[Lyna Ouandjeli] The 25 June 2025 interview will primarily focus on concise questions centred on the relationship between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), in addition, two brief questions linked to current events, particularly tensions between Iran and Israel, and President Erdoğan’s recent stances on these issues. The objective is first and foremost to lay down a general framework, without diving too much into the details, in order to provide readers with a few essential contextual elements. With that in mind, I have prepared a series of questions. The first aims at offering a short historical overview of the origins and the evolution of the conflict between Turkey and the PKK, to gain a better understanding of the genesis and dynamics of this lengthy confrontation. What are the main historical causes of the conflict between Turkey and the PKK, and how has Turkish security policy with regard to the Kurdish movement evolved since the 1980s?
[Ahmet İnsel] The relationship between the Turkish state and the PKK falls within a larger historical framework, marked by claims carried by part of the Kurdish population, particularly regarding the recognition of their cultural identity. Among recurring demands lie the use of the Kurdish language in the public space, the right to learn it as a mother tongue, and the official recognition of the Kurdish identity within the Turkish Republic. The emergence of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) at the end of the 1970s therefore does not constitute the first episode of confrontation between the Turkish state and Kurdish movements. From the very first decades of the Republic, several Kurdish uprisings were suppressed with extreme severity, as part of successive waves of disputes and repression. The PKK emerged in a particularly troubled political context, characterised by violent polarisation between far-right organisations and left-wing revolutionary groups. The founders of the PKK originated from this radical left-wing movement, advocating for armed struggle against central power. The movement was born in 1977-1978, in a climate of latent civil war. From the very beginning, the PKK clashes with other Kurdish organisations, sometimes violently, in an environment marked by a plurality of demands: some advocate for independence, others a recognition of Kurdish rights within the Turkish Republic.
Anticipating the September 12, 1980 military coup, the PKK leadership, led by Abdullah Öcalan, left Turkey to go into exile in Syria. It is from the outside that the movement prepared its armed strategy. The first actions claimed by the PKK on Turkish soil started in the summer of 1984, soon after the official transition to a liberal right-wing civil government. The first attacks, carried against military barracks in locations close to the Iraqi border, marked the beginning of a long armed conflict between the PKK and Turkish security forces. The 1990s saw the violence considerably intensifying. This decade was characterised by an increased militarisation of the conflict and gross human rights violations: forced disappearances, extrajudiciary executions, population displacements and the destruction of Kurdish villages are widely documented. The PKK, meanwhile, also led particularly harsh armed actions. A few negotiation attempts took place within that period, 1993 marking the first ceasefire, but these endeavours systematically failed. One of the main obstacles lies with persistent refusal of the Turkish state to consider any kind of recognition of Kurdish demands as part of the dialogue with the PKK, officially designated as a terrorist organisation.
In the early 1990s, the Turkish state granted limited recognition of the public use of the Kurdish language, though not permitting its teaching in schools. No significant progress followed this symbolic measure. In the 2000s, the situation became slightly more appeased, but it is most importantly a major turn that took place in 1999 that deeply reshaped the dynamics of the conflict: under Turkish pressure, Syria demanded the departure of Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK’s leader. After months of diplomatic wandering, searching for political asylum, Öcalan was arrested in February 1999 in Nairobi, with the complicity of Western services, particularly American ones, and handed over to Turkish authorities. He has been detained in Turkey ever since, sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Following the start of his detention, Öcalan initiated a progressive ideological evolution of the PKK. The initial objective to create an independent Kurdish state was abandoned in favour of a project of democratically transforming the states where Kurds live – mainly Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran. This new paradigm, called “democratic confederalism” by Öcalan, relies on the establishment of local autonomies, particularly cultural and political, without questioning the borders of the existing states. From the perspective of the Turkish state, Kurdish claims put forward by the PKK have been recoded since the 1990s in the language of security as a threat of “separatist terrorism,” replacing the old “anarchy” discourse. This discursive change allowed more systemic and legally supervised repression. Turkey adopted a legislation specific to counterterrorism, distinct from the Penal Code, which suspends a significant number of fundamental freedoms. This legislation justified the establishment of a security regime centred on the declared objective of fighting terrorism.
