At the end of 2024, Turkey entered a complex process, often difficult to decipher: in autumn, Ankara suddenly initiated an attempt to find a political solution to the Kurdish question. Far from being a fleeting or illusory effort, within a few months, this initiative led to the dissolution of the PKK, after its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, declared the abandonment of armed struggle in an appeal “for peace and a democratic society.” This outcome is even more unexpected given that the country is today far less democratic[1] than it was ten years ago, when the AKP had launched and concluded the last attempt to resolve the Kurdish question. However, parallel to this Kurdish opening, an unprecedented wave of repression was unleashed against the CHP, the main opposition party. Not only was one of its leading figures, the mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu, arrested, but an interminable series of legal proceedings continues to harass local officials who have become the driving force behind the party’s renewal.
This simultaneous and contradictory movement is unfolding within a broader and equally paradoxical global context. Recent international developments have put Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in a position of strength within the emerging new Middle East, while domestically, the AKP leader appears weakened by twenty years in power, declining economic performance, and the uncertainty surrounding his ability to run again in the next presidential election[2]. Reflecting on these domestic and international dynamics – sometimes contradictory in nature – this article seeks to shed light on the underlying mechanisms of the complex political scenario currently unfolding in contemporary Turkey.
The Unexpected Revival of a Settlement Process with the Kurds
Finding a solution to the Kurdish question is nothing of a new ambition for the AKP[3], which has already undertaken three separate initiatives between 2009 and 2015 in pursuit of a political resolution[4]. Yet, it must be acknowledged that these efforts ultimately ended in failure. On the military front, the abrupt abandonment of the third attempt during the summer of 2015 led to an unprecedented urban war in the country’s southeast[5]. On the political front, the following years confirmed the durable entrenchment within the Turkish political system of a legal Kurdish party capable of disrupting the authoritarian presidential project of the AKP leader[6].
In this context, the unexpected revival of a process to resolve the Kurdish question in the autumn of 2024 – moreover, through the mediation of Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)[7], theoretically hostile to such an initiative – could not fail to intrigue [8] observers. All the more so as this initiative rather quickly produced tangible results. In July, months after the PKK’s dissolution in May 2025, around thirty of its fighters symbolically burned their weapons near the Jasana caves in northern Iraq[9]. On August 5, a parliamentary commission known as the “Commission for National Solidarity, Fraternity, and Democracy” (Milli Dayanışma, Kardeşlik ve Demokrasi Komisyonu), composed of about fifty deputies representing nearly all parties in the Grand National Assembly, began its work[10]. Operating under the authority of the Speaker of Parliament and tasked with hearing the main actors in the conflict (ministries, the army, intelligence services, victims’ associations, trade unions, bar associations, etc.), the commission has been instructed to propose reforms by the end of 2025 (its mandate being extendable in two-month increments if approved by three-fifths of its members).
At the same time, a Kurdish settlement process was launched in Syria. While this primarily concerns interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Charaa, who came to power in December 2024 following the departure of Bashar al-Assad, Turkey made it clear, immediately after the fall of the Baathist regime, that it would not tolerate the continued existence of a self-proclaimed[11] Kurdish region along its borders. Ankara considers such an entity to be closely linked to the PKK and, consequently, a center of “terrorism.” From that point on, the Turkish and Syrian Kurdish processes became intertwined. On March 10, 2025, an agreement was signed between Ahmed al-Charaa and Mazloum Abdi, leader of the Syrian Kurds[12]. The agreement provides for the full integration of Rojava’s civil and military institutions into the new Syrian state by the end of 2025[13]. Hailed by Ankara as an extension of the process initiated in Turkey, this agreement serves to reinforce the perception that the struggle against “terrorism” is nearing completion[14]. Domestically, however, the Turkish regime – eager to preserve the sensitivities of its most nationalist electorate – has refrained from officially describing the initiative as a new Kurdish opening. Instead, it has allowed Devlet Bahçeli to take the lead, framing the effort as an initiative aimed at “ridding Turkey of terrorism” (Terörsuz Türkiye)[15], which for Ankara also entails the disappearance of Rojava.
