Introduction – Nuclear power does not explain everything, but it reveals everything
In the confrontation between Israel and Iran, the nuclear issue has emerged as the dominant factor. It shapes political discourse, justifies military strikes, mobilises foreign ministries and fuels fears. Yet this central role is misleading. Nuclear power is not the root cause of the conflict, it is the most telling indicator of it. It crystalizes a deeper crisis : the regional system’s inability to foster mutual respect among its members, and the erosion of an international order that states now prefer to circumvent, defy or withdraw from. The central issue is therefore not merely the proliferation. It arises from the opposition of two different kinds of mistrust. Indeed, Iran is using the nuclear threshold to challenge an international order that it considers asymmetrical and hypocritical. israël’s position does not, however, amount to the world order as such, but rather reflects scepticism regarding the system’s actual ability to guarantee the security of the Jewish state in the face of an environment it regards as structurally hostile.
In both cases, nuclear power becomes less of a weapon and more of a political language: a language that allows one to signal without striking, to threaten without declaring war, and to manage uncertainty without bearing the maximum cost. This is why the Israeli attack in June 2025 cannot be adequately interpreted either as a mere counter-proliferation operation or as an isolated military incident. It is part of a sequence that began on 7 October 2023, amidst the erosion of the unwritten rules of the shadow war between israël and Iran, and within a broader realignment in which international law is simultaneously invoked, circumvented and disregarded.
I. What a threshold nuclear Iran means for Israel
For Israel, the threat posed by Iran on the threshold of nuclear capability is not a theoretical scenario. It is the very concrete prospect that an adversary which denies Israel’s legitimacy and supports its regional enemies might one day use nuclear deterrence to shield its hostility, its strategy of regional destabilisation and its support for armed groups. The available data supports this interpretation: in its 2025 report, the IAEA estimates that, as of 13 June 2025, Iran held 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60 per cent – a level very close to the military threshold – and that the Agency cannot guarantee that Iran’s programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes. In the same year, the British Parliament pointed out that no other non-nuclear-weapon state recognised under the NTP produces or stockpiles such quantities at this level of enrichment. This constitutes a breach of Iran’s obligation under the NTP, but that is not the only issue. To understand the depth of Israel’s concern, one must look beyond the technical aspects to interrogate the political roots of the conflict.
For Israel, a nuclear Iran does not only represent the risk of a future attack; it also poses the threat of a lasting restriction on its freedom of action. An Iran on the threshold of nuclear capability could continue to fund, arm or encourage hostile actors, while radically complicating Israel’s strategic calculations by making the cost of an expanded response unpredictable. The weapon, or even the quasi-weapon, then serves as a mechanism for sanctifying hostility. This is precisely what makes the nuclear issue an existential concern in Israeli doctrine and a multifaceted challenge, in that it combines the ballistic missile threat, proxy war, the memory of calls for Israel’s annihilation, and the fear that the window of opportunity for action is closing. This interpretation is one possible reading, but it is fully consistent with the analyses of Israel’s “secularisation” in relation to Iran and the evolving shadow war.
This fear is part of a longer political history marked by persecution in Europe, the failure of external guarantees, and a deep mistrust of international protection. Several academic studies point out that Israeli suspicion of Europe is also rooted in the history of the persecution of Jews on the continent and in the persistent disconnect, in Israel’s view, between European moral imperatives and the reality of its own security imperatives. An academic article on UE-Israel relations explicitly notes that Israeli mistrust of the European Union is rooted in Europe’s history of persecution and the atrocities of the Second World War. Another study by the Begin-Sadat Centre describes Israeli mistrust of Europe’s motives and actions as a recurring feature of the bilateral relationship.
This mistrust is now being expressed openly. In May 2025, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar accused European officials of fuelling “toxic anti-Semitic incitement”. In March-April 2026, Franco-Israeli relations deteriorated further, to the point that Le Monde described Israel as “turning its back” on France, while Paris was criticized by Israël and the United States in the context of the war against Iran. These are not proof of an overarching anti-european doctrine, but they are strong indications of an Israeli perception of Europe as a region that is at once moralizing, unstable and potentially failing.
This is where the issue of 7 October comes to the fore. Open-source information does not allow us that Iran directed the Hamas attack in the operational sense of the term. As early as 9 October 2023, Reuters reported that the White House considered Iran to be an “accomplice”, while making it clear that it had no evidence of direct Iranian involvement in the attack. On 10 October, Reuters also reported that Khamenei denied any direct involvement, while welcoming the attack. Further information reported by Reuters in November 2023 suggests that Khamenei informed the Hamas leader that Tehran had not been warned in advance and that it would not go to war on the movement’s behalf. In other words, the theory of a direct command has not been publicly established; that of strategic, logistical, financial, and ideological responsibility, however, is much more firmly established.
It is this point that allows for a strong political hypothesis: for some in Israel, June 2025 did not open a new front; it shifted the war towards what is perceived as its center of gravity. 7 October shattered the illusion that the shadow war with Iran, made by proxy, threshold, and indirect deterrence, was still sufficient to contain the risk. Carnegie put it clearly after the direct strikes of April 2024: the Israeli-Iranian shadow war is “over” as such, and new “rules of engagement” appear to be taking hold. This interpretation does not amount to proof of outright revenge; rather, it supports the argument that, on the Israeli side, the post-7 October period has broadened the definition of self-defense to include Iran, which is regarded as the main driver for regional insecurity. Nevertheless, the interpretation must be criticized.
