The overthrow of the pro-Western monarchy in Egypt in 1952 and the rise to power of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who pursued a pan-Arabist policy, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, the Oslo Accords of 1993, and the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011 have all been recorded in history as events that altered the balance of power in the Middle East. Each of these developments has, in different ways, influenced and reshaped regional dynamics.
The changes brought about by Hamas’ attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023 are no less significant than the aforementioned events. One of the most consequential shifts in the Middle Eastern power equation following the Hamas attacks is, undoubtedly, the collapse of the 53-year-long Assad regime in Syria. The fall of the Assad regime in the aftermath of the October 7 attacks underscores the deeply interconnected nature of developments in the Middle East.
The Losers of the October 7 Attacks
When examining the new balance of power that emerged in the aftermath of the October 7 attacks, it becomes evident that while some states in the region have gained advantages, others have suffered significant losses. Among the latter, Iran stands out as the greatest loser in this new equation.
For years, Iran had engaged in a proxy war against Israel through groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Particularly following the Second Gulf War, Iran significantly strengthened its regional position and, through the Syrian civil war and its influence in Lebanon, came close to becoming a direct neighbor of Israel. The Syrian war provided an exceptional foundation for Iran’s long-standing neo-Persian geopolitical strategies. However, with the fall of the Syrian regime, Iran lost a substantial portion of the strategic gains it had accumulated over the past 30 to 40 years.
Iran’s losses were not limited to the political sphere; the country also experienced a massive economic setback.
Iran’s Financial Support to Syria Since the Onset of the Civil War
Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Iran has provided various forms of financial assistance to Syria. In an effort to sustain the Assad regime, Iran supplied Syria—despite international sanctions—with oil, food, and military equipment throughout the conflict. In July 2013, Iran signed a $3.6 billion credit agreement with Syria to facilitate the purchase of petroleum products and other essential goods[1].
According to a 2020 report by the Atlantic Council, Iran had supplied Syria with more than $10.3 billion worth of oil since 2011[2]. Additionally, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, the former chairman and current member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, stated in an interview with Iran’s semi-official Etamad Online news agency in May 2020 that Iran had provided between $20 billion and $30 billion to Syria[3]. Furthermore, on December 7, 2024, former Iranian Member of Parliament (MP) Bahram Parsaei declared that Syria owed Iran more than $30 billion, while Syrian opposition sources suggested that Iran’s total financial support to Syria exceeded $50 billion[4].
A 2024 assessment by Iran International and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace estimated Iran’s financial support to Syria since 2011 to be between $30 billion and $50 billion. Due to the lack of transparency in Iran-Syria relations, it is difficult to determine the exact amount of financial assistance. However, experts estimate that Iran’s combined military and economic aid to Syria could range between $30 billion and $105 billion[5].
On December 8, 2024, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the following statement: “In this situation when Syria is at a critical juncture of its history, ensuring the security of all Syrian citizens and nationals of other countries, as well as preserving the sanctity of religious holy sites and protecting diplomatic places are very crucial, and all should observe the standards of international law.” The statement further emphasized that Iran expected its relations with Syria to continue based on mutual interests[6]. On December 17, 2024, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ismail Baghaei stated that Iran would seek to recover its financial claims from Syria in accordance with international law and under the “succession of states” principle[7].
Recovering the funds Iran has transferred to Syria over the years will not be an easy task. International law suggests that Syria might attempt to evade repaying this debt, but such an action could subject the country to significant international pressure. Historical precedents highlight similar cases. In 1917, when Russia refused to honor debts from the previous Tsarist regime, and in 1947, when China rejected the debts inherited from the previous government, Western countries exerted pressure to block their access to global financial markets. Similarly, in 1986, after the fall of Haiti’s oppressive Duvalier regime, the new government initially sought to repudiate its debts to Western countries but ultimately had to accept repayment obligations due to the threat of economic sanctions[8].
