal of another State, for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State” (para. f). At every stage of the conflict, official statements cast Iran as an aggressor acting in a vacuum and, consequently, guilty of every violation. Security Council Resolution 2817 (March,11 2026) is a particularly telling example in this regard. Its wording portrays Iran as the aggressor against its neighbours, condemning “in the strongest terms the unacceptable attacks perpetrated by the Islamic Republic of Iran against the territories” of its neighbours— specifically citing attacks on residential areas and civilian property, civilian casualties, and damage to civilian buildings. Astoundingly, there was no mention whatsoever of the attacks Iran itself initially endured, nor —in contrast with the treatment reserved to its neighbours— of its right to see its sovereignty and territorial integrity respected, of the assassination of many of its leaders, or the massive strikes against civilians and civilian infrastructure[82]. This blatant double standard clearly contributes to exacerbating the situation.
Extensively analysed in post-colonial academic literature[83], this strategy effectively denies Iran — viewed as a “barbaric” and “terrorist” actor— the protections of the law, and does so on two counts. First, in the face of Israeli-American attacks, it dismisses the right of Iran to invoke the UN Charter —specifically Article 51, which recognises the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” Iran is further denied the protections of international humanitarian law and the laws of war given that European capitals and Brussels failed to condemn the massive strikes launched against its territory —including attacks on sites that resulted in horrific civilian casualties, such as the 168 young girls and teachers killed on the first day of the aggression[84]. Nor was there any condemnation of the assassinations of key regime figures, or of the Israeli-American targeting of energy or nuclear infrastructure.
Conclusion
Over the past three years, the acute crises shaking West Asia have exposed the extent of the normative disintegration of Europe and its member states. This disintegration is manifest for all to see: in Gaza —where the ICJ has deemed the perpetration of genocide by Israel to be plausible— and across the rest of the occupied Palestinian territories confronted with Israeli colonial violence; in Lebanon, the victim of an ethnic cleansing of a substantial part of its tiny territory and of collective punishment targeting the Shia population primarily and, to a lesser extent, the country as a whole; and in Iran, which —despite the multiple acts of aggression it has suffered, particularly in June 2025 and February 2026— remains the target of condemnations that do not extend to its aggressors. In the face of such a situation that is consuming entire societies —claiming tens of thousands of victims in Palestine and thousands more in Lebanon and Iran, not to mention the immeasurable material destruction— European claims regarding the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity and the principles of equality and solidarity no longer hold water. Nor does their commitment to the principles of the UN Charter and international law, given that Europeans are now incapable of naming the massive violations perpetrated by the United States and Israel, let alone identifying the aggressors themselves.
Sustained by mainstream media narratives and by significant parts of the cultural and economic elites, European governments now stand out for their systematic practice of double standards. While they themselves seem comfortable with this, many of their fellow citizens watch on in bewilderment; this behavior also fuels resentment in Southwest Asia and across the Global South —whose peoples have traditionally been on the receiving end of European lectures regarding human rights and rule of law.
At a time when, for want of lucidity and political courage, Europe stands by as a partisan onlooker to a series of conflicts with no militarily sustainable solution, at a time when it has let itself be sidelined from the dynamics of crisis resolution —even though the resulting upheavals will inevitably take an economic, security and migration toll— the consequences of this European normative disarray could prove devastating. This is all the more true given that the literature has long established that crushing and humiliating peoples can never bring peace but merely sow the seeds of future violence and deviant strategies.
(UCLouvain’s Piccolo AI has been used in specific cases for translation purposes).
Notes
[1] See in particular: Richard Rosecrance, “The European Union: A New Type of International Actor”, in Jan Zielonka (ed.), Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 15–23; Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002, pp. 235–258; Lisbeth Aggestam, “Europe Puissance: French Influence and European Independence”, in Helene Sjursen (ed.), Redefining Security? The Role of the European Union in European Security Structures, ARENA Report, no. 7, 2000, pp. 67–82; and Helene Sjursen, “Security and Defence”, in Walter Carlsnaes, Helene Sjursen and Brian White (eds), Contemporary European Foreign Policy, London, Sage Publications, 2004, pp. 59–74.
