Turkey remains currently dominated by the omnipresent figure of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In power for almost two decades, he maintains restrained control over state institutions. Questions are nevertheless worth asking regarding his succession, particularly with the elections set for 2028, perhaps even before if an early voting is organised. In this context of institutional uncertainty, economic fragility and will for stabilisation, both on the internal and regional levels, in a constantly boiling Middle East, an unexpected evolution therefore seems to submerge the potential revival of the peace process between Ankara and the Kurds. This initiative has so far not been subject to any institutional formalisation, although the call made by Abdullah Öcalan from the island-prison of Imrali in February 2025 was received as a signal. This article explores these dynamics through a return to historical precedents, Öcalan’s call, and regional consequences, particularly in Iraq and Syria.
A look back at Dolmabahçe’s 10 points and failure
The Dolmabahçe initiative, launched in February 2015, constituted a Kurdish-Turkish conflict resolution attempt. The process had gathered representatives from the Turkish government and members of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), around ten principles supposed to serve as a basis for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. These points, partially inspired by Öcalan’s ideas, included elements pointing to a project of pluralist democratic state, with a recognition of the Kurds’civil, cultural and political rights, as well as a commitment to draft a more inclusive constitution. The 10 points covered themes touching upon the definition of “free” citizenship, the recognition of multiple identities, gender equality, the protection of the environment or a renewed constitutional framework. This text as well as the meetings organised alongside it aimed at gradually demilitarising the conflict while outlining a refoundation of the Turkish social contract on pluralist bases. The 2015 momentum was interrupted shortly after by the “trenches war”[1]. This new strategy, carried by a Kurdish motion, sought to block access to Kurdish large cities for the military and Turkish security forces by digging trenches, before declaring some zones as autonomous from Ankara. Initially marginalised and propelled by young Kurdish militants, this tactic was quickly picked up and legitimised by an important fringe of Kurdish political forces in Turkey. This swing constitutes a major turn: it reflects a deep loss of trust in the capacity of the Turkish state to implement a sustainable political solution to the Kurdish question. The PKK labelled this sequence as a new phase of “popular revolutionary war”. The trench war thereby illustrated the Kurdish movement in Turkey’s persistent and structural ambiguities. After more than fifteen years marked by a peaceful conflict resolution discourse, built on the democratisation of the Turkish state, a part of the movement led a radical strategic shift, opting for a logic of confrontation aimed at paralysing a state perceived as irremediably hostile to the recognition of Kurdish rights[2].
The Turkish state therefore, adopted a more rigid and authoritarian stance on the country and particularly in relation to the Kurdish opposition by considerably intensifying human rights violations, military operations and other kinds of restrictions. The HDP was outlawed, thousands of militants arrested, Kurdish municipalities placed under tutelage, and finally, an intensification of military operations against the PKK in the southeast of the country. As a result, the state once again took control of the Kurdish agenda, silencing any prospect of peace.
Today, ten years later, internal conditions have changed. Indeed, Ankara has been facing a deep economic crisis since 2018, which continues to worsen, and seeks to consolidate its hold on the country’s Kurdish zone, while also trying to exert influence on the region, particularly on its Syrian neighbour. With this in mind, informal discussions reportedly began on the conditions for the gradual reintegration of PKK guerrillas, starting with the youngest and oldest, as part of a demilitarisation process under international supervision. It would therefore be relevant to share some excerpts of the information published by the Iraqi Kurdistan media group, Rudaw, in its May 12, 2025, edition:
The weapons will be delivered under Turkey’s supervision in Sulaymaniyah and Erbil. Over 300 high-ranking PKK officials will be sent to third-party countries like South Africa and Norway. Roughly 4 000 Turkish citizens will be welcomed at the Turkish border by steps … Öcalan will remain in İmralı. There will be no guarantor countries like the United States and France. PKK members will also benefit from a new law on executions, and measures will be taken to guarantee the release of people of old age or in pain. Depending on the evolution of the process, a middle ground will be found in Parliament to draft a new Constitution, criminal legislation will be reorganised and, when social consensus will be found later on, partial amnesty could also be considered.