Moreover, while the PKK presented itself as a political military organisation, it also resorted to tactics that can be qualified as terrorist attacks – suicide bombings, bomb attacks – led directly or through affiliated groups. In response, the Turkish state engaged in extralegal operations, including targeted assassinations of PKK officials and members. The armed conflict, despite punctual phases of respite, continued by episodes, particularly intense in the 1990s and 2010s. For several years now, the PKK’s military presence on Turkish soil has become marginal; the organisation is now mainly based in the Qandil mountains, on the Iraq-Iran border, and in some regions of northern Syria. It is in this context that a new political sequence has emerged. In October 2024, the president of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Devlet Bahçeli, publicly revealed the existence of talks between Öcalan and Turkish services. According to these declarations, Öcalan was supposedly ready to call for the end of the armed struggle and the PKK’s dissolution, paving the way for a “terror-free Turkey.” This declaration was followed, in February 2025, by Öcalan’s call for the end of the armed struggle. In May 2025, at the end of its 12th Congress, the PKK officially announced the end of armed struggle as a political strategy and the dissolution of its organisation. This decision nevertheless does not mark the end of Kurdish political involvement, but rather a transition to forms of non violent mobilisation, centred on cultural and political demands. Despite this major shift, no concrete progress was instigated by the Turkish state. The detention conditions of Kurdish leaders, including elected mayors from the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) or the Republican People’s Party (CHP), remain unchanged. Many are imprisoned on charges of collusion with a terrorist organisation. Thus, despite the official discourse promoting the idea of a Turkey freed from terrorism, no tangible measure has been taken to accompany the announced end of the armed struggle. This asymmetry between the Kurdish political initiative and the inertia of the State of Turkey illustrates a deep deadlock, one that is epistemological, cultural and historical. The Turkish state, shaped by decades of nationalist rhetoric and the demonisation of Kurdish demands, remains paralysed by the idea of any kind of recognition, even limited, or the Kurds’ cultural or political rights. In this context, the way out of the conflict seems to depend on a political will that is still lacking, despite the historic opportunity that presents itself.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] Following on from what you said about what the State of Turkey could do to support the PKK’s decision to renounce armed struggle and disband, there is one major question that needs to be addressed: could the Turkish state consider revising Abdullah Öcalan’s prison status, or perhaps releasing him on parole, as a sign of openness and willingness to engage in dialogue as part of a lasting peace process? Or on the contrary, does this hypothesis remain totally excluded in Ankara’s perspective, due to the political and symbolic weight represented by Öcalan, rendering any prospect of his imprisonment being reconsidered unrealistic in the short or medium term?
[Ahmet İnsel] Right now, it seems more realistic to expect concrete symbolic and legal gestures from the Turkish state, particularly concerning the release of democratically elected Kurdish mayors, currently detained on charges of “dealing with a terrorist organisation.” If the PKK truly came to cease all armed activities and was effectively dismantled, it would become hardly justifiable, from a legal and political perspective, to maintain thousands of people in jail over alleged ties to an organisation that would no longer exist operationally on Turkish soil. The matter of Abdullah Öcalan, however, is significantly different. According to available information, he has not expressed to this day any wish to be released or transferred from the Imralı prison island, where he would benefit from security conditions deemed preferable. A plausible evolution would consist of a progressive transformation of his detention regime: the latter could be oriented towards a semi-open model, as it was the case for Imralı before its exclusive dedication to Öcalan. Such a shift would imply increased freedom of movement, a more regular access to visitors – whether they are political actors, journalists or former PKK officials – as well as a restoration of its communications channels with the outside world.
In this respect, it should be noted that some changes have already been made: the presence, alongside him, of several volunteer political prisoners from the PKK, responsible for forming a sort of informal secretariat, marks a change in the way his isolation is managed. No concrete measure has however been adopted to this day. A reform of the Penal Code, particularly the counterterrorism legislation, which could pave the way for an evolution of the situation, was reported – while it had been set to take place in June, it was rescheduled to the fall of 2025. This postponement reflects strong doubts from the executive, torn between several contradictory imperatives. On the one hand, President Erdoğan could gain, from an electoral perspective, political benefits from Kurdish constituencies by committing himself to the conflict resolution process. On the other hand, such commitment would risk alienating a considerable part of his nationalist electoral basis, in favour of competitive ultranationalist forces. This tension, already observed in the 2015 political sequence, stalls to this day any significant progress. It highlights a deep-seated blockage, both ideological and structural, which prevents any recognition of Kurdish demands, even the most basic ones, without them being perceived as threats to the unity of the state.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] Thank you for your answer. My next question focuses on recent military operations, led despite the announcement of the ceasefire – correct if I am mistaken – in April or May. In this context, how can one make sense of the fact that, despite this unilateral declaration of a cessation of hostilities, the Turkish army has continued to carry out targeted strikes and operations in Iraq and Syria on several occasions, targeting and killing PKK members? How can this dynamic be reconciled with, or conversely contradict, the prospect of a genuine dialogue for peace between the Turkish state and the representatives or former cadres of the PKK?