[2] See the critique put forward by Thomas Diez, Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative Power Europe’, paper presented at the PSA Annual Conference, Leeds, 5–7 April 2005, p. 1 (available at www.psa.ac.uk/2005/pps/Diez.pdf); Elena Aoun, “L’Union européenne en Méditerranée : puissance en repli, normes en déshérence, Politique européenne, no. 39, 2013, pp. 76–104.
[3] The term ‘Southwest Asia’ designates what is commonly known as the ‘Middle East’, a Eurocentric label that this article deliberately moves away from.
[4] This qualification, which is analytical rather than legal in nature, rests on an examination of Israeli practices in Gaza in light of Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948). It also draws on the Order of the International Court of Justice of 26 January 2024, as well as on the legal analysis conducted by the independent commission established in May 2021 by the UN Human Rights Council and published in September 2025. It is also worth noting the article by an Israeli specialist in Genocide Studies published a few days after the start of Israel’s retaliation in Gaza: Raz Segal, “A Textbook Case of Genocide”, Jewish Currents, 13 October 2023.
[5] Emma du Chatinier & Alexander Fanta, « The EU has spent millions of euros on Palestinian infrastructure. Israel keeps knocking it down », Follow the Money, 9 August 2024.
[6] David Cronin, Europe’s alliance with Israel. Aiding the Occupation, London, Pluto, 2011.
[7] Didier Fassin, Une étrange défaite. Sur le consentement à l’écrasement de Gaza, Paris, La découverte, 2024.
[8] For a review of the statements by various senior Israeli political and military officials and public figures revealing genocidal intent or incitement to genocide, see the three annexes to the “Public dossier of openly available evidence on the State of Israel’s acts of genocide against the Palestinians in Gaza as at 4 February 2025” submitted by the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the President of the UN Security Council by letter of 28 February 2025 (S/2025/130).
[9] ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), 26 January 2024; in December 2024, Amnesty International pleaded – in vain – for European states to individually assume their obligations should their divergences, invoked as a pretext for inaction, not be overcome (Eve Geddie, “If the EU won’t stop Israel’s genocide in Gaza, member states must go it alone“, Amnesty International, 20 December 2024).
[10] Andras Rostovanyi, « La Hongrie déroule le tapis rouge à Nétanyahou et claque la porte de la CPI », Le Devoir, 3 April 2025. See also : « L’Union européenne se divise sur les mandats d’arrêt émis par la CPI visant Nétanyahou et Gallant », Libération, 22 November 2024.
[11] After raising the possibility of suspending preferential trade arrangements with Israel in the summer of 2025, while famine was raging in Gaza, the EU abandoned the idea as soon as a ceasefire was announced in early October, thereby depriving itself of any instrument of pressure to ensure that the Israeli government complied with a ceasefire that proved to be entirely illusory. See Jennifer Rankin, “EU criticised for pausing sanctions on Israel in response to Trump Gaza efforts“, The Guardian, 21 October 2025; on the deadly character of the Gaza “ceasefire”, particularly for children, see Daniel Johnson, “Gaza: Sneeze and you might get shot, warns UNICEF in alert on child killings“, UN News, 19 June 2026.
[12] According to the British politician Jeremy Corbyn in his Instagram post of 20 June 2025. This claim echoes those of many public figures such as Francesca Albanese, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, who speaks of a “live-streamed atrocity”, notably in her report.
[13] Emma Graham-Harrison & Yuval Abraham, “Revealed: Israeli military’s own data indicates civilian death rate of 83% in Gaza war“, The Guardian, 21 August 2025.
[14] Neta C. Crawford, “The Human Toll of the Gaza War: Direct and Indirect Death from 7 October 2023 to 3 October 2025“, Costs of War, Brown University, 7 October 2025; UN Human Rights Council, Legal analysis of the conduct of Israel in Gaza pursuant to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 16 September 2025.
[15] “Famine à Gaza : ‘un échec pour l’humanité toute entière’, selon le chef de l’ONU“, UN, 22 August 2025.
[16] Gisha, “Gaza Now. Facts and figures” (last accessed: 29 June 2026).
[17] Physicians for human rights, Deaths of Palestinians in Israeli Custody: Enforced Disappearances, Systematic killings and cover-ups, November 2025.
[18] B’Tselem, Living Hell. The Israeli Prison System as a Network of Torture Camps, January 2026.