This opening is part of a more or less asymmetrical logic, since no specific request seems to have been made by the Kurdish organisations, which are both politically and militarily weakened. The process’s calendar and terms appear to be entirely under the control of the Turkish state, which filters announcements and selects its interlocutors. Several hypotheses can be discussed behind this revival. Either the Turkish government is seeking to guarantee a smooth and controlled transition by securing the country for the 2028 elections, probably favouring Erdoğan or the person/candidate he will be supporting; or through this targeted strategy of appeasement and regional “mediator,” Erdoğan is trying to restore sufficient legitimacy for a new constitutional reform which would allow him to run again. In this situation, the Kurds are not making many pragmatic demands, either out of exhaustion or strategic caution.
Öcalan’s February 2025 call asking for the PKK’s demilitarisation, while prudent, could therefore indicate a willingness to open a new cycle, more technocratic than political. The Turkish state mainly seems to aim at avoiding any armed or crossborder agitation.
The regional issues of this process
Since the adoption of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, Iraqi Kurds have recognised autonomy under the denomination of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Despite the 2017 independence referendum, which resulted in diplomatic failure, Kurdish leaders now prefer the status quo for themselves, which means preserving autonomy without seeking immediate independence. However, today, Nechirvan Barzani (KDP) and Bafil Talabani (PUK) say they would be ready to support peace between Ankara and Turkey’s Kurds. They welcomed Öcalan’s call very favourably, and took part in the Sulaimaniyah Congress in May 2025, expressing cautious solidarity with no wish to interfere. It is possible to see that their positioning aims to stabilise the region while strengthening their role as mediators, without playing an active role between the two parties.
As for the self-proclaimed Federation of North Syria, better known as Rojava following the unification of the three Kurdish counties in Rojava, almost fully administered since the end of the war against ISIS by the PYD (linked to the PKK), it currently constitutes a de facto autonomous entity, although it remains unrecognised and marginalised by the Syrian regime and the international community. Recent agreements between Kurdish commanders from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Ahmad al-Sharaa’s interim government suggest potential normalisation. One of the aspects of this accord was the integration of Kurdish forces within the Syrian Army, reflecting a rapprochement which remains fragile. According to first reactions, it appears that Ankara is opting for cautious optimism and it would be difficult to say that Turkey considers the rapprochement between Syrian Kurds and Syria’s interim government as a direct threat, for now at least. It was also indicative, perhaps paradoxical, to see Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself described the March 10, 2025 agreement between Syria’s interim government and the SDF as a “step in the right direction”. With this in mind, the PKK’s gradual demilitarisation in Turkey and Rojava’s potential situation could be used as diplomatic leverage in the dialogue with Damascus. A tripartite coordination between Turkey, Syria and the Kurds is therefore not impossible, as long as the status of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria remains under control.
The peace process that seems to be taking shape between Ankara and Turkey’s Kurds is based less on recognition of identity than on a desire for security. This is a peace agreement, but with a view to a strategy of containment and normalisation under the control of the Turkish state. Öcalan’s call, signals from the KRG and repositionings in Syria are all elements indicating a regional willingness to avoid escalation and failure. This hypothesis seems truer than ever with the launch of a war against Iran a few weeks ago, which shows that the Middle East is a highly unstable region and that if one wants to win, they have to avoid escalation at home. Once again, the process between Turkey’s Kurds and the Turkish state remains fragile. It is neither legally structured nor accompanied by a clear political framework. The absence of explicit demands from the Kurdish side could reveal a strategic expectation.
Notes
[1] Here one could also make the argument that the gains made by Syrian Kurds in terms of autonomy in their country led to a reassessment of the political and ideological line of Turkey’s Kurdish political class, including PKK fighters, which had strived since early 2000 to develop a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question, not through autonomy but rather through Turkey’s democratisation.
[2] Elsa Tulin Sen, « Le conflit syrien : un élément perturbateur du mouvement social kurde en Turquie », Confluences Méditerranée, vol. 117, no. 2, 2021, pp. 195-209.