[Ahmet İnsel] In this context, it is difficult to truly talk of a peace process. In the Syrian theatre, fighting between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – partially supported by entities close to the PKK – and the Turkish army, or armed groups sponsored by the latter, have seemed to have stopped in the middle of May. Since then, the situation has remained frozen, without any direct confrontation but at the same time without any notable political progress: zones like Afrin and other regions of northern Syria remain under Turkish occupation. In Iraq, however, Turkish strikes against PKK positions are being constantly carried out. The PKK meanwhile claims to have adopted a strictly defensive stance, not responding militarily to these attacks. A fundamental point should be reminded here: the ceasefire was declared unilaterally by the PKK. It is therefore not a bilateral agreement, nor a reciprocal negotiation framework. The Turkish state, here the government led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has never recognised this ceasefire, nor expressed a willingness to engage in negotiations.
On the contrary, Ankara’s position remains firmly unilateral: it consists of demanding an end of the armed struggle, the surrender and self-dissolution of the PKK, without committing to anything in return – whether it is symbolic, legal or political concessions. In these conditions, it becomes difficult to imagine a credible peace dynamic. The end of the PKK’s armed struggle undeniably constitutes a potentially decisive turning point for Turkey and could pave the way for an era of normalisation and democratisation. But if this break with the cycle of violence is to have any lasting meaning, the State of Turkey will have to accompany this development with a concrete political framework, putting an end to the logic of the security state of exception and the repressive policies justified by the “terrorist threat.” Failing that, scepticism remains the order of the day.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] It is indeed striking to observe the mediation role the Government of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, in particular Nechirvan Barzani, has been able to play as part of the discussions between President Erdoğan and Abdullah Öcalan. This intermediary role, while discreet, seems to have weighed in the recent political sequence. My question therefore focuses on the concrete repercussions of the call made by Abdullah Öcalan on February 27, 2025, followed by the PKK congress which took place in Suleimaniye on May 5 and 7. More specifically, what might be the implications of this decision to abandon the armed struggle for the Kurdish regional scene as a whole – in particular the Kurds of Syria, given the fact that the People’s Defence Units (YPG), though functioning autonomously, share deep ideological and organisational affinities with the PKK? Furthermore, how could this evolution be perceived or potentially be exploited by the authorities of Iraqi Kurdistan, in a regional context of recomposition? More broadly speaking, what could the effects of the turning point be on the Kurdish geopolitical equilibrium in the region?
[Ahmet İnsel] Iraqi Kurdistan, in this configuration, only plays a marginal role. The region is indeed dominated by the government of the Barzani clan, whose relations with the PKK have always been tense, predominantly marked by defiance rather than ideological or strategic solidarity. Although the PKK had camps in the region, these were limited to refugee zones under the strict control of Iraqi Kurdish authorities. In the past, we even witnessed episodes of direct confrontation between the two parties. It is, however, in Syria that most of the stakes are currently concentrated. The Turkish government there leads a determined action aimed at preventing any formal recognition of Kurdish autonomy or the emergence of a structured Kurdish political military entity. Ankara exerts in that sense constant pressure on the government of Ahmad al-Sharaa to block any progress in favour of an autonomous administration led by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), to which the YPG are affiliated.
These SDF nevertheless remain to this day the most solid, numerous and best organised armed forces in northern Syria. It is therefore difficult for the interim Syrian government to ignore their military and political weight, generating a dynamic made of ambivalence, deadlocks and hesitation. In this context, Turkey plays a fundamental role in hindering potential negotiations. We thus observe a shift of the centre of gravity of the Kurdish question: the latter no longer takes place solely within Turkish territory, but is also projected to a large extent in Syria. For the State of Turkey, the real “post-PKK” battle is now waged in the Syrian theatre, simultaneously crystallising security, diplomatic and identity-related issues related to the Kurdish question.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] This leads me to my two final questions, which primarily concern the Middle East region as a whole. You have highlighted that the question of Kurdish armed struggle and the dialogue between Turkey and the Kurds could have significant repercussions in Syria. My first question is therefore the following: how could this process redraw Kurdish equilibriums in the Middle East, taking into account Kurdish aspirations in Turkey, Iraq and Syria, which, while different, could be considered globally? What would also be the impact of this process on Kurds in Iran, on which we have less information? Would this call have a particular influence on them, according to you? My second question focuses on the recent escalation between Israel and Iran, still ongoing today, particularly with the intervention of the United States. The latter have expressed their willingness to negotiate with Iran to bring an end to the conflict, while Israel seems willing to end it as well, claiming it has achieved all the necessary missions it had set for itself in relation to the destruction of Iranian nuclear sites. Moreover, Erdoğan has taken a position which condemns Israeli attacks in Iran and defends Iran’s right to retaliate. Yet, over the last few years, this position vis-à-vis Israel has been ambivalent: between relatively cordial economic and commercial ties and a more critical stance, particularly since the events of October 7, 2023 and the tragic situation in Gaza.