Given that Iran itself is under significant international pressure due to its nuclear program, securing repayment from a new Syrian regime that may be unwilling to cooperate will be extremely difficult. Furthermore, Syria’s debt to Iran could easily be classified as “odious debt” or “illegitimate debt”, as Iran did not provide these funds in a manner that directly served the national interests of the Syrian people.
Russia as the Second Biggest Loser After Iran in the Middle East
Following the collapse of the Syrian regime, Russia emerges as the second biggest loser in the Middle East, after Iran. Russia’s influence in the region dates back to the Cold War era, when it first gained a foothold in Egypt following the 1952 military coup. Over time, Moscow expanded its influence beyond Egypt to other Arab states. During the Nasser era, Soviet troops played a crucial role in Egypt’s defense system[9]. Nasser, who pursued a nationalist and pan-Arabist policy, significantly contributed to the Soviet Union’s strategic presence in the Arab world[10]. Although the Soviet Union did not directly participate in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, it provided the Arab states with substantial military, logistical, and material support. However, during the conflict, Israel managed to capture tons of Soviet-made weapons and ammunition (Corm, 1988:56).
Russia’s policy of expansion toward warm waters (sees), particularly its aspiration to establish a presence in the Mediterranean, began during the Tsarist era and led to multiple wars between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Between 1676 and 1878, the two empires engaged in war twelve times over nearly two centuries. The wars occurred in the following years: 1676–1681, 1687, 1689, 1695–1696, 1710–1712, 1735–1739, 1768–1774, 1787–1791, 1806–1812, 1828–1829, 1853–1856 (the Crimean War), and 1877–1878. The last war (1877–1878) was the most significant conflict between the two states. When Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina revolted against Ottoman rule, Russia and Serbia intervened in support of the uprisings, launching attacks against the Ottoman Empire through Bulgaria. Following a defeat at the Siege of Plevna, the Ottomans retreated, and Russia captured the Thrace region and Edirne.
In March 1878, the Ottoman Empire and Russia signed the Treaty of San Stefano, bringing the war to an end. Under the treaty:
- Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro gained independence from Ottoman rule.
- Bosnia-Herzegovina was granted autonomy.
- A large, semi-independent Bulgarian state was established under Russian protection.
However, Britain and Austria-Hungary opposed the treaty, forcing Russia to accept the Treaty of Berlin in July 1878. Under the new agreement, Russia’s military gains were significantly curtailed. In return for Britain’s diplomatic intervention, the Ottoman Empire ceded administrative control of Egypt and Cyprus to the British.
Russia has never abandoned its strategy of maintaining a presence in the Mediterranean and exerting influence over Middle Eastern geopolitics. The war in Syria provided Russia with an opportunity to establish a military presence in the Mediterranean. In September 2015, Russia deployed its forces to Hmeimim Air Base in Latakia, Syria. The following month, in October 2015, Russia began expanding its naval facilities in Tartus. The Tartus naval base, originally built in 1971 during the Soviet era, had become largely inactive following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, Russia revitalised and modernised the base in 2015.
In 2017, Russia signed a 49-year agreement with the Assad regime to secure control over Hmeimim Air Base and the Tartus naval facilities. However, the fall of the Assad regime rendered Russia’s strategic plans for Syria obsolete, effectively undermining its long-term ambitions in the region. The collapse of the Assad regime dealt an irreparable blow to Russia’s prestige in the Middle East. Regional countries have now come to the realisation that Russia is an unreliable ally. Even after the Ukraine war ends, Russia will never be able to find allies in the Middle East as easily as before.
Winners After October 7
Following the October 7 attacks, while powers such as Iran, Russia, Hamas, and Hezbollah suffered losses, the new geopolitical equation also produced winners. At the top of this list is Israel, followed by Turkey. However, the extent of each country’s gains will become clearer as events unfold, as both Israel and Turkey have significant strategic interests in Syria.
The vision for Syria held by Israel and Turkey differs significantly. Israel views Syria primarily through a security lens, whereas Turkey considers both security and economic factors. The role envisioned for post-war Syria has brought Israel and Turkey into opposition. While Turkey’s proposed governance model for Syria raises concerns in Israel, Israel’s preferred model for Syria does not align with Turkey’s interests.
