“Predicting the general course of European politics, including the Russian situation, was easy. However, when it came to the Afro-Asian countries, the task became much more difficult, and we found ourselves increasingly relying on human sensitivities and instincts.”
– Miles Copeland, Game of the Nations, 1969
In a manner reminiscent of Kafkaesque transformations, Al-Jolani gradually morphed into al-Sharaa. This transformation unfolded over several years in a controlled process, rather than suddenly or following a nightmarish event, as in the case of Gregor Samsa. Unlike Kafka’s protagonist, Jolani may not question, “What’s happened to me?” Yet, he remains uncertain about his future—or, more precisely, what ought to happen to him– as he evolves from a Salafi-Jihadi figure to someone that the international community might eventually accept. When he stepped onto the Aleppo citadel on November 27, it marked the beginning of a new era in Syria, and perhaps the broader region. As Syrian expert Patrick Seale argued, Syria is the key prize any external actor seeking to establish dominance over the Middle East. The image of the young bearded man in military attire was not just a routine photo op. Nearly a decade earlier, various Islamist groups and Turkish proxies had turned their attention to the citadel. However, the core of the ancient city remained a contested area, with government forces holding the citadel, even as opposition forces controlled much of the southern part of the city, including groups positioned near the Ayyubids’ ceremonial zone at its entryway. The conflict between the Syrian opposition and the Assad regime had never directly reached the citadel itself; rather, it centered on the Great Mosque and spread through the ancient city. This unique context made the visit particularly special. It was a declaration of what was deemed to be impossible just a few weeks prior. Taking the citadel did not only mean capturing Aleppo but also a change in the rebels’ fortune against the regime. In addition to this, it also signified that we are dealing with a figure who knows how to deal with symbols and media.
When Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a group led by Al-Jolani, entered Hama, they presented a message signed with the name Ahmed al-Sharaa—the birth name of the rebel leader, better known by his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammed Al-Jolani—and revealed his face. This was not a merely routine change as is common among the revolutionaries after achieving success. This shift in identity, shedding the name tied to al-Qaeda, Zarqawi, ISIS, and al-Nusra, was a significant public relations effort aimed at convincing the world that he was no longer the same person. A process that started in 2021 when he first engaged with Western media, including an interview with PBS journalist Martin Smith. The name change carries additional layers of meaning. “Al-Jolani” is a reference to the Golan Heights, a plateau at the southwest corner of Syria, annexed by Israel in 1981 as part of its strategy to tighten control over the region, captured from Syria in 1967. Interestingly, in 2020 Al-Jolani’s father wrote a book under the title The Forgotten Revolution of Al-Zwya 1920-1927: Revolution of Al-Sharaa. In this book, his father complains that the role of the al-Sharaa tribe in Syria’s modern history was overlooked, particularly, in the post-1950s school education curriculum. The book indirectly highlights the fragmented nature of Syrian society and politics, which many believe contributed to the failure of the Syrian revolution. For local observers, this was a direct result of the fragmented social structure of the Syrian local communities. For them there existed “a plethora of communities” rather than a Syrian society.
The reclaiming of the family and the tribe surname by Al-Jolani carries further significance, particularly in relation to his stance on Israel. Under his reign, “Syria won’t be used as a launchpad for attacks on Israel.” A major shift in Syrian policy and its political groups discourse. On December 11, 2024, former Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani advised Syrian rebels to avoid engaging with Israeli threats and abuses. Instead, he suggested they register Syria’s legal position through its ambassador to the UN and the International Security Council. While acknowledging that this might not yield practical results, he emphasised that it would present a situation that the world could recognise as legitimate. He further warned that issues raised beyond Syria’s internal situation were distractions meant to derail their focus on more pressing priorities. It’s noteworthy that Qatar is one of the key supporters of the current regime change in Damascus. Prior to the citadel posture, Abu-Muhammed Al-Jolani had led a tumultuous life. Born Ahmed in Riyadh in 1982, he was the youngest of five children in an educated family. His parents, who now live in Egypt, had a strong academic background; his father earned a doctorate in economics in Baghdad and then spent nearly ten years (1979–1989) working as an economist in the Saudi oil industry. At that time, the Saudi oil sector was going through a boom, producing more than 10 mbd a day. The family remained in Riyadh until 1989, during which time Ahmed spent his formative years in Saudi Arabia.
