[Lyna Ouandjeli] Thank you very much for taking the time for this interview. I will strive to distinguish between the Turkish and Kurdish spaces based on the elements you have provided. However, I have nonetheless addressed the Kurdish space to some extent, as it is difficult to completely separate these two dynamics, particularly in light of relations with Turkey and Öcalan’s discourse on the PKK situation. I will, however, ensure that this distinction is made as clearly as possible, and I thank you in advance for your feedback.
To begin this interview, I have learned and studied that you are one of the pioneers of the concept of “space,” applied notably to the Arab, Turkish, Kurdish, Israeli spaces, and others.
[Hamit Bozarslan] Geographers, in fact, were already discussing this as early as the 1920s and 1930s.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] Could you explain the meaning of this concept and how it primarily applies to the Middle East?
[Hamit Bozarslan] Yes, indeed. Originally, I used the term “sphere” or “space” simply because state borders do not allow for the delineation of a group or phenomenon. For example, when considering the Kurds, there is a classical, traditional, historical Kurdistan, but without precise borders. Yet, we observe a continuity of this Kurdistan in the Russian or Soviet Caucasus, as well as in Iran. Khorasan[1], though very far from historical Kurdistan, is home to Kurdish communities due to deportations. There are also “proximity diasporas,” particularly in Lebanon, which have always been dynamic. It would therefore be insufficient to define Kurdistan solely based on present-day Kurdish-populated areas.
A similar reasoning applies to Palestine. Which Palestine do we take into account? That of 1967[2], with the occupied territories of Gaza? That of 1948, with the Arab community of Israel? Should we include the immediate diaspora in Lebanon and Syria? Does it represent a diaspora in the strict sense, or a continuity of Palestine? Not to mention the more distant diaspora. The advantage of the concept of sphere or space is thus to integrate these continuities, highlighting dynamics that are rooted in an initial territoriality while extending beyond it.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] Thank you very much. Borders are indeed particularly complex to define in the Middle East, especially due to both historical and current dynamics. This leads us to begin our discussion on the repercussions of the events following October 7, 2023. As we have observed, the Middle East has been profoundly shaken in a very short time, whether in Palestine, Israel, or in neighboring countries such as Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey. In this context, how have Turkey and the various Kurdish actors—whether in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, or Iran—reacted to the events of October 7, 2023? How does their positioning differ?
[Hamit Bozarslan] Yes, indeed, there are many differences. Let’s start with Kurdistan, which follows its own dynamics due to both its history and the current context. When discussing the post-October 7 period, it already represents a significant span of time, and what was valid a year ago is not necessarily valid today. Many upheavals have taken place. Historically, the Kurdish movement and the Palestinian movement have been closely linked, evolving in parallel. For example, Jalal Talabani (1933-2017), the future Iraqi president (2005-2014), had very close ties with Palestine. The PKK, for its part, rebuilt itself in 1979-1980 in Palestinian camps in Lebanon. It is striking to note that the first victims or “martyrs” of the PKK did not fall to the Turkish army but to the Israeli army during the occupation of Lebanon in 1982. From this perspective, a historical continuity has always existed.
Moreover, Israel has also played an important role in the Kurdish space. As early as 1967, Israeli support was granted to the Iraqi Kurds. Today, while the Kurdish movement as an organized entity does not follow a unified line, Kurdish public opinion tends to be relatively pro-Israeli. This stance does not stem from hostility towards the Palestinians but from a perception that, without Israel’s support, the existence of Rojava—Syrian Kurdistan—would be severely threatened. Thus, a forced alliance has formed and has gradually intensified over time. This means official recognition of the ties between the Kurds of Rojava and the Israeli government. These ties have been confirmed multiple times, both by the Israeli Foreign Minister and the Rojava authorities. We are thus in a completely unprecedented situation, where Israel, which was far from being a positive reference for Kurdish movements, particularly leftist ones, suddenly becomes an alternative, acting as a sort of guarantor for their survival. This phenomenon is probably not unique to the Kurds. For example, the Druze community in Syria has openly mentioned the possibility of seeking Israeli protectorate status and creating a state under its protection.