Nevertheless, the agreement signed by Ahmed al-Charaa and Mazloum Abdi has struggled to be implemented[16], and despite some significant early progress, the process initiated in Turkey remains vague. No concrete roadmap has been defined regarding the substance of the reforms, their legal form (ordinary laws or constitutional amendments), or the timeline for their implementation. Thus, this initiative reproduces many of the ambiguities that characterized previous attempts at settlement in Turkey: the PKK is not recognized as an official interlocutor; negotiations are conducted indirectly through the parliamentary Kurdish party; objectives remain uncertain; and the government adopts a triumphalist tone to avoid appearing as though it is yielding to Kurdish demands. However, the current process contains an additional tactical unknown. The sitting president could benefit politically from reforms arising from this process if they entail constitutional revision. By resolving the Kurdish question, he could not only amend the status of his mandate to allow himself to run again but also permanently fracture the convergence between the Kurdish and Kemalist oppositions that deprived him of a majority in the most recent municipal elections[17]. This hypothesis is further supported by the wave of repression simultaneously unleashed against the CHP since the end of 2024.
The Repressive Offensive Against the Kemalist Opposition
After the warning sign represented by the AKP’s loss of its absolute majority in the June 2015 legislative elections (which it regained in the snap elections that followed in November), followed a genuine humiliation for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: the rise of Ekrem İmamoğlu to the leadership of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality in 2019. The event demonstrated that an alliance could emerge between a parliamentary Kurdish force – by then the country’s third-largest political party – and a revitalized Kemalist opposition. This synergy did not succeed in securing victory during the 2023 presidential elections. Yet the 2024 municipal elections, which saw İmamoğlu confirm his 2019 triumph and turned the CHP into Turkey’s leading party in terms of votes[18], revealed the extent to which the old Republican formation had managed to renew itself[19], notably by governing major metropolitan centers along the country’s Mediterranean coast.
From that point on, Erdoğan deemed it urgent to respond. Initiated by the arrest of the mayors of two Istanbul districts at the end of 2024, a major offensive against the CHP began to take shape and intensified with the arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu[20] in April 2025[21]. It was soon followed by direct attacks on the party itself, in the form of legal actions aimed at challenging its leadership[22] and targeting its new president, Özgür Özel, who had emerged as a brilliant orator and an efficient organizer during the protest movements sparked by İmamoğlu’s arrest. In retrospect, this repressive campaign against the CHP appears as yet another illustration of the AKP’s traditional strategy for maintaining power: the use of purges.
Victorious in both the presidential and snap parliamentary elections of 2007, the party that had come to power in 2002 launched the Ergenekon case[23] (followed in 2010 by the Balyoz case). Ostensibly aimed at upholding the rule of law and dismantling the “deep state,” this wave of arrests and trials for conspiracy, most often led by special prosecutors linked to the Gülen movement, profoundly undermined the republican state apparatus. By primarily targeting military officers, academics, and civil servants, the operation effectively destroyed the political influence of the army and the Kemalist establishment, the main obstacles to the dominant party’s full control of power.
Once this movement appeared to have achieved its objectives, a new offensive began in 2013, this time directed against the Gülenists who, in the wake of the previous purges, had consolidated their positions, particularly within the police and the judiciary[24]. This campaign reached its peak following their alleged involvement in the attempted coup of July 2016. However, the ensuing repression also extended to a broad range of other real or potential opponents: academics who had signed a national petition opposing the end of the third Kurdish peace process[25], Kurdish officials and elected representatives, as well as “liberal” intellectuals who had supported the Gezi movement.
The repression targeting the CHP since 2024 thus appears as the third major purge since the AKP’s rise to power[26]. It reproduces all the familiar elements of the previous ones: the presence of emblematic magistrates, such as Arkın Gürlek – the current Istanbul[27] prosecutor responsible for İmamoğlu’s arrest, reminiscent of Zekeriya Öz from the Ergenekon case -; successive waves of arrests, beginning with the detention of Esenyurt’s mayor, Ahmet Özer, in October 2024, and continuing at a steady pace; and the exposure of a shadowy criminal network allegedly threatening national stability. The accused, often suspected of dubious links to the PKK, are primarily charged with having been corrupted by the companies of businessman Aziz Ihlan Aktaş, who was arrested in January 2025 and later released after agreeing to cooperate with investigators[28].
After a year of proceedings, the offensive’s results are evident: beyond the neutralization of a striking number of CHP officials and local administrators, a latent conflict has emerged between the Kurdish party engaged in ongoing negotiations with the government and the Kemalist party subjected to repression. The targeting of the CHP’s leadership has even resulted in internal disputes within the party itself.