[19] On the intrinsic dangers of this plan, see Elena Aoun, “La «paix » de Trump ou le plan de tous les dangers“, Le Blog de Médiapart, 24 October 2025. For an assessment of the deadlocks six months after its adoption, see Larry Garber and Liam Hamama, “Six Months In: Assessing the Status of the Gaza Ceasefire », JStreet, 16 April 2026.
[20] Dana Reignier-Tayar and Agatha Verdebou, “Les sanctions européennes contre Israël : quand le consensus limite l’action“, GRIP, 26 February 2026.
[21] “L’Allemagne réitère son refus de suspendre l’accord d’association entre l’UE et Israël“, France 24, 21 April 2026.
[22] Tal Schneider, “Israel has surpassed UK as 7th largest global arms exporter, report shows“, The Times of Israel, 10 March 2026.
[23] Israel Innovation Authority, Israeli Researchers and Companies Secure Over €1.1 Billion in Horizon Europe Grants, Cementing Global Leadership in Innovation, 19 March 2025.
[24] Erika Guevara-Rosas, “Europe: Stop punishing Palestinian solidarity and start punishing those who commit genocide“, Amnesty international, 15 February 2025; Benjamin Goodwin, “Repression on protests in solidarity with Flotilla and Palestinian people: NGOs demand EU Council action“, European Civic Forum, 16 October 2025; Josephine Solanki, “Germany’s Crackdown on Palestine Solidarity. Solidarity under Siege Series: Introduction“, TNI, 26 November 2025; “Austria: Crackdown on Palestinian solidarity has triggered significant chilling effect“, Amnesty International, 18 March 2026. Established as early as 2019, the European Legal Support Center platform documents the repression of Palestinian solidarity across Europe and provides legal support to those targeted by it. Its reports and analyses are available at this link: https://elsc.support/research-and-report/.
[25] Dima de Clerck, Stéphane Malsagne, Le Liban en guerre : 1975-1990, Paris, Gallimard, 2025.
[26] The toll of this operation amounted to 150 Lebanese civilians killed and 350 injured, while on the Israeli side 62 civilians had been wounded (Amnesty International, “Israel/Lebanon: Amnesty International concerns over killings of Lebanese civilians reinforced after visits to Israel and Lebanon“, 23 May 1996). On 18 April 1996, the Israeli army’s targeting of a UNIFIL depot caused the “Qana massacre”, in which 94 Lebanese civilians were killed. This event caused international revulsion and forced Israel into a ceasefire (Françoise Chipaux, “Le massacre de Cana oblige Israël à envisager un cessez-le-feu“, Le Monde, 20 April 1996. See more broadly on this episode and the diplomatic efforts surrounding it: Hervé de Charrette, Opération Raison de la colère. L’histoire secrète d’un succès diplomatique français, Paris, éditions du CNRS, 2018.
[27] Elena Aoun, “The European involvement in Post-2006 UNIFIL: The art of the possible”, in Elena Aoun (ed.), The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: Multiple Perspectives on a Multinational Peace Operation, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2018, p. 115-139.
[28] “Les principaux points de la résolution 1559 de l’ONU sur le Liban”, Le Monde, 12 March 2005.
[29] Nicholas Blanford, Killing Mr Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and Its Impact on the Middle East, New York, Tauris, 2006.
[30] “Qu’est-ce que la résolution 1701 du Conseil de sécurité ?”, ONU Info, 3 October 2024.
[31] Alexander Mattelaer, “Europeans to the Front! The Role of France, Italy and Spain in the UNIFIL Enhancement”, in Elena Aoun (ed.), The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon…, op. cit., pp. 173-189.
[32] Elena Aoun (ed.), The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: multiple perspectives on a multinational peace operation, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2018.
[33] “Senior Hamas figure Saleh al-Arouri killed in Lebanon“, The Guardian, 2 January 2024.
[34] See the charts compiled by Al Jazeera based on the independent database “Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED)”: Mohammed Hussein and Hanna Duggal, “Mapping over a year of cross-border attacks between Israel and Lebanon“, Al Jazeera, 13 October 2024.
[35] By the end of November 2024, Lebanon had counted 4,047 dead and 16,638 injured, the vast majority of them civilians. On the Israeli side, 45 civilians had been killed, along with 73 soldiers, 52 of whom died on Lebanese territory (see: “Israeli attacks have killed 4,047 people in Lebanon, Lebanese minister says”, Reuters, 4 December 2024; “Costs of Israel-Hezbollah conflict on Lebanon, Israel“, Reuters, 27 Novembre 2024; “Israël/Liban : Les attaques du Hezbollah ont mis en danger des civils“, Human Rights Watch, 7 March 2025).
