The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and its replacement by the Sunni movement Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) represents a geopolitical earthquake, with repercussions already being felt in neighboring Iraq. Historically, the relationship between Baghdad and Damascus has always been marked by tensions, stemming from both their political rivalry and the confessional structure of their respective regimes. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was dominated by a minority Sunni elite representing about 20% of the population, while the Assad regime in Syria was based on an Alawite social base, itself a minority making up barely 10% of the Syrian population. While both regimes claimed allegiance to Ba’athism, their competition for control over the party and their geopolitical divergences systematically fractured their relationship.

Starting in 2003, the regional landscape changed drastically. The U.S. intervention in Iraq ended Saddam Hussein’s regime and transferred power to a Shiite majority (53% of the population). A new dynamic emerged: initially, the new Iraqi government accused Assad’s regime of financing, arming, and supporting international terrorist groups to hinder the rise of a “new Iraq” under American influence, where the Shiites had taken the reins of power. However, this initial hostility did not last. Iran quickly played a mediating role, establishing a strategic link between Baghdad, now led by a Shiite elite, and Damascus, under Alawite control since 1970. Gradually, the Islamic Republic integrated these two states into what would become known as the “Axis of Resistance,” whose main objective was to counter American influence and that of the Sunni Gulf powers.

In the 2010s, Iraqi militias played a key role in supporting Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian civil war, further consolidating this sectarian and strategic alliance. However, in 2024, Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed. This event is the result of a combination of factors that must be put into perspective before analysing their impact on the stability of Shiite power in Iraq.

The Factors Behind the Fall of Bashar al-Assad’s Regime

Thirteen years of civil war have brought Syria to its knees. This prolonged conflict destroyed infrastructure, drained economic and human resources, and left the country in ruins. An exhausted population, a massive exodus of elites and the middle class, and a collapsed economy weakened the social base of the regime. The authorities’ inability to stabilise recaptured areas and initiate genuine reconstruction prevented the restoration of lasting legitimacy[1]. The Syrian armed forces, weakened by defections and massive losses, were increasingly unable to fulfil their role. The destruction, by Israel, of the capabilities of pro-Iranian militias from Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan was a determining factor in the fall of the dictatorship.

The gradual disengagement of Russia, preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, deprived Assad of his main military support, particularly air support. Iran, while still present, could not fill this void. At the same time, Israeli strikes targeting military infrastructure and Iranian bases in Syria further weakened the regime[2]. Without logistical support or diplomatic protection, Damascus found itself isolated in the face of increasingly determined opponents. Despite attempts to normalise relations with certain Arab countries, the Syrian regime remained a pariah on the international stage. Western sanctions paralysed its economy and blocked any hope of a revival. Moreover, regional diplomatic initiatives failed to offer the financial and political support necessary for its survival.

The Rise of HTS to Power: What Are the Consequences for Shiite Iraq?

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite regime, replaced by the Sunni movement Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), reshuffles the cards in the Middle East. If Syria becomes a Sunni stronghold hostile to the Shiite axis, neighbouring Iraq finds itself exposed to multiple pressures, both internal and regional. This strategic realignment worries Baghdad, which must now face challenges of a strategic scale.

Regime Change in Iraq: A Plausible Risk?

The fall of Damascus sets a precedent that worries the Iraqi political elites. If a regime like Bashar al-Assad’s, supported by Iran and Russia, could fall due to a combination of internal and external dynamics, similar scenarios could unfold for Shiite Iraq, according to the Iraqis we regularly engage with. They themselves propose at least three possible scenarios:

A Military Coup: The fragility of the sectarian political system could push Shiite and Sunni nationalist officers in Iraq to unite in an effort to overthrow the current order. While this scenario is complex, it could receive tacit support from Western powers, who would see a more moderate regime as an opportunity to limit Iranian influence in Iraq.

Internal Political Reorganisation: The implosion of the sectarian system could lead to the emergence of a liberal coalition, comprising Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. Motivated by a rejection of the current order and the desire to stabilise the country, this coalition would offer an alternative to the pro-Iranian militia model[3].

Fragmentation of the Country: Finally, the division of Iraq into three independent entities – Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish – remains a possibility. However, this scenario could trigger internal wars over the division of oil resources and disputed territories, exacerbating widespread instability.

These scenarios, although speculative, highlight how the rise of HTS to power in Syria amplifies the uncertainties surrounding the political situation in Iraq, which shares a 600 km border with Syria.