In the archives of the notorious Palestine Branch of Syrian security and intelligence in Damascus, a report spanning a hundred pages sheds light on part of Al-Jolani’s life. According to the archive, “Ahmad Hussein Al-Sharaa, mother’s name Wedad, born in 1982, resided in Damascus—Mezzeh, Eastern Villas. He had a beard and traveled to Iraq for jihad during the U.S. war, staying there for ten days before returning to Syria. A dispute with his father ensued, after which he left home and never returned. It is unknown whether he remains in Syria or is abroad.” It is emphasized that his father was a Nasserite, aligned with the branch of Arab Nationalism that originated with Jamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s second president. Nevertheless, he worked as an advisor to the Syrian government in the early 1990s and was a member of the Tuesday seminar club in Damascus. To this day, the father remains at odds with his son’s jihadist views. In his manuscript, Reading the Syrian Resurrection, he outlines his political stance, which sharply diverges from his son’s. For him the solution to Syria’s issues post-political transition is the establishment of a civil, democratic, and pluralistic state based on citizenship– without discrimination by race, religion, or sect. He advocates for a new constitution that guarantees Syria’s independence, the sovereignty of the people, respect for freedoms and other opinions, political pluralism, freedom of party work, the submission of institutions to the laws, and the removal of military and security forces from politics after fair trials for criminals among them.
Ahmed’s political formation began in the early 2000s, influenced by the second Intifada—also known as the al-Aqsa Intifada. Around that time, he started attending sermons by Abu Qaaqa, a radical pro-Assad, who was killed in 2007. It appears that he played a role in radicalizing Ahmed and preparing him for his journey to Iraq. Between 2005 and 2006, Bashar al-Assad facilitated the departure of jihadis from Syria to fight U.S. military forces in Iraq. This move was a strategic one for Assad, as it allowed him to eliminate his own jihadis through U.S. military action while also maintaining control over the flow of jihadis, which gave him leverage in negotiations with the United States. The jihadis’ departure point was ironically located near the U.S. embassy in Damascus. A Syrian researcher, Obayda Amer, states that Ahmed took a long bus journey from Damascus to Baghdad prior to the US invasion of Iraq. There, he joined Al-Qaeda affiliated groups and was captured while attempting to detonate a bomb. He was taken to prison, where his experiences contributed to shaping his future path. Ahmed was sent to Camp Bucca, a notorious U.S. detention facility in Iraq, that morphed into a breeding ground for radicalisation. As one attendee of the camp put it: If there had not been American prisons in Iraq, ISIS would not have come into being. Bucca was a factory that produced us all and shaped our ideology.”
After his release, he rejoined jihadi groups and eventually became the emir, or leader, of the Nineveh region in western Iraq for the Islamic State of Iraq, which later evolved into the Islamic State. When the Syrian demonstration began, as part of the Arab Spring, he contacted Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to establish a branch of ISIS in Syria. According to sources, he requested a hundred jihadis, but he only received six, reflecting the limited support he initially received. Many in Iraq were happy to see him go. He was at odds with al-Qaeda’s leaders there, and the rivalry between him and al-Baghdadi intensified. In August 2011, he crossed the border into Syria with bags of cash, reportedly around $400,000, enough to fund operations for six months. This move not only served to expand al-Qaeda’s presence in Syria but marked also an important ideological shift for Al-Jolani, much like the shift that occurred within socialism after the introduction of the idea of “socialism in one country”. Writing in the New Left Review in 1976 under the title Socialism in One Country, Jean-Paul Sartre complained that the slogan was a product of conflicts within the leadership. A similar framework applies to Al-Jolani and his relationship with Baghdadi and his view of global Jihadism. Hence, there were personal and socio-political factors behind the shift. Jolani disliked al-Baghdadi and looked down upon him.