[36] “‘Unimaginable consequences’: World reacts to Israel’s strikes on Lebanon“, Al Jazeera, 24 September 2024.
[37] “Israel, Hezbollah agree to ceasefire brokered by US and France, to take effect Wednesday“, Reuters, 27 November 2024.
[38] Nicolas Falez, “Cessez-le-feu entre Israël et le Liban: qu’est ce que le «mécanisme de supervision» ?“, Le Figaro, 5 December 2024.
[39] “Liban : Israël a illégalement détruit du matériel de reconstruction“, Human Rights Watch, 15 December 2025; “‘Un défi à l’État libanais’ : la Jamaa Islamiya réagit quatre jours après l’enlèvement d’un de ses responsables“, L’Orient-Le Jour, 13 February 2026; “Pulvérisation de glyphosate par Israël : le Liban prépare une plainte à l’ONU“, L’Orient-Le Jour, 4 February 2026.
[40] See the analyses based on the reports of the UN Secretary-General in: Elena Aoun, Flexibility and adaptability of UN missions: UNIFIL between opportunities and contextual limitations, Observatoire Boutros Ghali, DGRIS, GRIP, February 2026, notably pp. 13-14 and annexes 4 to 8.
[41] “Iran Update Special Edition: Israeli Strikes on Iran, June 13, 2025“, Institute for the Study of War, 14 June 2025.
[42] Laure Stephan, “Le Liban se dote enfin d’un président, après une élection sous la pression occidentale et arabe“, Le Monde, 10 January 2025; Hélène Sallon, “Au Liban, Nawaf Salam forme un gouvernement ‘de réforme et de salut’“, Le Monde, 9 FebruaryS 2025.
[43] “Israël pilonne le Liban-Sud, Aoun, Salam et Berry interpellent les pays garants du cessez-le-feu“, L’Orient-Le Jour, 18 September 2025.
[44] “Frappes sur l’Iran : les Libanais craignent d’être entraînés dans la guerre”, Les Echos, 28 February 2026.
[45] “Le Hezbollah n’interviendra pas en cas de frappes américaines ‘limitées’ contre l’Iran“, Le Figaro, 25 February 2026.
[46] “Le Hezbollah tire des missiles sur Israël et précipite de nouveau le Liban dans la guerre“, Le Monde, 2 March 2026.
[47] “Déclaration des dirigeants du Canada, de la France, de l’Allemagne, de l’Italie et du Royaume-Uni concernant l’escalade du conflit entre Israël et le Hezbollah », Paris, 16 March 2026.
[48] Déclaration à la presse de M. Jean-Noël Barrot, ministre de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères, sur le conflit au Moyen-Orient, à Tel Aviv le 20 March 2026.
[49] “Le Hezbollah n’interviendra pas en cas de frappes américaines ‘limitées’ contre l’Iran“, Le Figaro, 25 February 2026.
[50] Id.
[51] “Lebanon: Statement by the High Representative on the recent developments“, European External Action Service, 9 March 2026.
[52] It stood at 4,247 dead and 12,195 injured, the overwhelming majority of them civilians (see the website of the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health, https://www.moph.gov.lb/en/Pages/129/85842/, last accessed on 28 June 2026).
[53] “Liban : 18 % de la population déplacée en 16 jours, un pourcentage record“, Ici Beyrouth, 18 March 2026.
[54] “Lebanon caught in the crossfire: EU’s silence signals political weakness, expert says“, EUPerspectives, 8 April 2026.
[55] United Nations General Assembly, Definition of Aggression, Resolution 3314 (XXIX), 14 December 1974.
[56] These terms echo those of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, which states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”
[57] https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf
[58] “Contraire au droit international, mais justifiée : Maxime Prévot réagit à l’attaque contre l’Iran“, 7 sur 7, 2 March 2026.
[59] Olivier Decottignies, “Europe and the JCPOA“, Washington Institute, PolicyWatch 2655, 13 July 2016.
[60] Arun Vishwanathan, “Iranian Nuclear Agreement: Understanding the Nonproliferation Paradigm”, Contemporary Review of the Middle East, no. 1, 2016, pp. 3-22.