When Hassan Nasrallah (1960-2024) was killed, massive celebrations took place in the Idlib region, controlled by HTC (Hayat Tahrir al-Cham). Today, HTC’s reactions towards Israel show a degree of moderation that could not have been anticipated. Israel appears to have become the dominant power in the region, to which both real and imaginary virtues are attributed. It is believed to exert significant influence over the White House, which could be true. Indeed, this is the first time we are witnessing an American government that is so pro-Israel, and one could speak of an ideological or even organic continuity between the two. However, this is not the only factor determining U.S. policies. We have a president who adopts a completely erratic governance style, sometimes referred to as a “weathervane,” making it difficult to predict long-term positions. But what is certain is that Israel is today perceived both as a real power and an imaginary superpower.
As for Kurdish public opinion, I would not say that it has sympathy for Israel, but rather that it is in search of alliance and protection. The situation in Turkey is indeed very different. Until the late 1970s, Turkey was pro-Israel. However, the Turkish left has always positioned itself against Israel; official Turkey only adopted an anti-Israel stance late, mainly under the AKP. After the October 7, 2023, attacks, Turkey took a very firm stance, calling the events in Gaza genocide. President Erdogan even threatened Israel militarily, stating that they could act “at night,” without warning, similar to their interventions in Nagorno-Karabakh and Libya. Regarding public opinion in Turkey, it has not shown massive support for Erdogan’s policy. Certainly, it is overwhelmingly anti-Israel, but it is primarily wary of the economic crisis, and pro-Gaza protests have been limited, with only a few gatherings. The situation appears similar in other Muslim countries like Tunisia and Algeria, where initially impressive demonstrations also quickly lost momentum. However, Erdogan’s position remains highly anti-Israel and pro-Hamas. Officially, Ankara is not a sponsor of Hamas, but it is evident that some structures of this group are present on its territory, and Erdogan has met with Hamas members several times, including Ismail Haniyeh. This situation raises tensions, and Israel is pressuring the United States to limit Turkey’s influence, particularly in Syria.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] Observing the situation, we notice that Turkey seems to have taken a leadership position, particularly on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. While Saudi Arabia had long been at the center of this issue, hosting numerous conferences, Turkey is now seeking to move closer to this role. In this context, how has Turkey used the regional situation after October 7 to strengthen its diplomatic position with Western powers, particularly NATO members, the United States, and the European Union, as well as Russia?
[Hamit Bozarslan] The situation with Moscow is complex because Russia has been one of the main allies of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. It feels betrayed by Turkey and believes that the status quo around Syria, which had been negotiated between Iran, Turkey, and Russia, was broken by Erdoğan. Probably, Turkey did not intend to overthrow the regime, which was becoming increasingly fragile, without a real social base. The Alawite community has suffered a demographic hemorrhage, with approximately 100,000 people killed out of a population of 2 to 2.5 million, representing an enormous loss—far worse than the losses of World War I. Similarly, Hezbollah, which saved the regime in 2013, and Russia, which supported it in 2015, are weakened. The regime has therefore collapsed from within, finding itself in a real political vacuum. However, in the current Russian perception, there was a form of betrayal by Turkey, and it is known that if the Ukrainian crisis calms down, there will likely be repercussions for Turkey. The question remains whether Turkey will be able to rely on American support in this context, which remains uncertain. As for Turkey’s anti-Israel stance, it risks isolating it among its NATO allies. Most countries have adopted a policy of neutrality or support for Israel, and this also includes the Arab world. For example, Saudi Arabia, with Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), who declared, “I don’t care about the Palestinians[3],” clearly illustrates the current trend. Egypt has never taken a strong stance against Israel, and the Emirates have adopted a policy of silence. Thus, Turkey, alongside Iran, finds itself at the forefront of resistance against Israel, further isolating it on the international stage.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] Indeed, Turkey and Iran have taken on an increasingly significant role in the region, particularly Iran and its proxies, including Hezbollah, which was weakened in 2024 with the destruction of its headquarters and the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah. Regarding Turkey, we see that the Kurds have now come into the spotlight since October 7. The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the reconstruction of Syria under Ahmed al-Charaa could potentially include the Kurds of Rojava, who enjoy a certain degree of autonomy from Damascus. The Iraqi Kurdish model, with a fully autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government, is another example to follow. In your opinion, how have the Kurdish responses in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey impacted the situation, both militarily and politically? And do you think these movements could achieve some form of autonomy or even independence in their respective countries in the future?