It is known that Jolani had identity issues since his childhood, as he was seen as nazeh نازح (displaced”). An epithet that followed the family everywhere—a constant reminder of their Golan origins. However, he claimed Jolani referenced Golan in Syria, especially after 2012, but his goal was to (instead) establish a Sunni state in Syria, rather than fighting Israel or freeing Jerusalem. The family also earned income from a supermarket run mainly by Jolani’s brothers in the upmarket al-Mezzeh districts. The only disturbance in this otherwise comfortable situation was the nazeh identity that dogged the family. One of the many signs of the displaced identity in the Middle East is the lack of acceptance and inclusion in the city community. Those who relocate, or even migrate from rural to urban areas, are typically not accepted right away. As a result, they develop a forced identity and constantly recall their former locations. This type of soft rejection results in the displaced person having a love-hate relationship with the newly adopted urban spaces. Jolani therefore saw Damascus as a place of residence, but not as a place of identity or feeling. This probably explains why he chose Jolani as his jihadi name. While the identity tells the hard and closed nature of the urban communities in the region. A phenomenon is common in other cities in the region, be it Mosul, Basra, or Sulaymaniyah. Being a refugee or displaced is to lose his home and not be able to regain it elsewhere. Such circumstances lead to estrangement in the world. A circumstance that pushes one toward a global movement in the sixties and seventies, such as socialism, and nowadays Jihadi.
The Idlib ‘state’ stage!
The Idlib stage in Al-Jolani’s life provides an important insight into his ideology and leadership style. During the war years, Idlib became a site of heavy internal displacement. As a result of a combination of domestic, regional, and international factors, a range of jihadist, Islamist, and Salafi actors have wielded control in the area. After a number of splits and killings, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham became the de facto ruler of the area. It emerged as a result of pressure, failure, and fragmentation of the Syrian opposition and especially the jihadi movements. As put in the declaration statement: “In view of what the Syrian revolution is undergoing today from plots that plague it and internal conflict that threatens its presence and with great effort on our part to join forces and close ranks, we—the factions whose signature is present below—announce that all our factions will cease to exist and a complete merger within the new entity under the name Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham”. The factions were Jabhat Fath Al-Sham, Harakat Nour Al-Din Al-Zinki, Liwa Al-Haq, Jabhat Ansar Al-Din, and Jaysh Al-Sunna. Meanwhile, the insights from Aaron Y. Zelin on Al-Jolani’s emphasises on state-building shed light on his governance and political vision. For Jolani, “Every brick built in the liberated areas (Idlib province) advances us hundreds of kilometers towards our fundamental goal, which is the liberation of Damascus—God willing.” Jolani’s focus on governance and diversity was a strategy for HTS to consolidate power and assert its dominant control over the region and other groups. This reveals two important aspects of Jolani’s perspectives: first, his view on governance, and second, his approach to politics. For him, governance serves as a means to assert superiority, marginalise competitors, and establish dominance. At the same time, when it comes to politics, he might prioritise services and development over human (women) rights and democracy. This model resembles the Chinese development model versus the liberal democratic model.
While this might appeal to many within Syria, given that 90% of the population lives below the poverty line, therefore, Syrian expert Charles Lister argues that Jolani’s future is likely to be shaped more by his dictatorial and authoritarian tendencies than by any specific ideologies stance. However, the Idlib period was far from ideal. The region was plagued by constant factional infighting, and cooperation among various personalities and groups proved difficult. Split, attacks, arrests, and killing were common practices. Moreover, HTS faced widespread protests, calling for Al-Jolani’s removal, the release of detainees, and improvements of living conditions. Based on the analysis of Jolani’s approach in Idlib, one might infer that in Damascus, with increased power and higher stakes, he could adopt a more authoritarian stance and deal with opponents in a more forceful and potentially violent manner.