[61] Security Council, Resolution 2231 (2015) on Iran Nuclear Issue.
[62] “Nucléaire : l’Iran poursuit la mise en œuvre de ses engagements“, ONU Info, 5 March 2018.
[63] Julian Robinson, Ariel Zilber, Francesca Chambers, and David Martosko, ” EU chief says Europe must ‘replace the US’ as world superpower as he attacks Trump over Iran deal and accuses America of turning its back on allies“, The Daily Mail, 10 May 2018; “US turning its back on allies by quitting Iran deal: EU’s Juncker“, PressTV, 10 May 2018.
[64] Philippe Gélie, « Iran: Trump déchire l’accord sur le nucléaire », Le Figaro, 8 May 2018.
[65] International Atomic Energy Agency, Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) – Report by the Director General, 3 March 2020.
[66] Reflecting the European prevailing stance on the assassination of Haniyeh, Peter Stano, spokesperson of the European Commission for foreign affairs, barely condemned it, limiting himself to recalling that “the EU has a principled position which consists in rejecting extrajudicial executions,” (author’s free translation) and to calling for restraint (quoted in Jean Delaunay, “L’UE appelle à la «plus grande retenue » après l’assassinat du chef du Hamas Ismaïl Haniyeh“, L’observatoire de l’Europe, 1er August 2024.
[67] “Iran dismisses European leaders’ call to refrain from retaliating for Hamas leader’s killing“, Euronews, 13 August 2024.
[68] Julian Borger, “A week of war that left Iran stunned and bloodied“, The Guardian, 20 June 2025.
[69] “Iran : au moins 610 morts depuis le début de la guerre contre Israël“, L’Orient-Le Jour, 24 June 2025.
[70] “Guerre Israël-Iran : Les 28 victimes tuées lors des attaques de missiles iraniens “, The Times of Israel, 30 June 2025.
[71] “Trump annonce que les États-Unis ont mené plusieurs frappes sur des sites nucléaires iraniens“, Le Parisien, 22 June 2025.
[72] “Le tour du monde des réactions après les frappes israéliennes contre l’Iran“, France 24, 13 June 2025.
[73] “Guerre au Proche-Orient : ‘Israël fait le sale boulot pour nous tous’ selon le chancelier allemand Friedrich Merz », RTBF Actus, 17 June 2025.
[74] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Reported impact snapshot | Gaza Strip (25 June 2025).
[75] Enola Richet, “Attaque d’Israël : comment les négociations avec Washington ont endormi la vigilance de l’Iran“, L’Express, 14 June 2025; Banafsheh Keynoush, “The Perils of Nuclear Talks after the US-Israel War on Iran”, Middle East Policy, Vol. 32, No 2, 2025, p. 36-50.
[76] “Nucléaire iranien : la France, le Royaume-Uni et l’Allemagne déclenchent le mécanisme pour réimposer les sanctions de l’ONU“, Le Monde, 28 August 2025.
[77] “Nucléaire iranien : le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU rétablit les sanctions contre Téhéran“, Le Monde, 26 September 2025.
[78] “US and Iran agree to Friday talks in Oman but still at odds over agenda“, Reuters, 4 February 2026.
[79] “Le chef de la diplomatie omanaise accuse Washington de s’être ‘laissé entraîner’ dans la guerre“, L’Orient-Le Jour, 19 March 2026.
[80] “Iranian missiles shake Gulf cities after US, Israeli strikes on Iran“, Reuters, 28 February 2026.
[81] “France, Germany and UK urge Iran to ‘negotiate solution’ after attack“, The Guardian, 28 February 2026. It should be noted that the vast majority of Iranian attacks targeted American military sites, as attested by satellite analyses showing extensive destruction at some twenty military bases across the region (cf. Merlyn Thomas, Alex Murrayand, Matt Murphy, “Iran attacks damage 20 US military sites since start of war, satellite images show“, BBC, 1st June 2026).
[82] Security Council, Resolution 2817,11 March 2026.
[83] Anthony Anghie, “The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 27, n° 5, 2006, pp. 739–753.
[84] Tess McClure, “Minab school bombing: what evidence is there that the US was responsible?“, The Guardian, 10 March 2026; Jeremy Scahill, Murtaza Hussain, and Reza Sayah, “Massacre at Minab: The School That Became a Grave“, Dropsite, 30 September 2026.
