The sequence set in motion by the recent wave of diplomatic recognition and by the announcement of a twenty-point American plan for Gaza has shifted the Palestinian question from the symbolic realm to a more operational dynamic — provided it is accompanied by tangible levers of implementation. The fact that a large majority of United Nations member states now recognize Palestine confers upon it a political identity that can no longer be relegated to the periphery of the international system. At the same time, France too has taken the step of recognition, seeking to anchor it within a broader strategy aimed at the “sanctuarization” of the two-state solution. This momentum is reshaping diplomatic coalitions and reopening margins of initiative for Europe. Yet, on its own, it remains insufficient to generate effective sovereignty. The core challenge, therefore, lies in transforming a powerful political signal into concrete outcomes — despite Israeli opposition on the ground, the often-obstructive role of the United States within the Security Council, and the institutional fragmentation of the Palestinian polity. Several questions thus arise in this context: Is this merely a symbolic gesture, or does it mark the starting point of an irreversible dynamic? How does this decision reshape the balance among Israel, the Arab states, Europe, and the United States? And above all, what concrete prospects does it open for a people whose right to self-determination has been constrained for more than seventy-five years?
A Belated but Historically Pivotal Recognition
If the recognition came “late,” it is because it was made possible by a rare confluence of otherwise misaligned factors. First and foremost, the humanitarian urgency: after nearly two years of war and more than 52,000 deaths in Gaza, according to UN figures, the situation created a moral and political imperative that could no longer be ignored. Civil society pressure — from NGOs, lawyers, and trade unions — also weighed heavily on European governments. In France, the open letter signed by 400 journalists demanding the resumption of evacuations, the legal actions brought before the International Criminal Court by the NGO Pour la Justice au Moyen-Orient, the trade union mobilizations of 14 June 2025 in Paris, and the launch of humanitarian flotillas such as Global Sumud, all compelled the executive to act. This decision was announced in a uniquely charged diplomatic context: the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly, co-organized by France and Saudi Arabia, during which Emmanuel Macron declared, “The time for peace has come, for we are moments away from losing our grasp on it.” By conditioning the opening of a Palestinian embassy in Paris upon a ceasefire and the release of hostages, the French president sought to “sanctuarize” the two-state solution without appearing overtly hostile to Israel. This stance — balancing legal firmness and political caution — marks a historic turning point for French diplomacy.
France’s recognition is part of a long diplomatic continuum, oscillating between solidarity with Israel, fidelity to international law, and political restraint. Since the 1970s, Paris has alternated between symbolic gestures and prudence: the opening of the Palestine Liberation Organization office in 1975, the Mitterrand–Arafat meeting in 1989, and France’s support for Palestine’s accession to UNESCO (2011) and its observer status at the UN (2012). Under Emmanuel Macron, France’s position gradually evolved. Initially close to Benjamin Netanyahu and admiring of Israel’s “entrepreneurial spirit,” Macron had shown limited engagement with the Palestinian issue. Yet, as the Gaza war and humanitarian crisis deepened, his stance shifted. Following his visit to a humanitarian post in the Sinai, a letter from Mahmoud Abbas, and mounting public pressure, he ultimately formalized France’s recognition — seeking to reconcile legal principles with the realities of the conflict.
What Resonance in French and Israeli Societies?
In France, the impact was immediate. Presented by the executive as an act of moral consistency, it unfolded within a tense national climate marked by a “historic” surge in antisemitic incidents since 2023—rekindling deep-seated memory fractures and compelling the government to clarify the distinction between criticism of the Israeli government and antisemitism. While 68% of French citizens consider antisemitism a societal threat, 78% declared themselves opposed to an “immediate and unconditional”recognition of Palestine, according to an IFOP survey. Despite the Élysée’s intention to frame this move as an act of balance and to embody a coherent European stance, the decision encountered a fractured domestic landscape—shaped by security concerns, memory-based tensions, partisan divides, and a volatile public opinion in which support for the two-state principle does not necessarily translate into endorsement of immediate recognition.
In an already fragmented Israeli society, this decision deepened the polarization between a nationalist camp convinced that France was “rewarding” Hamas and a majority of Israelis wary of the war and acutely aware of their country’s growing diplomatic isolation. The demonstrations against the Rafah offensives in May 2024 and the calls for the Prime Minister’s resignation reflected a profound sense of fatigue that had set in since 2024. According to a Maariv Institute survey, more than 70% of citizens deemed the government’s military strategy ineffective, while 74% favored a negotiated end to the war involving a gradual withdrawal from Gaza. Far from being perceived as a military threat, European recognition instead acts as a mirror: it reveals to part of the Israeli population the growing costs of international isolation and the fragility of a national project trapped in a perpetual siege mentality.
Tightening of the Washington – Tel Aviv axis
The Washington–Tel Aviv axis remains the principal architect of the parameters of action. The UN sequence of September 2025 starkly illustrated this divergence: on one side, European capitals eager to translate into action the exhaustion of the traditional peace process; on the other, an American–Israeli tandem entrenched in a security-based rationale and the doctrine of so-called “preventive responses.” On 22 September 2025, The Washington Post ran a front-page headline: “France Defies Trump”. The following day, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took the podium at the United Nations, brandishing a map of “Greater Israel” during his speech and accusing Paris of “building a Palestinian state on the blood of the victims of October 7.” Israel’s ambassador to France, Joshua Zarka, went so far as to describe Emmanuel Macron as “a destabilizing agent in the Middle East.”