Turkey’s Vision for a Unitary Syria
Turkey envisions a unitary Syria in which a Sunni Arab majority governs the entire country from Damascus, with education, healthcare, and security centralised under a single administration. While Turkey insists on a unitary Syria, this stance extends beyond mere territorial integrity; Turkey also opposes ethnic or religious minorities seeking local governance or autonomous administration.
Turkey supports keeping the country’s official name as the “Syrian Arab Republic” and expects Kurdish and Christian communities, who are integral to Syria’s demographic fabric, to accept this arrangement. In essence, Turkey appears to advocate for Sunni Arabs in Syria to enjoy the same level of dominance that Shia Arabs currently hold in Iraq. Recent history has demonstrated how the exclusion of Sunni Arabs by the Shia-led government in Iraq fueled a prolonged civil conflict. Turkey’s vision for Syria raises questions about whether a similar scenario could unfold. While Turkey insists on a unitary Syria, Israel perceives a centralised government in Damascus as a security threat. Instead of a highly centralised system, Israel believes that a Syria composed of autonomous or federal regions would pose less of a security risk.
Recently, HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) and other Sunni jihadist groups that have seized power in two-thirds of Syria have adopted a pro-unitary state policy. In contrast, Kurdish, Druze, and Alawite communities advocate for a decentralised Syria, where governance powers are distributed from the central government to local regions. The Druze population near the Israeli border prefers integration with Israel over being subjected to a unitary, Sharia-based regime in Damascus. If given a choice between Israeli rule and an Islamist government in Damascus, likely, Syria’s Christian and Alawite populations would also opt for Israeli governance. According to the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), between March 6 and 10, over 1,200 Alawite civilians were reportedly killed in targeted massacres across Syria[11].
While Israel and Turkey had already been harshly criticising each other over the Hamas-Gaza war, their tensions escalated further after the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, as they clashed over Syria’s future. In response to Israel’s expansion of its control zones near the Golan Heights, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan issued a strong statement, declaring: “It is crucial to impose an arms embargo on Israel, terminate trade relations with Israel, and isolate it on the international stage. These steps must be firmly implemented to ensure peace in the region.” On March 9, during a press conference in Amman, Jordan, attended by the Foreign Ministers of Syria, Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reaffirmed Turkey’s opposition to Israel’s expansionist policies[12].
In the short term, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which has taken control in Syria, does not pose an immediate threat to Israel. Israel has already eliminated most of Syria’s military infrastructure and stockpiles left from the Assad regime. Additionally, Syrian jihadist factions have consistently stated from the outset that they do not seek confrontation with Israel. If a democratic government in Syria—one that represents all religious and ethnic groups—could have been established, it might have laid the groundwork for peaceful coexistence with Israel, potentially leading to agreements similar to those Israel previously signed with Egypt and Jordan. However, given Syria’s current political climate, such a scenario appears highly unlikely.
History has demonstrated, in cases like Afghanistan and Iran, that no Islamist movement aiming to establish Sharia rule has embraced democracy after seizing power. Israel, perhaps more than any other actor, understands that despite its moderate rhetoric, HTS is unlikely to change its ideological stance in the near future.
HTS-Run Syria: A Long-Term Threat to Israel
A Syria governed by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) may not pose an immediate threat to Israel, but in the medium and long term, it will inevitably become a significant challenge. Acknowledging this reality, Israel is compelled to factor Syria into its strategic calculations. Another reality well understood by Tel Aviv is that Sunni Islamist groups in the Muslim world tend to be more anti-Zionist and anti-Israel than Shia Islamist factions and organisations. The role of the United States and Western powers will be crucial in determining which governance model—Turkey’s or Israel’s—ultimately prevails in Syria. The extent of Western support for either regional power will largely shape the political and administrative structure of post-war Syria.