An International Dynamic Amid Internal Fragilities
Such a domestic situation, difficult to grasp, contrasts with an international context that appears far more favorable to the AKP regime. The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 suddenly clarified the complex circumstances that had long prevailed along Turkey’s southern border. By ending Russian and Iranian presence in the area, it opened a new opportunity for Ankara to extend its influence[29], confirming its central role in the Middle East. Frequently portrayed as a diplomatic upturn, the advantage Turkey now derives from this reversal stems from its initial and sustained support for the Syrian opposition – well illustrated by its ties with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the organization from which Ahmed al-Charaa emerged, based in the Idlib enclave from which the decisive offensive against the Baathist regime was ultimately launched[30]. In post-Assad Syria, Turkey is now playing a decisive role alongside two other major actors in the new Middle East: Saudi Arabia, with which Ankara has normalized relations in recent years, yet which remains a serious economic and political rival; and Israel, whose government views Turkey’s new position in Syria with concern, as it evokes the one previously occupied by Iran[31]. The revival and acceleration of efforts to resolve the Kurdish question, in both Turkey and Syria, may in fact stem from Israel’s growing influence in the region, as Ankara fears that the Jewish state could instrumentalize the Kurdish cause for strategic purposes[32].
Further north, the war in Ukraine remains a major concern for Turkey, which fears the potential gains in power Russia might secure in the Black Sea from a victory. Yet, as in Syria, Ankara’s position on this northern front has improved compared to the previous decade, due to the recent reshaping of strategic balances[33]. Donald Trump’s inconsistent stances toward Ukraine and his tumultuous relations with European leaders have led the European continent to consider, for the first time since the Cold War, developing an autonomous defense strategy. This prospect enhances Turkey’s strategic value, as it seems unlikely that Europe could construct such a defense architecture without the participation of the pivotal Turkish state – anchored on the southern flank of the Balkans and the Caucasus, and, moreover, the guardian of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits.
Finally, recent developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have also reinforced Turkey’s strategic position. Taken by surprise by the events of October 7, while it was in the midst of normalizing relations with Israel and reaching record levels of trade with the Jewish state, Ankara swiftly shifted course to become one of the most outspoken critics of Israeli repression in Gaza. In this configuration, it was able to capitalize on its long-standing relationship with Hamas, established through its repeated condemnations of Israeli military operations in the Palestinian enclave over the past fifteen years. Notably, in October 2025, İbrahim Kalın, the head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MiT), was admitted to the Sharm el-Sheikh negotiations in Egypt, which led to the Gaza ceasefire under the framework of the Trump Plan[34].
Can these diplomatic gains offset a domestic situation that remains uncertain? Hardly. The economic austerity policy, initiated after Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s re-election to the presidency in 2023, has proven fragile. Inflation, which rose again in September 2025 to 33.29%[35], has particularly affected education, healthcare, and housing, thereby eroding the purchasing power of Turkish citizens[36], despite notable improvement since the end of 2024. This has created a social climate ill-suited to calming the latent mistrust that has long been directed toward the government within Turkish society. Recent events have shown that even the government’s international achievements can unexpectedly become sources of domestic criticism. Erdoğan’s support for the Trump Plan on Gaza in early October triggered a wave of protests on social media, including from users typically aligned with the regime[37]. Accusing the Turkish president of “hypocrisy,” even “betrayal,” many netizens found in this controversy a channel for expressing their broader domestic discontent. These criticisms subsided somewhat after the completion of negotiations and the signing of an agreement between Israel and Hamas. Yet, despite the new international prospects that have opened, the fog enveloping Turkey’s internal affairs remains stubbornly slow to lift.
Notes
[1] INSEL Ahmet, « Un autoritarisme électif et autocratique : l’erdoganisme », Critique, 2021/6, n°889-890, p. 559-572
[2] « AK Party eyes another run for President Erdoğan in 2028 », Daily Sabah, November 18, 2025
[3] ÖZCAN Yılmaz, « La question kurde en Turquie : retour aux années 1990 ? » Confluences Méditerranée, vol.84, n°1, 2013, p.159-171
[4] MARCOU Jean, « La question kurde en Turquie et le régime de l’AKP : reconnaissance, tentatives de règlement et renouveau de la négation », Orients stratégiques, 2022, N°12, p.29-44
[5] GOSSE Matthieu, « La vieille ville de Diyarbakır, broyée et remodelée par la guerre », Orient XXI, 5 janvier 2018
[6] ÇELIK Adnan, « Le mouvement kurde toujours debout malgré le ‘politicide’ orchestré par Erdoğan », CERI-Sciences Po, Paris, avril 2023
[7] ASLAN Dilara, « Erdoğan’s ally Bahçeli’s handshake: normalization or strategy?”, Daily Sabah, October 2024
[8] MARCOU Jean, « Turquie : vers la reprise d’un processus de paix avec les Kurdes ? », EISMENA, 10 janvier 2025
[9] VAN WILGENBURG Wladimir & SOYLU Ragip, « PPK fighters burn weapons in ladnmark disarmament ceremony », Middle East Eye, July 11, 2025 / BAŞAR Ayşenur, « PKK’s’farewell to arms’: What is ending and what is beginning? », Bianet July 14, 2025.
