[Lyna Ouandjeli and Héloïse Liebenberg]
Good afternoon, and thank you very much for agreeing to speak with us. Today, we would like to explore in greater depth the situation in Iran, which has experienced significant waves of demonstrations since late December and January. These protests have been met with force by the regime. They began with economic grievances but gradually evolved into broader social and political demands. At the same time, the situation has been subject to various forms of internal and external interpretation and, at times, manipulation.
Our objective today is to provide greater clarity and to benefit from your analysis of the Iranian situation. Thank you again for accepting this interview. Before we begin our questions, we would like to give you the opportunity to introduce yourself.
[Marie Ladier-Fouladi]
Thank you very much for the invitation.
My name is Marie Ladier-Fouladi. I am a sociologist and demographer, and I serve as Honorary Director of Research at the CNRS. The principal focus of my research throughout my academic career has been Iran, particularly Iran following the rise to power of the Islamists in 1979.
[Lyna Ouandjeli and Héloïse Liebenberg]
Popular mobilizations in Iran are often presented as isolated or recent events. However, Iran has experienced multiple waves of demonstrations since the establishment of the Islamic Republic. In your view, how should we understand the current protest movements within the broader historical trajectory of post-1979 Iran?
[Marie Ladier-Fouladi]
Since the Islamists came to power in 1979, Iran has experienced recurring waves of protest. In the early years of the Islamic Republic, these mobilizations were relatively dispersed and localized. Over time, however, they became more structured and more politically articulated. A particularly significant episode occurred in 2009, following the presidential elections. That period gave rise to what became known as the Green Movement. The protests were sparked by allegations of electoral fraud after the re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad against Hossein Mousavi. Large segments of the population challenged the results, leading to substantial mobilization, especially in urban centers.
This episode represented a major political turning point. However, its demands remained focused primarily on electoral integrity and reform within the system. Beginning in 2017, a new phase of mobilization emerged. Protests expanded geographically, extending beyond large cities into smaller towns and more economically vulnerable regions. The demands also shifted. Economic grievances—such as unemployment, rising prices, declining purchasing power, and corruption—became central. These were no longer limited to middle-class urban reformist claims but reflected broader socio-economic frustration.
More recently, we have observed protests that incorporate strong symbolic elements, particularly concerning women’s rights. However, it is essential not to reduce the movement solely to the question of the veil. While the veil has become a powerful symbol, the underlying demands concern dignity, freedom, recognition, and broader structural change. The current protests are therefore not unprecedented. They are part of a longer historical dynamic of contestation within the Islamic Republic. What distinguishes the present moment is the breadth of social participation and the systemic nature of the demands being expressed.
[Lyna Ouandjeli and Héloïse Liebenberg]
You mentioned the evolution of protest movements since 2009 and especially since 2017. Many analysts emphasize the generational dimension of the current mobilizations. A large portion of Iran’s population today was born after the 1979 Revolution and has no direct experience of the ideological and political context that shaped the establishment of the Islamic Republic. How does this generational transformation affect the relationship between society and the state, and how does it influence the nature of contemporary protest movements?
[Marie Ladier-Fouladi]
The generational dimension is indeed fundamental to understanding the current situation. The majority of young Iranians today were born after the Revolution. They did not experience the revolutionary moment, the war with Iraq, or the early consolidation of the Islamic Republic. As a result, their political socialization is fundamentally different from that of earlier generations. This younger generation has grown up in a society that is both highly educated and deeply connected to global cultural and informational flows. Iran has experienced a significant expansion of higher education over the past decades, including among women. Consequently, expectations regarding personal autonomy, professional opportunity, and civic participation have increased considerably. At the same time, institutional structures have not evolved at the same pace. There remains a structural concentration of authority within the framework of the Islamic Republic, particularly through the doctrine of velayat-e faqih, which grants ultimate authority to the Supreme Leader. This creates a structural asymmetry between societal dynamism and institutional rigidity.
Young people are therefore not merely expressing dissatisfaction; they are articulating claims grounded in education, social experience, and comparative awareness. Their demands concern dignity, participation, economic opportunity, and individual freedoms. These claims are neither incoherent nor externally imposed. They are rooted in lived social reality. The generational gap thus contributes to a growing disconnect between state institutions and segments of society. This does not necessarily mean that all young people reject the political system in identical terms, but it does indicate that expectations have evolved in ways that existing structures struggle to accommodate.
[Lyna Ouandjeli and Héloïse Liebenberg]
In several waves of protest, economic grievances appear to have acted as a trigger. Demonstrations in 2017 and 2019, for example, were widely described as being driven by economic hardship. To what extent can the current discontent be linked to economic policy decisions implemented over the past decades, particularly reforms affecting subsidies, public spending, and social redistribution?
[Marie Ladier-Fouladi]
Economic factors have played a significant role in successive waves of protest. One particularly important reform occurred under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad between 2009 and 2010. Historically, the Iranian state used oil revenues to subsidize essential goods and services directly. This mechanism reduced prices at the point of consumption and formed part of a redistributive model. Ahmadinejad introduced a major restructuring of this system. Instead of maintaining low prices through subsidies, the government replaced them with direct cash transfers to households. In theory, this approach aimed to rationalize state spending and target assistance more efficiently. However, over time, it contributed to inflationary pressures and fiscal strain.
Combined with international sanctions, structural inefficiencies, and governance challenges, these economic reforms intensified social frustration. Rising living costs, unemployment—particularly among educated youth—and declining purchasing power became central concerns. Economic grievances are therefore not isolated from political dynamics. They intersect with perceptions of inequality, corruption, and limited institutional responsiveness. As a result, economic protest can rapidly acquire broader political dimensions.