Although Turkey and the United States are both part of the NATO alliance, Israel—despite not being a NATO member—has maintained a strong alliance with the U.S. since its founding. Under President Donald Trump and his administration, Israel’s security became one of the top priorities of U.S. Middle East policy. In the International Coalition against ISIS, the U.S. has closely collaborated with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), while officially designating HTS as a terrorist organisation and strongly opposing a jihadist-led government in Syria. Not only the U.S., but also all Western countries view an Islamist regime in Syria as a direct threat to their national interests and security.
The U.S.-Brokered Agreement and Turkey’s Concerns Over Syrian Autonomy
Under the supervision and approval of the United States, France, Germany, and Britain, an agreement was reached on March 10 between SDG Commander General Mazloum Abdi and HTS leader Ahmad al-Sharaa. This agreement envisions a decentralised Syria, where Kurds and other ethnic and religious minorities would be integrated into governance. If fully implemented, Syria will no longer be a strictly unitary state as it was in the past.
On March 12, President and AK Party Chairman Recep Tayyip Erdoğan commented on the agreement between Syria’s interim President Colani and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), stating: “The implementation of this agreement will serve Syria’s security and stability. The true winners will be the Syrian people as a whole.”[13] However, one key phrase in the agreement—“the integration of SDG into state institutions”—has been interpreted in different ways within Turkey. Ankara expects this integration to mean dismantling the SDF’s military forces and absorbing them into the new Syrian army. However, the exact nature of this process remains uncertain.
Turkey strongly opposes the idea of Kurdish autonomy or federal status in Syria, much as it does in Iraq, and perceives such a development as a direct threat to its national security.
Conclusion
The October 7 attacks have ushered the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into a new phase, which I classify as the third stage of the conflict. The first stage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was essentially an Arab-Israeli conflict, beginning in 1948 and lasting until the Oslo Accords of 1993. During this period, which spanned approximately 45 years, the main actors in the conflict were Israel and the Arab states. From 1993 onward, the nature of the conflict shifted as Arab states withdrew from direct involvement, and Iran assumed a leading role in supporting Palestinian factions. This phase, lasting from 1993 to 2024, saw the Israeli-Palestinian issue evolve into an Iran-Israel confrontation, which escalated into open warfare on October 7, 2023.
The fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024 and Iran’s military setback marked the beginning of this third phase of the conflict. The defining characteristic of this phase is that Israel and Hamas remain the primary actors on the battlefield. If the war continues, it will no longer be a broader regional conflict but rather a direct confrontation between Israel and Hamas.
Following the October 7 attacks, Iran and its proxy forces suffered significant setbacks, while the new regional balance of power has brought Turkey and Israel into direct confrontation like never before in history. However, Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Israel, formally acknowledging the state on March 28, 1949. Turkey established its first diplomatic mission in Israel on January 7, 1950. In fact, Turkey’s recognition of Israel came just 2-3 months after the United States recognized Israel on January 31, 1949. Among Muslim-majority nations, Turkey was the first to recognise Israel and establish formal diplomatic relations. Despite periodic fluctuations in bilateral relations, the two countries reaffirmed their diplomatic ties as recently as December 2022, when their ambassadors presented their credentials to the respective presidents, marking the full restoration of diplomatic relations.
Previously engaged in mutual accusations over the Palestinian issue and Hamas, Turkey and Israel have now entered a new phase of rivalry over Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime. The growing tensions between the two nations raise the possibility of a direct military confrontation in Syria, given that both Turkey and Israel currently maintain military forces within Syrian territory. Israel is particularly concerned about Turkey’s close relationship with the new Syrian administration and Ankara’s active role in shaping post-war Syria. Unless a new Syrian government emerges that addresses both Turkey’s and Israel’s security concerns, it is highly unlikely that either country will withdraw its military presence from Syrian territory in the foreseeable future.
In recent years, Turkey has made significant military and economic advancements, solidifying its position as a key actor in the Middle East. Today, Turkey is the second-largest country in terms of overseas military deployments, following the United States. Even during the Assad regime, Turkey had established military bases in northern Syria, specifically in Al-Bab, Al-Rai, Akhtarin, Afrin, Jindires, Rajo, and Jarablus. Following the withdrawal of Iran and Russia, Turkey swiftly filled the power vacuum in coordination with the new Syrian administration.