Looking at the situation, we can see that Turkey seems to have taken a leadership position, particularly on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. While Saudi Arabia had long been at the center of this matter, hosting numerous conferences, Turkey is now seeking to move closer to that role. In this context, how has Turkey used the regional situation after October 7 to strengthen its diplomatic position with Western powers, particularly NATO members, the United States, and the European Union, as well as Russia?
[Hamit Bozarslan] The situation with Moscow is complex because Russia has been one of the main allies of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Russia feels betrayed by Turkey and believes that the status quo around Syria, which had been negotiated between Iran, Turkey, and Russia, was broken by Erdogan. Probably, it was not Turkey’s goal to overthrow the regime, which was increasingly weakened and lacked a real social base. The Alawite community suffered a demographic hemorrhage, with around 100,000 people killed out of a population of 2 to 2.5 million, representing an enormous loss—far worse than the losses during World War I. Similarly, Hezbollah, which had saved the regime in 2013, and Russia, which supported it in 2015, have been weakened. As a result, the regime collapsed from within, finding itself in a real political vacuum.
However, from the Russian perspective, there was a form of betrayal by Turkey, and we know that if the Ukrainian crisis calms down, there will likely be consequences for Turkey. The question remains whether Turkey will be able to rely on American support in this context, which remains uncertain. As for Turkey’s anti-Israel stance, it risks isolating it among its NATO allies. Most countries maintain a policy of neutrality or support for Israel, and this also includes the Arab world. For instance, Saudi Arabia, with Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), who declared, “I don’t care about the Palestinians,” clearly demonstrates the current trend. Egypt has never taken a strong position against Israel, and the UAE has adopted a policy of silence. Thus, Turkey, along with Iran, finds itself at the forefront of resistance against Israel, which further isolates it on the international stage.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] Indeed, it is clear that Turkey and Iran have taken an increasingly significant role in the region, particularly with Iran and its proxies, including Hezbollah, which was weakened in 2024 following the destruction of its headquarters and the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah. Concerning Turkey, we observe that the Kurds have been under the spotlight since October 7. The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the reconstruction of Syria under Ahmed al-Charaa could potentially include the Kurds of Rojava, who enjoy a certain degree of autonomy from Damascus. The Iraqi Kurdish model, with a fully autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government, is another example to follow. In your opinion, how have Kurdish responses in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey impacted the situation, both militarily and politically? And do you think these movements could achieve some form of autonomy or even independence in their respective countries in the future?
[Hamit Bozarslan] As the saying goes, “I predict, therefore I am wrong,” so I prefer not to make forecasts about the future. But what we can observe today is that the heart of Kurdistan mainly beats in Rojava. This is widely recognized, and we can say that what happens in Turkey is indirectly linked to this situation. The issue is twofold. First, the Turkish question: The biggest obstacle to Rojava’s existence remains Turkey, which has never accepted the presence of this region, just as it did not accept the idea of a federated Kurdish region in Iraq in the 2000s. This opposition was the source of tension for nearly ten years before Turkey normalized relations. The question now is what Turkey’s stance will be toward Rojava, especially if the United States pressures it. Trump’s administration includes pro-Kurdish figures such as Secretary of Homeland Security Marco Rubio, who could influence Turkish policy. The second aspect concerns the situation in Syria. It is important to remember that HTC (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) is extremely weak, leading a coalition of militias. The question is whether this coalition will want or be able to move beyond a jihadist logic—I believe that phase is now behind it—or abandon the project of establishing an Islamic emirate in order to evolve toward the construction of a legitimate and rational state, similar to what has been attempted elsewhere. Will it adopt a model of a legal state?