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF): Towards Forced Dissolution?

The Popular Mobilization Forces (Hachd al-Chaabi) form a central pillar of Shiite defence in Iraq. This militia coalition, created in 2014 to fight ISIS, has since become an indispensable political, military, and economic force. However, with the fall of Bashar al-Assad and the weakening of Iran in Syria, the role and future of these militias are now being questioned.

Dependence on Tehran’s Directives: Although theoretically under the authority of the Iraqi Prime Minister, the PMF primarily answers to Iran’s orders. With the erosion of Iranian influence in Syria, these militias risk losing their cohesion and regional purpose.

Accusations of Internal Destabilisation: The abuses committed by the PMF against Sunnis and Kurds, as well as its attacks on American interests, have intensified calls for its dissolution. A reform or dismantling of these forces, though difficult, could become a necessity to ensure internal stability and reduce sectarian tensions. However, any attempt to restructure the PMF would face staunch resistance from pro-Iranian factions, who see these militias as an essential instrument to maintain their power against Sunni hostility. Thus, managing the future of the PMF represents a critical test for Baghdad, with implications for the balance of power in Iraq[4].

The Spectre of ISIS’s Return: A Major Security Challenge

The collapse of the Syrian regime and the rise of HTS have created a security vacuum that could be exploited by ISIS to regain ground in Iraq. This scenario particularly concerns Baghdad, given the precedents related to the jihadist occupation of Mosul in 2014. Several factors exacerbate this risk:

• The Fragility of Syrian Detention Camps: The camps under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), where thousands of ISIS fighters and their families are detained, are threatened by Turkish pressure and the growing instability in northern Syria. A mass escape could fuel the jihadist resurgence in Iraq.

• The Jihadist Card Used by Iran and Russia: In difficulty in the region, these actors could, in various ways, favour a return of ISIS to destabilise the Sunni order represented by HTS and weaken Western interests, particularly the United States.

• Internal Radicalisation in Iraq: In an environment of heightened sectarian polarisation, marginalised Sunni populations in Iraq might turn to ISIS as an alternative to Shiite hegemony and the abuses of the radical branches of the PMF.

A resurgence of ISIS would not only jeopardise Iraq’s internal security but also increase pressure on the government to justify a prolonged foreign military presence.

A Review of Relations with Iran: Between Dependence and Diversification

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime represents a severe blow to Iran, whose regional influence is partly built on the Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus-Beirut axis. For Baghdad, this new development fuels debates on the need to revise its relations with Tehran.

• Pressure for a More Balanced Policy: Some Iraqi leaders advocate for diversifying strategic partnerships with Arab and Western powers to reduce dependence on Iran. This diversification could include strategic rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as well as a new military alliance with the United States.

• Resistance from Pro-Iranian Militias: However, Shiite factions loyal to Tehran have considerable mechanisms to block any attempt to shift Iraq’s strategic orientation. Their disruptive power, combined with the lack of a clear political consensus in Iraq, currently complicates any effort to break from Iran.

• Gradual Weakening of Iranian Influence: In the medium term, the fall of Damascus could further isolate Tehran, reducing its ability to project its influence in Iraq and impose its agenda.

The nature of these multiple debates reflects a growing tension within the Iraqi elites, torn between ideological and sectarian loyalty to Iran and the need to adapt to a rapidly transforming regional order. Faced with these developments, Baghdad is confronted with a series of complex strategic choices. In this critical moment of regional history, the decisions made by Iraq’s Shiite elites will not only determine the political and security future of Iraq but also the country’s ability to assert itself as a key actor in a reshaping Middle East.

Notes

[1] Balanche, Fabrice, Les leçons de la crise syrienne, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2024, 352 pages.

[2] « L’Iran et ses milices en 2024 : 563 morts dans des attaques aériennes et terrestres… et un retrait humiliant de Syrie après y avoir semé le chaos pendant des années », en arabe, Observatoire syrien des droits de l’homme, 04/01/2025

[3] Luizard, Pierre-Jean. « Le nouvel État irakien de 2003 et le piège du communautarisme », Confluences Méditerranée, 2021/1 N° 116, 2021. p.63-73.

[4] Bakawan, Adel, « Entre le Hachd al-Chaabi et l’axe de la résistance : la zone grise ! », Centre Français de recherche sur l’Irak (CFRI), le 03/05/2024.