Beyond Syria, Turkey maintains military bases in Iraq, Qatar, Cyprus, Libya, Somalia, and Azerbaijan. As of 2024, the United States had approximately 166,000 military personnel stationed abroad, while Turkey deployed around 50,000–60,000 troops overseas, primarily in the Middle East. This means that Turkey has a larger military presence in the Middle East than the U.S.
A Kurdish Bridge for Peace: A Security and Economic Win for Turkey and Israel
Unless Turkey and Israel, as the two primary beneficiaries of the October 7 attacks, reach an agreement on Syria, the risk of the ongoing civil war in Syria persists, along with the possibility of both countries being drawn into direct military confrontation. In reality, the new regional balance presents a political formula that could secure the interests of both Turkey and Israel. This solution would require Turkey to set aside its concerns over Kurdish autonomy and accept a federal status for Syria’s Kurds, similar to the arrangement in Iraq. In this scenario, Kurds could serve as a bridge for peace between Israel, Turkey, and the Arab communities in Syria. A governance model that ensures the fundamental rights and freedoms of all ethnic and religious minorities in Syria—particularly the Kurds—could bring lasting peace to the country. It is becoming increasingly clear that a unitary Syrian state is no longer a viable option. A federated or autonomous system would not pose a threat to Israel or Turkey, whereas a highly centralised Syria would inevitably revert to an authoritarian dictatorship, as it has in the past.
If the Kurds serve as a peace bridge between Turkey and Israel in Syria, Israel’s security concerns regarding Syria would be eliminated. Such a Syria would pose no threat to its neighbors or the world, nor would it remain a haven for radical terrorist organisations. Israel’s security concerns regarding Syria subside; Turkey stands to gain both in terms of security and economic benefits. Just as Turkey profited the most from the reconstruction of Iraq and the Kurdistan region, it would also be in a prime position to benefit from the billions of dollars in reconstruction funds allocated by Gulf nations for Syria. Turkey’s construction and trade sectors would play a leading role in rebuilding the war-ravaged country.
At present, there appears to be no alternative formula that would secure and expand the post-October 7 gains of Turkey and Israel while ensuring long-term stability in the region.
Notes
[1] “Iran Grants Syria 3.6 billion credit facility to buy oil products,” Reuters, July 31, 2013
[2] “Iran’s credit line to Syria: A well that never runs dry,” February 10, 2020, Atlantic Council
[3] “Iran: MP Reveals Regime Paid $20-30 Billion to Syria,” NCRI, 22 May, 2020
[4] “Deep Dive: Syria’s foreign debt to Iran,” Amwaj, Dec. 9, 2024
[5] “Iran’s credit line to Syria: A well that never runs dry,” February 10, 2020.
[6] “Deep Dive: Syria’s foreign debt to Iran,” Amwaj, Dec. 9, 2024
[7] Enab Baladi & Jana al-Issa, “Odious debt: Iran’s unprofitable investment in Syria,” January 9, 2025
[8] Ibid.
[9] Corm, Georges G., Fragmentation of the Middle East, The last thirty years, Hutchhinson Education, 1988, p.53
[10] Following the overthrow of the pro-Western monarchy in 1952, Egypt, under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, adopted a Pan-Arabist foreign policy. Positioned as the defender of the Arab cause, Egypt sought to establish Arab unity through the Arab League. Nasser frequently emphasized Egypt’s regional ambitions, stating:”The horizon of Egyptian diplomacy stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf region.” See:Nader Entessar, “The Lion and the Sphinx: Iranian-Egyptian Relations in Perspective” in Iran and Arab World, Edited by Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar, Macmillan 1993, p.161
[11] Hilken Doğaç Boran, “Türkiye’deki Aleviler Suriye’de yaşananları nasıl izliyor?” BBC, 10 March 2025
[12] Anadolu Ajansı, 9 March, 2025
[13] “Tüm boyutlarıyla Şam-SDG mutabakatı,” Cumhuriyet, 12.03.2025