Damascus: the new intricate leaf
The dramatic fall of Damascus to opposition forces in 2024 marks a pivotal moment in Middle Eastern geopolitics. For years, Damascus was the center of anti-Western bloc in the region, uniting Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Russia, and also China. On December 8th, Jolani visited the symbolic Umayyad Mosque, a site rich in symbolism. With the collapse of the Shia resistance project, it gained a new dimension: a symbol of the counter-regime forces, as underscored by Jolani and Turkey. During the Assad regime and the Iranian influence over Syria, the Sayyidah Zaynab shrine held considerable political, military, and religious significance. It used to build a narrative to legitimize sectarian dominance of the Shia. Sayyidah Zaynab, the granddaughter of Prophet Muhammad and daughter of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the fourth caliph of Islam and the first Shi’ite imam, is loaded with narrative elements tied to Shi’ite history. According to Shi’ite tradition, Zaynab was taken captive to Damascus after the Battle of Karbala in 680, where her brother, Hussein, was killed. Her captivity, referred to as Sabi – a form of enslavement with sexual connotation– helped build a narrative of resistance against oppression. Therefore, prior to the fall of the Assad regime, a popular slogan among Shi’ite Iranians, Iraqis, and Syrians was, “You cannot enslave Zaynab twice”. This narrative continues to echo in the background of today’s Damascus and is expected to last for many years. This also drives a counter-narrative from the Sunnis, as Jolani also promised to establish a Sunni state when he was in Idlib. His vision of a Sunni state relies heavily on symbolic Sunni landmarks in the capital, with the Umayyad Mosque. The latter, with its Byzantine architecture, carries with it a history of various dynasties and empires. For centuries, Damascus was a meeting point of the Byzantine and Arab worlds. The Umayyads, who ruled the early Islamic Caliphate, sought to blend these two cultures. Their Empire, and the Umayyad Mosque at its center, became a powerful symbol of this synthesis, as noted Ross Burns in his manuscript, Damascus: A History. For the Umayyads, the Great Mosque of Damascus was at the heart of their empire.
This historical and symbolic weight has fueled demonstrations in Damascus, especially among secularists and Christians. Damascus has a long and painful history of sectarian violence, including massacres against Christians. As Eugene Rogan details in The Damascus Events, the 1860 massacre was part of a broader wave of communal violence that devastated Syria and Lebanon. Al-Sharaa, however, is now an enigmatic figure. He makes efforts to assure others that he is no longer the person he once was, claiming he poses no threat to his neighbors, including Israel. Yet in a city as politically charged as Damascus, it is almost impossible to remain unaffected by the surrounding tensions and influences. As Ross Burns aptly observes, Damascus is not only a city that encapsulates the history of the region like no other, but it also holds a magnetic allure, even for those with only passing knowledge of its role in the evolution of Islam or Christianity.
How to understand the mysterious man is in Damascus?
Based on the available information, we can analyse former Jolani and current al-Sharaa in several ways. The first aspect to consider is the psychological side of Ahmed al-Sharaa. He is a young figure with frequently changing stance, and his complex relationship with the world has led some to view him as narcissistic. If narcissism was a driving force behind his past radicalism, it could translate into a hunger for power and a reluctance to share control, leaning toward authoritarian tendencies once in power. In terms of his electoral prospects, if elections occur after the anticipated transition period, which could extend beyond a year, al-Sharaa is likely to have a stronger chance than others. , His success may be supported by his past victories, external backers, media influence, and a narrative that appeals to the public. Based on the Idlib experience, he might be expected to use state power and resources to consolidate his control and suppress any competition.
When it comes to his political approach, reports suggest that al-Sharaa’s role model is the Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). As a result, he is expected to prioritise reconstruction and public services rather than democracy or power transitions. His strategy may involve securing legitimacy through development initiatives and ensuring the support of external actors, especially to maintain financial backing and secure his position. Turkey’s role in shaping the future of Syria, and by extension Jolani, will also be important. Ankara will seek to influence Syria’s political landscape according to its own geopolitical and economic interests. This will present a challenge for Jolani, as Turkey’s vision for Syria could clash with the goals of the United States and other Arab countries. This situation could leave Jolani in a difficult position, as he struggles to navigate these conflicting interests, a challenge he has been unable to overcome in the past. Historically, jihadi groups tend to scale back their terrorist activities when they gain international support and attention. However, when they feel neglected or sidelined, they often revert to their former tactics of violence. Jolani is currently under the global spotlight, and should that attention fade, there is concern that he may return to his old ways. This uncertainty leaves the world in a “wait and see” position, watching to see how he will behave as his influence evolves.
In addition, many of Syria’s neighbours, including Turkey, view Jolani and his group with suspicion and fear. Turkey, as a democratic country with shifting political elites and priorities, could lead to Jolani facing semi-isolation if there is any significant change in the Turkish government. This could further complicate his position, both within Syria and on the regional stage. Lastly, internally, there is also growing unease within HTS itself. Many members are uncomfortable with the group’s liberal tendencies and its failure to impose a strict Islamic rule. As tensions rise within the group, there is the potential for fragmentation, and as crises accumulate, a split within HTS becomes increasingly likely.