The United States had refused to grant a visa to Mahmoud Abbas to attend the UN General Assembly plenary session on 21 September, before unveiling their own “Plan for Gaza” — presented by Donald Trump on 29 September. This twenty-point plan, ostensibly aimed at reconstruction and a ceasefire under the supervision of an Arab–Western coalition, was widely perceived as a direct response to the UN recognition of Palestine. Yet the plan remains profoundly asymmetrical, imposing draconian conditions on the Palestinian population while sidestepping the core issue of Palestinian sovereignty. At the level of international law, Washington continues to invoke the right to self-defense to justify its military support for Israel. Yet the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has repeatedly affirmed that preventive self-defense, in the absence of an imminent threat, has no legal foundation, and that collective punishment is expressly prohibited under the 1948 Geneva Conventions[1].
Thus, while the United States effectively endorses Israeli impunity, the Hebrew State finds itself more isolated than ever. Its trade relations with Europe are deteriorating, and several European chancelleries — notably those of the United Kingdom, Spain, and Norway — have imposed individual sanctions on ministers such as Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich.
European Common Front: Diplomatic Symbolism and Economic Leverage?
In September 2025, the European Commission proposed the partial suspension of the tariff preferences granted to Israel—covering approximately €5.8 billion worth of exports and amounting to an estimated €227 million in additional duties per year. At the same time, nine European countries—Belgium, Spain, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, and Sweden—called for the launch of negotiations to ban trade with Israeli settlements. This measure would extend the Psagotjurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (2019), which already mandates the labeling of products originating from the occupied territories.
France, whose exports to Israel amounted to $1.8 billion in 2024 (COMTRADE), remains exposed in several sensitive sectors — pharmaceuticals, high technology, and dual-use goods among them. A policy of stricter controls could be implemented to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law. These economic measures are not punitive but rather incentive-based: the aim is to make the continuation of settlement expansion more costly than its economic freeze. Through its regulatory instruments, the EU could thus establish a direct link between compliance with international resolutions and access to its commercial benefits.
On the Ground: Impunity for Israel
From a more empirical perspective, recent months have confirmed the centrality of settlement expansion as a tool of territorial domination. The E1[2] project, approved on August 2, 2025, epitomizes this strategy: it involves a vast tract of roughly 12,000 hectares located between East Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Bethlehem, designed to connect Jerusalem to West Bank settlements through a corridor of infrastructure and housing. This project—condemned by 21 countries on August 20, 2025 (including France, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia)—would create a major territorial discontinuity between the northern and southern parts of the West Bank. The expulsions of Bedouin families from Atallah al-Jahalin, the demolition of homes, and the confiscation of land in East Jerusalem exemplify what Israeli political scientist Oren Yiftachel calls a “governance by exception,” a system in which the application of law depends on identity and ethnic affiliation.
This policy violates not only the UN Charter and Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 but also the Geneva Convention, which prohibits the annexation of territories and the transfer of civilian populations. International Court of Justice (ICJ) has already ruled the construction of the separation wall, erected in 2004, illegal, and characterized the regime imposed on Palestinians as one of “apartheid.” Thus, while Western chancelleries continue to invoke the two-state solution, Israel is pursuing an irreversible territorial reconfiguration. The recognition of Palestine therefore takes on the value of a legal act of resistance — a means of reaffirming that international law remains the only safeguard against the logic of fait accompli.
Sovereignty Under Construction: Law, Economy, and Institutions
International law should not serve merely as a moral compass but as a genuine operating framework for international relations. The Montevideo Convention sets out four criteria for statehood: a permanent population, a defined territory, an effective government, and the capacity to engage in international relations. Of these four, Palestine meets only two. It possesses a population and administrative institutions (the Palestinian Authority), as well as an extensive—though unofficial—diplomatic presence. However, it controls neither its borders nor its customs, and has no sovereignty over its water or energy resources.. The Oslo I and II Accord, along with the Paris Protocol established an asymmetric customs union in which Israel collects Palestinian tax revenues and transfers them at its discretion, leading to recurring budgetary crises.
To build genuine sovereignty and move beyond this outdated framework, economists Arie Reich and Guy Harpaz recommend replacing the current customs union with an asymmetric free trade agreement that would give Palestine control over its own trade policy. Europe could support this transition by helping to establish an independent customs administration, facilitating trade corridors with Jordan and Egypt, and securing private investment through public guarantees. Yet economic sovereignty alone is not enough. It must be accompanied by restored institutional legitimacy. The Palestinian Authority suffers from a lack of efficiency and public trust, while Hamas derives its legitimacy from armed resistance. The formation of a national unity government is therefore essential; it would help restore a unified political voice and enable negotiations on a coherent basis. Legal scholar Omar Dajani, for instance, has proposed the establishment of a transitional international administration to oversee this phase, and ensure a gradual transition toward sovereignty.