[Lyna Ouandjeli and Héloïse Liebenberg]
Beyond economic and generational factors, the institutional architecture of the Islamic Republic appears to shape the dynamics of protest and reform. In particular, the relationship between the elected president and the Supreme Leader has often been described as structurally imbalanced. How does this institutional configuration influence political mobilization and the prospects for reform?
[Marie Ladier-Fouladi]
The institutional structure of the Islamic Republic is characterized by a dual dimension: elected institutions coexist with unelected authorities. While the president is elected by popular vote, ultimate authority resides with the Supreme Leader, whose legitimacy is grounded in both political and religious doctrine. Since the late 1990s, and particularly after 1999, tensions between reformist presidents and the Supreme Leader have become more visible. Presidents may advocate for reform or greater openness, but their capacity to implement structural change remains constrained by institutional limits.
This configuration reduces the effectiveness of electoral channels as mechanisms for systemic transformation. When citizens perceive that electoral participation does not produce substantive policy change, frustration can accumulate. Moreover, because the Supreme Leader’s authority is rooted in the doctrine of velayat-e faqih, political dissent may be framed as religious defiance. This framing can shape the state’s response to protest movements, reinforcing cycles of mobilization and repression. Thus, institutional rigidity plays a significant role in shaping the dynamics of protest.
[Lyna Ouandjeli and Héloïse Liebenberg]
In addition to internal dynamics, Iran operates within a highly complex regional and international environment. Regional tensions, including those involving Israel, Hezbollah, and Hamas, as well as negotiations with Western powers, appear to influence domestic political discourse. How do external pressures and geopolitical developments interact with internal protest movements?
[Marie Ladier-Fouladi]
Iran’s domestic political dynamics cannot be entirely separated from its regional and international positioning. The Islamic Republic operates within a geopolitical environment marked by persistent tensions, strategic rivalries, and fluctuating diplomatic engagements. Regional escalations, particularly those involving Israel and armed non-state actors such as Hezbollah or Hamas, contribute to a political climate in which national sovereignty and external threat narratives are emphasized. In such contexts, the leadership may invoke external pressure as a unifying factor, framing internal dissent within a broader struggle for national security and independence.
This external dimension can have a dual effect. On the one hand, it may consolidate segments of the population around the idea of national sovereignty. On the other hand, it can exacerbate economic difficulties, particularly when tensions lead to sanctions or diplomatic isolation. Negotiations with international actors, including the United States, also shape economic conditions. Even limited diplomatic openings can influence currency stability, investment expectations, and public perception. Conversely, diplomatic breakdowns may intensify economic strain. The regime must therefore manage a delicate balance: addressing internal dissatisfaction while navigating regional strategic pressures. These external dynamics do not create protest movements, but they form part of the broader structural context within which internal grievances develop.
[Lyna Ouandjeli and Héloïse Liebenberg]
In several recent protest movements, women have played a central and visible role. International media have often focused on the issue of the compulsory veil as the defining symbol of mobilization. From a sociological perspective, how should we interpret the prominence of women in these demonstrations, and how should we understand the symbolic and structural dimensions of their claims?
[Marie Ladier-Fouladi]
Women’s participation in protest movements in Iran has deep historical roots. Women were active participants in the 1979 Revolution, and they have remained central actors in various forms of civic engagement since then. The prominence of women in recent demonstrations must be understood within the broader context of educational and social transformation. Over the past decades, women’s access to higher education has expanded significantly. In many fields, women constitute a substantial proportion of university graduates. This educational transformation has reshaped expectations regarding professional life, public participation, and personal autonomy.
The issue of the compulsory veil has become a powerful symbol because it represents state regulation of the body and, more broadly, state authority over personal autonomy. However, reducing women’s mobilization to the veil alone would oversimplify the movement. The demands being articulated concern broader questions of dignity, equality, legal rights, and social recognition. Women’s activism reflects structural contradictions within Iranian society: high levels of education and social participation coexist with legal and institutional constraints. This tension contributes to sustained mobilization. The visibility of women in protests therefore signals not only opposition to a specific regulation but also a broader aspiration for structural change.
[Lyna Ouandjeli and Héloïse Liebenberg]
Given the recurrence of protest cycles, the generational shifts within society, and the institutional rigidity you have described, how do you assess the broader trajectory of Iranian society? Are these movements indicative of gradual transformation, structural impasse, or cyclical contestation?
[Marie Ladier-Fouladi]
Iranian society has undergone profound transformation over the past four decades. Demographic transition, expansion of education, urbanization, and technological connectivity have reshaped social expectations and modes of engagement. These structural changes generate aspirations that are not easily contained within existing institutional frameworks. However, transformation does not necessarily follow a linear trajectory. It often unfolds through periods of contestation, adjustment, and reconfiguration. The recurrence of protest movements suggests that underlying tensions remain unresolved. At the same time, the persistence of mobilization indicates a society that remains politically conscious and socially engaged.
Whether this dynamic leads to gradual reform, structural reconfiguration, or continued cyclical protest depends on multiple factors, including institutional adaptability, economic conditions, and regional developments. What can be stated with certainty is that the movements we observe are not episodic anomalies. They are expressions of long-term structural evolution within Iranian society.
[Concluding Remarks]
Iran’s contemporary protest movements must be understood within a continuum of post-1979 political and social developments. They reflect generational transformation, economic strain, institutional constraints, and evolving expectations regarding dignity, participation, and rights. Reducing these mobilizations to a single issue—whether economic hardship or the veil—would obscure the structural depth of the phenomena. They are multidimensional, rooted in lived experience, and embedded in both national and regional contexts. Understanding Iran today requires attention to historical continuity, institutional architecture, socio-economic restructuring, and the evolving relationship between society and state.