Finally, we must consider Arab nationalism, particularly in its Ba’athist form, which has caused significant damage in Iraq and Syria. Will HTC leave this period behind and accept a pluralistic Syria, integrating different communities without advocating for secession, whether for the Druze or Alawites? Despite HTC’s declared intentions, there have been massacres of Alawites, and a desire for vindictive justice can only lead to mass crimes. Could HTC avoid crossing that line? That remains uncertain. Furthermore, Syrian society is exhausted. The country, which had 22 million inhabitants in 2011, has lost 500,000 people and now hosts 11 to 12 million refugees. No one can accept another civil war. HTC is well aware of this. The question is what Turkey will do and, ultimately, what the ruling group will decide. Ahmed al-Charaa has repeatedly stated that a war with the Kurds would be a bloodbath, and negotiations between the Kurds and HTC are ongoing. The issue of integrating the Kurdish armed forces into the Syrian army remains unresolved. The Kurds, due to historical reasons linked to the fall of ISIS, now control Raqqa, a city that is not predominantly Kurdish, although it has always had a Kurdish community. What forms of autonomy will emerge in the future? There have been negotiations and agreements that resemble treaties between two entities, particularly regarding oil sales between the Kurds and Damascus. In fact, even though they lack official recognition, there is an entirely official agreement stipulating that the Kurds sell oil to Damascus. So, although the situation remains uncertain, contacts have been established, and negotiations are ongoing.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] Thank you. The situation indeed remains quite uncertain regarding Ahmed al-Charaa’s army. We still do not know their intentions or what they are truly trying to achieve. Currently, we are trying to analyze and understand their maneuvers, not only through their meetings but also through international conferences organized for Syria’s reconstruction. It is a matter to follow closely, but it is clear that the issue of Rojava is essential for rebuilding and ensuring peace among Syria’s various communities.
[Hamit Bozarslan] Rojava could indeed represent an opportunity for Syria, especially since there is no demand for secession or even federation. What remains strong in Rojava is a notable social dynamism. There is a military force of 60,000 to 100,000 people, men and women, which is a particularly interesting feature of Rojava. I believe there is real potential there. Regarding Syria’s reconstruction, we know it will require around $500 billion. That amount is not so exorbitant, especially if spread over ten years, which comes to $50 billion per year. Only Europe and the wealthy Gulf countries seem capable of covering such a sum.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] Thank you for your feedback. Let’s move to the economy. What have been the consequences of the events of October 7 on the Turkish economy, particularly regarding regional exchanges and internal policies? For example, with regard to regional exchanges, we’ve noticed an increased difficulty in maintaining peaceful relations with the Middle East since October 7, which has affected these exchanges. What impact have these events had on Turkey’s internal politics, especially regarding the Kurds? Abdullah Öcalan’s call for the PKK to lay down arms has also changed the relations. Could you give us an overview of the economic and social consequences for Turkey in this context?
[Hamit Bozarslan] I’m not an economist; in fact, I’m quite illiterate in that area, but from what I perceive, the impact has not been enormous. The only tangible effect has been the embargo policy that Turkey applied against Israel. However, we know that this embargo hasn’t really had any effect. For example, according to official data from Ankara, the export of Turkish steel “to Palestine” increased by 5000%. If you’ve ever visited Palestine, you know there is no arms or steel industry there. This shows that, despite Turkey’s boycott, this steel is still being sent to Israel, which greatly needs it to maintain its military capabilities. So, from this perspective, one can see some hypocrisy. On the other hand, we must not forget that there has been an economic crisis in Turkey since 2018-2019, directly linked to a policy of growth at any cost, especially through construction and real estate. Today, the dramatic consequences of the economic choices made in the 2010s are clearly visible. The country is dying before the astonished eyes of observers. Regarding the Turkish economy, it is, despite everything, much more integrated into the European economy than into the Chinese or Asian economy, which makes the Suez Canal secondary for Turkey. Regarding the Kurdish question, before Öcalan’s declaration, the initiative for negotiations came from the far-right in Turkey. This was quite paradoxical, because this far-right, or nationalist right, represented by the Nationalist Movement Party, which has always had a very anti-Armenian, anti-Semitic, anti-Greek, anti-Jewish, anti-Kurdish, and ultra-conservative stance, proposed this initiative. The idea was to call Öcalan and invite him to dissolve his “terrorist organization.” The subtext of this initiative was the following: if we don’t take the initiative, Israel and “the imperialists” will, and the Kurdish issue will become an externally manipulated issue. The idea was therefore to solve this problem “on our own,” without external intervention. This logic stems from an Ottoman-Turkish obsession dating back to the 19th century, to the question of Macedonia. The Ottomans lost Macedonia at that time, which was not limited to current-day Macedonia but also included Kosovo, part of Greece, and the current Republic of North Macedonia, during the First Balkan War of 1912. This fear of external intervention is deep and lasting. As a result, initiatives emerged immediately after these events, one year after October 7, 2024.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] What is the context of Öcalan’s call to the PKK to lay down arms, and what does it mean for the future of the Kurdish movement in Turkey? How could this request affect relations between Erdogan’s government and the Turkish Kurds?