Such an architecture, though complex, would avoid the pitfalls of foreign tutelage while ensuring the stability and credibility of a future Palestinian state.
Toward a Reconfiguration of Arab Policies?
The regional dynamic is undergoing a cautious reconfiguration. Egypt, a historic partner in the peace negotiations, remains a key diplomatic pivot. Cairo has drawn several red lines:
- Rejection of any forced displacement of Palestinians toward the Sinai;
- Denunciation of what it has termed “genocidal acts”;
- A central role in mediation efforts through the Rafah and Kerem Shalom border crossings
In September 2025, President Al-Sisi went further, suggesting that Egypt might reconsider the Camp David Accords[3] Israeli operations were to continue. Jordan—where more than half the population is of Palestinian origin—had already recalled its ambassador in 2023 and remains one of the most outspoken Arab states against Israeli violations. Qatar, which was targeted by Israeli airstrikes in Doha on September 9, 2025, nonetheless maintains its role as a key mediator between Hamas, Israel, and Washington. In the Gulf, the United Arab Emirates—signatories of the 2020 Abraham Accords—have raised their tone at the UN, warning that any annexation in the West Bank would “jeopardize normalization.” Saudi Arabia, for its part, continues to pursue an agenda centered on U.S. guarantees in defense and civilian nuclear cooperation, now decoupled from immediate normalization with Israel, while still conditioning any diplomatic openings on progress regarding the Palestinian question.
These shifts do not signal a rupture but rather a rebalancing of regional power dynamics, as each actor seeks to capitalize on the international recognition of Palestine to strengthen its own regional legitimacy.
Toward a European Roadmap for Effective Sovereignty
Nearly 70% of Palestinians are under thirty. This generation, shaped by war, deprivation, and humiliation, represents both a potential asset and a serious vulnerability. Deprived of political horizons and economic prospects, they may become an easy target for radical narratives. Yet, if guided toward education, mental health, and international mobility, it could become the very heart of a sustainable reconstruction.
France and the European Union possess powerful levers: scholarship programs, dual-degree partnerships, city networks, and academic and cultural cooperation. These policies, often perceived as humanitarian in nature, are in fact strategic instruments — they help build social stability and prepare the groundwork for future local governance capable of embodying recognized sovereignty.Building on previous initiatives, Europe could turn this political recognition into a structuring tool, organized around five complementary pillars.
- Legally, this could involve embedding references to the Montevideo Convention and to the designation of “apartheid” within European diplomatic instruments, in order to provide a clear foundation for the adoption of graduated sanctions.
- Economically, the European Union could initiate a gradual withdrawal from the Paris Protocol and work toward the establishment of an asymmetric free trade agreement between Palestine and the EU.
- Institutionally, it could support the formation of a national unity government and the establishment of a transitional administration under international supervision.
- In terms of security, the goal would be to guarantee a clear sequence — including the release of hostages, a ceasefire, humanitarian access, and a freeze on settlement construction — all under international monitoring.
- Diplomatically, Europe could adopt a conditionality framework encompassing product traceability, the exclusion of settlement goods, targeted sanctions, and selective suspensions in cases of severe violations.
Within this framework, France is walking a fine line: its recognition allows it to reposition itself at the center of UN diplomatic efforts, but also exposes it to a deeply divided domestic landscape. The clarity of political discourse thus becomes as crucial as diplomacy itself — to explain international norms, to distinguish criticism of a state from hatred of a people, and to remind that stability in the Levant is a strategic interest for all of Europe, and for France in particular.
A passage from symbol to reality?
What is unfolding today extends far beyond Palestine. Recognition is no longer a mere moral gesture — it has become a test of credibility for the international system. It reshuffles priorities, redraws alliances, and compels major powers to choose between the rhetoric of law and the reality of power politics.
If Europe and France can channel this momentum into a coherent strategy, the two-state solution could once again become operational. The European Single Market, often viewed solely as an economic instrument, could evolve into a geopolitical tool. By linking its benefits to respect for human rights and international law, it would impose a logic of balance where asymmetry now prevails.
Thus, the recognition of the State of Palestine must not be seen as an end, but as a beginning — the beginning of sovereignty to be built, of a state to be strengthened, and of an international order to be rebuilt around law and human dignity. As Tunisian jurist Yadh Ben Achour once reminded us, “Law is not merely an instrument; it is the voice through which humanity seeks to escape suffering.” The recognition of Palestine, if accompanied by concrete action, could at last restore meaning to that voice.
Notes
[1] Killing members of the group (1) – Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group (2) – Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part (3) – Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group (4) – Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (5 — not observed for Israel).
[2] Israeli Plan: A project aimed at connecting the Ma’ale Adumim settlement to East Jerusalem through the construction of thousands of housing units and infrastructure in a strategic area of the West Bank. [Source: France Diplomatie]
[3] Camp David Accords (1978–1979): Established peace between Egypt and Israel, leading to Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula in exchange for Egypt’s recognition of Israel — marking the first peace agreement between an Arab state and Israel.