Indeed, the more Israel combines the trauma of 7 October, the threat from proxies and the nuclear issue within a single framework, the greater the risks that it will turn prevention into a policy of regional reshaping. Following this line of reasoning, the reality does not support the claim that a sudden weakening of the Iranian regime would result in a more stable, more cooperative or less hostile Iran in the long term. Part of Israel’s gamble thus rests on an uncertain political projection : that the cost of inaction will be higher than that of action likely to destabilise the region even further. This is a strategically understandable line of reasoning ; it is not, however, a stabilizing one.
If Israel views Iran’s nuclear programme as an existential threat, it would be a mistake to reduce Iran’s stance to a mere quest for survival. Iran’s nuclear programme is not merely a potential lifeline. It is also a means of protest, a challenge to both the regional order and the international normative framework.
II. Iran : the threshold strategy as a form of political protest
Iran has not merely developed sensitive capabilities, but it has built a policy of the threshold. This policy is based on a paradox: remaining legally within the NTP, asserting a right to civil nuclear power, and not officially crossing the threshold to weapons, while coming close enough to it to transform this latent capability into a strategic lever. The IAEA, which continues to monitor declared materials, highlights the growing limitations on its verification capabilities, since Iran restricted the Agency’s access and disrupted the “continuity of knowledge” regarding certain parts of the programme following the erosion of the JCPOA. Reuters noted in June 2025 that the IAEA no longer had the comprehensive overview it had before the American withdrawal from the agreement and the restrictions subsequently imposed by Iran.
This threshold strategy has an obvious capability dimension, but it is also a strategic manoeuvre. By stockpiling uranium enriched at 60% Iran is sending a message of power, without, yet bearing the full cost of a nuclear capability. By remaining a party to the NTP, Iran retains a valuable argumentative resource: that of a state party which claims to be subject to inspections and which denounces the double standards of an international order that is far more tolerant towards Israël, a de facto nuclear power but not a party to the treaty. This line of reasoning strikes a very real note in parts of the Global South, precisely because it highlights a legal and political asymmetry that is hard to deny. SIPRI, like the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, points out that Israel, along with India and Pakistan, is one of the states not party to the NTP.
This Iranian strategy is not merely a matter of opportunistic calculation. It is a part of a political experience shaped by the Iran-Iraq war, by the memory of a profound strategic isolation, and by the conviction that international guarantees are reversible. From this perspective, the nuclear threshold is not only a tool for protest ; it is also perceived as a form of minimal security in an environment deemed structurally unstable. But this interpretation remains incomplete. Iran is not content to protect itself : it projects power. Its strategy combines the memory of the Iraqi trauma, rivalry with the Gulf powers, and the construction of a sphere of regional influence based on armed proxies.
The revolutionary Guards play a key role here. Their doctrine is aimed not only at defending the regime, but also at establishing a lasting balance of power, in which Israel serves as a focal point for mobilisation that is as much ideological as it is strategic. This ideological dimension is also embodied in initiatives such as Al-Quds Day, where the Israeli question is presented as a central issue for mobilisation. Whilst not providing sufficient proof, this example illustrates the place Israel occupies in Iranian strategy, as a focal point enabling the articulation of political discourse, internal legitimisation and regional projection.
From this perspective, reaching the nuclear threshold takes on an additional function : it is no longer a matter of deterring an attack or ensuring the regime’s survival, but of safeguarding a sphere of influence that is currently being consolidated. The weapon – or even the quasi-weapon – does not only protect a territory, it protects a balance of power. It would enable Iran to pursue its regional influence by making any external attempts to challenge this balance far more costly.
We must therefore look beyond the term “nuclear programme”. For Tehran, the nuclear threshold is a way of operating on the fringes of the law to expose its flaws. It is less a withdrawal from the system than a methodical exploitation of its inconsistencies. Iran can thus maintain that it does not possess the weapon, that it remains within the treaty, that it is under exceptional pressure, and therefore that the system does not protect those who formally play by the rules. Reuters also noted in June 2025 that, in the context of the Israeli strikes, some Iranian voices were threatening to consider withdrawing from the NTP, because a treaty incapable of protecting a state party under attack by a de facto nuclear state had lost its political purpose[1].
However, we must remain vigilant, this point must not lead us to underestimate the offensive nature of Iran’s stance. This nuclear ambiguity is not underpinned by a neutral doctrinal environment. It is backed by rhetoric of radical hostility towards Israel, a political culture of mobilisation against the enemy, and longstanding support for armed organisations that have made the struggle against Israel part of their identity. The fact that no decisive public evidence establishes an Iranian operational order on 7 October in no way exonerates Tehran on the strategic front. Reuters spoke of Iranian “complicity” without proof of direct command; it is precisely this grey area that is the strength of Iran’s strategy: being involved enough to exert influence, yet sufficiently removed to maintain plausible deniability.