[Hamit Bozarslan] It’s still very early to answer this question, extremely early. However, I think we should read Öcalan’s statement based on what it contains and what it does not contain. First, what it does not contain. Because for Erdogan, and also for the far-right leader, it was about forcing Öcalan to say, “Look, I created a terrorist organization, and today I am dissolving this terrorist organization.” That was not said. Reducing, as the Turkish government does, the Kurdish issue to a terrorism issue would imply that the Kurdish question doesn’t exist in itself, that it is just a question of terror. Öcalan reminded that the Kurdish issue has existed for a hundred years and that the PKK is part of that. Second, the Turkish government wanted Öcalan to ask the Syrian Kurds to dismantle and destroy the structures they have. He did not do that. And third, he added in a postscript the link between the Kurdish question and democracy in Turkey. That’s everything that Turkey did not want. Official Turkey, I mean. Now, let’s move to what he did say: the time for armed struggle, which was a historical and sociological fact, is over (one must keep in mind that for the last ten years, there has been no armed struggle in Turkey itself). Öcalan also reminded that the armed struggle emerged in a 20th-century context, World War I, World War II, the Cold War, etc. Historically, this phase is now over. And sociologically as well, even if he didn’t use the term “sociologically,” simply because the Kurdish society is no longer what it was 40 years ago. Today, 65% of Kurds do not want a Kurdish resort to violence at all; the Kurdish issue should be resolved through civil resistance, political resistance, and political struggle. Forty years ago, there was no middle class among the Kurds in Istanbul. Because as soon as you had a bit of money, you went to Istanbul or Ankara. Today, there is a construction of a middle class. There is rampant urbanization. Forty years ago, indeed, every Kurdish family had seven or eight children. Today, it’s barely two. There is an intellectual elite that has formed, which did not exist 40 years ago. So, sociologically, Kurdish society has changed significantly. As much as the existence of armed forces in Iraq, in Iraqi Kurdistan, and in Rojava is justified, as much as in Turkey, and I would add in Iran, resorting to armed struggle seems, in my view, to be a currently fictional scenario. And so, Öcalan simply took note that this phase is over. That does not mean that Turkey will go all the way. That does not mean that provocations cannot occur. We don’t have the codes for what’s happening today in Turkey. We don’t know who the interlocutors are within the state. If we can still speak of a state. What’s happening? What are the different strategies of the regime and its various components? Only the historians of tomorrow, that is to say, in ten or fifteen years, when we have memoirs or internal documents, will be able to tell us what happened in the country at the turn of 2024-2025. For now, that’s where we are.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] Indeed, when we listened to Öcalan’s call, the first question that emerged was whether Turkey would continue its armed struggle, mainly in Syria and to a lesser extent in Iraq. This question has been at the heart of discussions, which has also highlighted the growing role of the KRG, i.e., the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq, in the peace process between Turkey and the Kurds, especially with the PKK. Could you perhaps elaborate on the role of the KRG in this context? Do you think this could allow the KRG to avoid being militarily affected by Turkey, in case the latter continues its military operations in the region?