Do you think that with this posture taken by Erdoğan, Israel could target Turkey, of course differently than what is happening in Iran? Could Turkey take part in this conflict between Iran and Israel by bringing some support to Tehran, despite a conflictual history between Turkey and Iran – going back to the time of the Ottoman and Sassanid Empires, then more recently of an Islamic Republic and a Turkey that claims to be democratic? According to you, could Turkey offer greater support to Iran, or will it stay cautious, preferring to concentrate on its internal situation, particularly in light of the 2028 presidential election and Erdoğan’s potential candidacy? Or on the contrary, would Turkey adopt a more detached posture regarding current tensions in the Middle East? I am asking you this pretty broad question as I have read, in the press and in the works of certain scholars, analyses which integrate Turkey within this complex context between Iran, Israel and the U.S. As an academic, what is your take on the matter?
[Ahmet İnsel] On the first part of the question, I don’t have a lot of precise information, particularly on the current situation of the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK). As for the Israeli intervention, one really needs to be cautious before making projections arguing that this intervention, coupled with the one led by the U.S., will weaken the Iranian regime and instigate regime change. In my opinion, this is widely detached from reality. This could on the contrary lead to the opposite effect, strengthening patriotic and nationalist sentiment which could consolidate an already fragile regime in terms of internal legitimacy. Regarding Kurdish configuration in the region, a “Kurdish card” does exist, but one should not exaggerate its importance, nor think that the Kurds form an ideologically and politically united, homogenous bloc. The situations in Turkey, Syria, Iraq or even Iran are very different, and it is important to bear in mind the variety of local and identity-related realities. What is clear is that in each country, a majority of Kurds demand the recognition of their identity. In Iraq, this recognition already exists with an autonomous government, a Kurdish-language university and official teaching of the language: it is to this day the only case where the Kurds have a quasi-state and where their demands have been institutionally taken into account. In other regions, these demands are still ongoing, but with different modalities depending on the context. Abdullah Öcalan’s letter to the PKK congress falls within this logic of adapting to new realities. While some historical parts can seem improbable, perhaps even confused or egocentric, his findings on the future are, in my opinion, quite realistic. One should, moreover, not exclude the possibility of Kurds being instrumentalised by local and foreign powers: Israel, Turkey, the U.S. or Iran could seek to use them for their own gains. The big question remains: will Turkey eventually withdraw from the territories it occupies in Syria? This remains of central importance. In the end, the Kurdish question will go on, under different forms, and each regional power will probably keep playing its Kurdish card in its own way. It is therefore to the Kurds to define an autonomous strategy, which is far from easy.
Regarding Turkey-Israel relations, one must avoid giving in to certain fantasies. Erdoğan’s posture, as well as some declarations made by Israeli hawks, do not reflect a true willingness to engage in direct confrontation. Israel has neither the wish nor the interest to enter into open conflict with Turkey, and vice versa, Turkey does not have an interest in engaging in direct confrontation with Israel. Indirectly, Erdoğan has been supporting Hamas with great firmness, without completely cutting off economic ties with Israel, which reflects this ambivalence. Regarding the conflict between Iran and Israel, the current moderate position adopted by Turkey is, in my opinion, the most rational: neither unconditional support to Iran, nor justification of the unilateral attacks led by Israel. This stance, that some might judge as opportunistic or exceedingly prudent, in reality fits a state logic which seeks to preserve its strategic interests and internal stability.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] Thank you very much for all your answers. They were all detailed and precise, and have allowed me to better comprehend the situation in Turkey as well as the situation of the Kurds mainly from Turkey and their impact on the region generally speaking. Thank you for your time. Have a wonderful day.
[Ahmet İnsel] Thank you. Goodbye.