Here, we need to keep two ideas in mind.
- Firstly : Hamas did not necessarily act as the executor of an Iranian order.
- Second : its action forms part of an ideological, financial and military ecosystem of which Iran is one of the most consistent architects.
This distinction is important because it avoids two opposing errors: one that would automatically cast Iran as the mastermind behind the 7 October attack, and one that would exonerate it on the grounds that no direct chain of command has been publicly established. In reality, Tehran may well have been taken by surprise by the timing or scale of the operation, whilst remaining politically responsible for the strategic environment that made it possible.
The consequences of this dual logic is decisive: neither Israel nor Iran fully adheres to the spirit of the system, both Israel and Iran, each in their own way, set themselves apart from the norms of the international non-proliferation regime. One world from within to expose its contradictions ; the other keeps its distance in the name of its security. Consequently, the nuclear crisis also becomes a crisis of law.
III. Israel, Iran and International law : from coercition to suspicion
The juridical debate surrounding the June 2025 strikes is indicative of the state of the international system. Reuters noted that the IAEA could monitor certain aspects of Iran’s programme without, however, being able to guarantee its peaceful nature, particularly due to a lack of full access and “continuity of knowledge”. This fragility of verification fuels the Israeli argument that waiting would pose a greater risk than taking action. Yet the cost is high: striking a state party of the NTP in the name of broad prevention also amounts to sending the message that a treaty and an inspection regime are no longer sufficient to protect those who formally adhere to them.
It is here Israel’s stance deserves to be analysed with the same conceptual rigour as that of Iran. Israel is often portrayed as the defender of the status quo against a proliferating regime. Beyond the doctrine of amimut – that organised nuclear ambiguity which consists of neither confirming nor denying the possession of the weapon – the fact that Israel is not a party to the NTP is in itself a political signal. AP noted in June 2025 that Israel has never signed the treaty and is therefore not subject to the same inspection regime as Iran, whilst, SIPRI and the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation have long pointed out that this lack of transparency has been tolerated by both its allies and its adversaries.
This choice can be interpreted as a defiance of international law. Not necessarily a wholesale rejection of the law, but the conviction that, in certain circumstances, the law can turn against Israel, hindering it more than it protects it, and proving incompatible with the ultimate imperative of self-defense. It is at this point that the comparison with Iran becomes interesting[2]. Iran challenges the international order by exploiting it to its limits; Israel challenges it by refusing to rely on it fully in the most sensitive of all areas. Both, each in their own way, are saying that real security lies elsewhere than in pure normativity[3].
This also sheds new light on Israel’s relationship with Europe. If Tehran denounces the hypocrisy of the international order, Israel suspects that parts of Europe will never fully understand its problems, or may even abandon it once again in times of crisis. Gideon Saar’s accusations against European officials in 2025, the deterioration of Franco-Israeli relations in 2026, and the recurring portrayal of a Europe more quick to admonish than to protect all fit into this logic. Here again, the aim is not to validate this interpretation, but to acknowledge that it shapes part of Israel’s strategic thinking.
Conclusion — Two forms of mistrust, the same underlying corrosion
Perhaps the most worrying aspect of this situation is not only the risk of future proliferation. It is the fact that, for both parties, the nuclear issue has become the focal point for a wider mistrust. For Iran, it is the means by which a state that has signed the NPT exposes the inequality of the international order whilst equipping itself with the means to ensure its survival. For Israel, it is proof that survival cannot be left either to the goodwill of institutions or to the moral intelligence of a Europe deemed ageing, hesitant, sometimes hostile, and always insufficiently aware of what the possibility of an existential defeat means for Israel.
Beyond the ‘amimut’ strategy, Israel’s refusal to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is therefore indeed a political signal. It reflects a deep mistrust of an international order in which Israel believes neither in the consistency nor in the genuine capacity for protection. History, in its view, has shown that norms do not necessarily protect threatened states and may even, in certain circumstances, turn against them. From this perspective, the law is not rejected as such; it is subordinated to a higher imperative: survival. Whereas Iran exploits the system’s loopholes to expose its flaws and challenge its legitimacy, Israel chooses to keep its distance, convinced that its security cannot be delegated.
This standoff, therefore, is not merely about a nuclear crisis. It reveals the clash of two mistrusts — and, more profoundly, the erosion of an international legal order which, for both sides, no longer appears as a guarantee but as an uncertain constraint. If this interpretation is correct, then the real dividing line does not simply oppose a proliferating state against a threatened state. It divides actors who, each in their own way, no longer believe that the system will save them. And it is precisely within this space of disbelief that the region may slide from a shadow war into a lasting cold war, structured by threat, threshold and anticipation.
Notes
[1] The Agency itself recognizes the structural limits of its mandate, lacking universal jurisdiction over nuclear activities (Reuters, June 23, 2025).
[2] The Agency specifies that it is not able to guarantee the exclusively peaceful nature of the program (IAEA, GOV/2025/50, §28, p.9)
[3] This situation is aggravated by the loss of “continuity of knowledge” in Iran’s program (IAEA, GOV/2025/50, §30–31, p.9–10).