[Hamit Bozarslan] I think the main issue for the Kurds today, in the entire Kurdish space, including within its diaspora, is that the Kurds have long appeared to be objects rather than actors of their own history. They have suffered enormous military pressure from Iran and Turkey on the KRG, with massive bombings and sometimes even direct military presence on the ground, creating a form of dependence. This has led to a paralysis of the KRG, especially regarding Rojava. However, in recent months, it seems that relations have considerably improved. Mazloum Abdi, the military leader of the Syrian Kurds, traveled to Erbil by American helicopter, and official meetings took place, welcomed by all Kurdish factions. This gesture symbolizes the willingness to say: we are no longer objects, but actors in a different historical context. It is now essential to integrate Kurdistan internally, in an intra-Kurdish way, and to decide for ourselves our future, within the possibilities available. We will not be passive, but will become active actors. This recent development, especially in the last 3-4 months, marks this transition. At the same time, a message has been sent to Turkey: you denied our existence for decades, but today, we exist and maintain good relations. There is no reason why you should not establish good relations with Rojava. This diplomatic mission was also carried out by the KRG with Europe and the United States. France and the United States, in particular, played an active role in this intra-Kurdish rapprochement. They had wanted this for a long time, but for the past 3-4 months, all the information we have, which is not available to the public, shows that France and the United States have been deeply involved in this approach.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] Before we conclude, I have two final questions. We have discussed the role of Turkey, as well as that of the PKK and the KRG, but could the normalization of relations between the PKK and the autonomous KRG region, or even with Turkey, have an impact on the Kurds of Iran? The Kurds of Iran are often forgotten, as their cause is not always highlighted in the media. However, could this process of normalization have an impact, not necessarily militarily, as you mentioned that the armed phase is over, but perhaps socially, politically, or even in the form of exclusion? I think yes. There is still an Iranian guerrilla, with three or four groups, but they are largely quite passive.
[Hamit Bozarslan] I think that in 2022, during the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement, the authorities did everything to provoke the Kurds and push them to resume armed struggle. However, I believe that the Kurdish movements, in their diversity, showed great wisdom by choosing not to resort to violence to avoid military pressure. What we know is that Kurdistan and Baluchistan[4] are today extremely dynamic. There are many underground movements, informal socialization that is neither armed nor clandestine. This manifests in circles of friendship, cultural spaces, and a form of protest, a refusal to participate in elections. Today, many people choose not to participate in elections. There are also solidarities, cultural activities, and a press, because in Iran, it is allowed to publish in Kurdish. On one side, there are many arrests and executions – several activists are executed every year. But on the other side, it is mostly civil resistance. We know that all Kurdish parties in Iranian Kurdistan supported the declaration of Jérôme. The Kurdish issue is well known, and the one in Turkey is also known, especially through what is called Rojhelat, or “the Iranian Kurdistan,” a poetic term meaning “where the sun rises.” Today, everything happening in Turkey resonates deeply in Rojava.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] Thank you. To conclude, my last question is an analytical point from you. Do you think Turkey is retreating into a form of national identity, perhaps even nationalism, to resolve its economic and social issues? Or do you think that, especially after the events of October 7th, Turkey could resume its role as a mediator and play a key role in finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? It seems to me that it’s too late. It’s too late because very harsh words have been spoken. Turkey has no credibility with Israel and no presence on the Palestinian ground.
[Hamit Bozarslan] Supporting Hamas is not enough. The Palestinian world is not limited to this group. There are Palestinian intellectuals, Palestinian politicians, and, unfortunately for them, in the worst conditions in its history, Palestine must produce new alternatives. Turkey absolutely does not have the means to contribute to this. The Palestinians have also been abandoned by the Arabs. We are faced with an extremely asymmetric situation: on one side, Israel, a true bulldozer power that recognizes no legitimacy in the Palestinian cause, not only through its devastating war but also by the very denial of the existence of this cause. And on the other side, a Palestine that is the victim of this situation, while Turkey has no presence on either side. I don’t see how Turkey could today address Israel after accusing it of pursuing a genocidal policy and militarily threatening it, or, conversely, protect the Palestinians.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] Thank you for sharing this detailed feedback on Turkey, Öcalan, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The Turkish space is indeed complex, but also very interesting, especially concerning the Kurdish community, so thank you very much for that. I look forward to editing and then distributing the video on our networks. I will also prepare a transcript that I will send you in advance so you can validate the statements highlighted in it.
[Hamit Bozarslan] Thank you. And you’re welcome. Goodbye.
Notes
[1] Editor’s note: Khorasan is a historical region located in the northeastern part of Iran and extends into certain parts of Afghanistan.
[2] Editor’s note: During the Six-Day War (June 5-10, 1967), hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled or were expelled from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
[3] Editor’s note: “MBS ‘does not personally care about the Palestinian issue,'” L’Orient-le Jour, September 29, 2024
[4] Editor’s note: Baluchistan is a region in Asia, divided between Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. This region is inhabited by the Baluch people, most of whom claim autonomy or independence.