[10] « Parliamentary commission sets framework for anti-terror bid », Hürriyet Daily News, August 6, 2025
[11] « Erdoğan : No return to pre-Dec 8 period in Syria », Hürriyet Daily News, April 16, 2025
[12] « Syrian presidency announces signing deal to integrate Kurdish institutions and forces », Le Monde, March 11, 2025
[13] SALLON Hélène, « Kurdish integration offers hope for Syrian reconstruction », Le Monde, June 17, 2025
[14] « Türkiye, Syria officials meet after deal with SDF », Hürriyet Daily News, March 14, 2025
[15] « Erdoğan vows to create terror-free Türkiye in upcoming period», Hürriyet Daily News, December 25, 2025
[16] « Syrie : cessez-le-feu entre les autorités et les Kurdes après des affrontements à Alep », TV5 Monde, 7 octobre 2025
[17] POUCET Sarah, « Turquie : comment le président Erdoğan divise l’opposition pour mieux régner », RTBF, les Clés, 25 mars 2025
[18] AKIN Ezgi, « Turkey’s Erdoğan handed historic setback in local elections », Al Monitor, April 1, 2024
[19] ÇAĞAPTAY Söner, « Erdoğan vs. The CHP : what’s next in Turkey’s political battle », Washington Institute, Policywatch 4107, September 22, 2025
[20] LEMAIGNEN Julien, « Tout comprendre aux poursuites qui visent Ekrem Imamoğlu, principal rival du président Erdoğan », Le Monde, 12 septembre 2025
[21] MARCOU Jean, « Après l’arrestation d’Ekrem Imamoğlu, c’est désormais l’avenir de la démocratie qui se joue en Turquie », EISMENA, 25 mars 2025
[22] PIERRE-MAGNANI Céline, « En Turquie, le principal parti d’opposition lutte pour sa survie politique », Le Monde, 7 septembre 2025
[23] BOLAT Nur, « L’affaire Ergenekon, quels enjeux pour la démocratie turque ? », Politique étrangère, Printemps 2010, p.41 à 53
[24] BALCI Bayram, « Islam et politique en Turquie : alliance et rupture entre le mouvement de Fethullah Gülen et le parti de la justice et du développement de Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Revue internationale de politique comparée, 2021/1Vol. 28, p. 135-156
[25] BAKIREZER Güven, « Le mouvement des académies solidaires en Turquie », Multitudes, 2023/3, N°92, p. 174-183
[26] BOURCIER Nicolas, « En Turquie, la répression sans fin des principaux organes d’opposition au pouvoir », Le Monde, 7 juillet 2025
[27] « Who is Akın Gürlek, the top judicial official dubbed as ‘mobile guillotine’ by Turkey’s opposition? », Bianet, November 7, 2024
[28] « Aziz İhsan Aktaş hakkındaki ev hapsi kararları kaldırılı », Bir Gün, 22.08.2025
[29] AYDINTAŞBAŞ Aslı, « Topple, tame, trade: How Turkey is rewriting Syria’s future, European Council on Foreign relations, February 6, 2025
[30] CYPEL Sylvain, HAENNI Patrick & GRIRA Sarra, « Syrie. Hayat Tahrir Al-Cham, radioscopie d’une mutation idéologique », Orient XXI, 16 décembre 2024
[31] EDZION Udi, « Israel must prepare for potential war with Turkey, Nagel Committee warns », Jerusalem Post, January 6, 2025
[32] BOURCIER Nicolas & SALLON Hélène, « En Syrie, Israël et Turquie à la manœuvre », Le Monde, 13 avril 2025
[33] RIBOUA Zineb, « Understanding Turkey’s role in the Russia-Ukraine war », Hudson Institute, 24 mars 2025
[34] GUMRUKCU Tuvan & SPICER Jonathan, « Turkey emerges as key player in Gaza ceasefire deal », Ekathimerini.com, October 9, 2025
[35] « Turkey inflation unexpectedly jumps to 33,3% in test for central bank », Reuters, October 3, 2025
[36] BOURCIER Nicolas, « En Turquie, les ravages de l’hyperinflation : ‘Pour 200 balles, tu n’as plus rien’ », Le Monde, 30 janvier 2025
[37] BOURCIER Nicolas, « Le ralliement d’Erdoğan au plan Trump provoque suscite une vague de contestation inédite », Le Monde, 1er octobre 2025
