[Lyna Ouandjeli] In recent years, and particularly since the events of 7 October 2023, we’ve seen Turkey and Saudi Arabia seemingly gaining the upper hand over other Middle Eastern powers. Whereas Iran once held a central position, these two countries now appear to be the new dominant players, assuming the role of mediators on both regional and international levels. Do you think Turkey could eventually take over from Saudi Arabia, which currently seems to be leading the diplomatic dance? Or will it struggle to assert itself in this role, especially due to its ambiguous positions? Indeed, Ankara expresses both a pro-Palestinian stance and criticism of Israel, while at the same time maintaining strategically beneficial relations with the Israeli state.
[Jean Marcou] I believe that if we go back to the very beginning of 7 October 2023, Turkey’s initial response was relatively restrained. At that time, Ankara was in the midst of restoring its diplomatic relations with Israel. Historically, Israel was one of Turkey’s few allies in the Middle East during the Cold War, a period when Turkey had tense relations with much of the Arab world. This relationship continued even after the AKP came to power, lasting until around 2009–2010. It notably allowed Turkey to import military equipment, including Israeli drones, before the country developed its own defence industry in that field.
However, from 2009–2010 onwards, relations began to deteriorate, particularly due to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip, which marked a turning point. This deepened the ties between Ankara and Hamas, which Turkey has supported far more openly than most Arab countries, which are often more cautious in their approach to the Islamist movement. This decline in relations lasted more than a decade, from 2010 to 2023, despite several attempts at rapprochement. The United States actively supported these efforts, since Turkey and Israel shared certain common interests in the region. However, each time a normalisation effort was made, a new Israeli offensive in Gaza would reignite tensions. In those moments, Turkey would voice strong support for the people of Gaza and for Hamas, seeking to present itself as a powerful advocate for the Palestinian cause, in contrast to Saudi Arabia or even Iran.
Thus, when the events of 7 October 2023 unfolded, Turkey was in the midst of resuming its diplomatic relations with Israel. High-level visits had taken place, and diplomatic channels were being reactivated. But this momentum was abruptly halted. Turkey’s initial reaction was measured, positioning itself as a potential mediator by highlighting its ties with both parties. However, this stance did not hold for long in the face of the scale of the Israeli response in Gaza, which severely affected the civilian population. Turkish public opinion was deeply moved, and President Erdoğan, initially criticised for his restraint, quickly hardened his tone. During a large rally in Istanbul, he strongly condemned Israel, which led to the departure of Israeli diplomats and a de facto severing of diplomatic ties — although they remained formally intact. Paradoxically, despite this political crisis, trade between the two countries continued to grow, illustrating a form of strategic ambiguity. However, in the months that followed, Turkey eventually scaled back some of these economic ties, thereby reinforcing its critical stance towards Israel.
At the regional level, however, Turkey has found itself sidelined in mediation efforts, unlike Egypt and Qatar, which have played a more direct role in negotiations. This marginalisation is partly due to Ankara’s firm stance: condemnation of the massacres in Gaza, support for South Africa’s case at the International Court of Justice, and a very harsh rhetoric towards Israel. These elements have made it difficult for Turkey to position itself as a credible intermediary. This contrast is all the more striking when compared to the role Turkey managed to play in the Ukraine conflict, where it succeeded in maintaining active dialogue with both sides, notably facilitating the agreement on Ukrainian grain exports. This success was also due to Turkey’s geostrategic position in the Black Sea and its enforcement of the Montreux Convention, which limits the access of warships – including Russian – to this strategic area.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] Coming back to the relationship between Turkey and Hamas: Turkey has historically adopted a more open stance towards Islamist groups such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. Since the events of 7 October, has this relationship strengthened, or on the contrary, has it been undermined?
[Jean Marcou] As far as I know, Turkey has always maintained relations with Hamas, which it has not labelled a terrorist organisation, but rather a resistance movement. This was one of the sources of tension between Ankara and Tel Aviv. As early as 2007 or 2008, President Erdoğan surprised the international community by officially receiving members of Hamas, thus adopting a distinct stance compared to other powers. This long-standing relationship has never truly been severed: at the time of the 7 October events, some Hamas members even sought refuge in Turkey. However, despite this political closeness, Ankara’s ability to act as a mediator in the conflict has been significantly limited. Turkey has mostly voiced its positions in international forums, condemning Israeli actions, but has not managed to influence negotiations or de-escalation in any meaningful way.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] I ask this because it seems to me that Turkey holds quite a particular relationship, standing in an in-between position. Hamas was founded during an intifada, and its founding charter explicitly states the goal of eliminating the State of Israel. Yet despite this closeness to Hamas, Turkey is simultaneously seeking to restore its relations with Israel. This ambivalence is precisely what I find intriguing and would like your insight on: how does Turkey manage to reconcile these two dynamics, both ideological and diplomatic?
[Jean Marcou] There has not been a formal rupture between Turkey and Israel, but rather a gradual deterioration of their relationship. Broadening the perspective, one could now speak of a form of strategic rivalry between the two countries in the Middle East, intensified by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Turkey has indeed taken an active role in condemning Israel on the international stage, denouncing Israeli actions in Gaza and more broadly across the region. This concern is no longer limited to Gaza: Turkey watches with growing unease the Israeli strikes on Hezbollah, on Iranian positions, and on Iran’s allies in Syria and Iraq – notably the Shia militias. It sees in these actions an Israeli attempt to redefine regional power dynamics. At the same time, Israel is increasingly worried about Turkey’s growing role in Syria. The Nagel Commission, for instance, has described Turkey as a threat, warning that it could fill the vacuum left by Iran. Another source of tension lies in the Kurdish question: although Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish forces do not have official relations with Israel, some in Israel view them as a potential strategic lever in the Middle East. Turkey, for its part, fears a strategic convergence between the Kurds and Israel. All these elements, which had long remained latent, seem to have crystallised and accelerated in the wake of recent developments – particularly in Syria – further deepening the underlying tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] You mentioned Syria, and indeed, several recent events—although distinct from those of October 7—appear to have accelerated the questioning of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Notably, developments in Idlib and the rise to power of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa come to mind. In this context, what role might Turkey play? Could Ankara be seeking to fill a void left by Iran, or is it more likely to adopt a cautious, measured stance? Especially considering that HTS has committed acts of violence against the Alawite community, and its future approach towards the Syrian Kurds remains uncertain. With that in mind, how do you interpret Turkey’s current position—and more specifically, Erdogan’s—towards this emerging Syrian configuration?
[Jean Marcou] When it comes to Turkey’s stance on this “new Syria,” one could almost speak of a kind of “divine surprise”—or at least a “half-divine surprise” for Ankara. Since the outbreak of the civil war, Syria has been a major concern for Turkey. In fact, just prior to the conflict, Turkey had initiated a policy of rapprochement with Bashar al-Assad as part of its “zero problems with neighbours” strategy. At the time, there was even talk of a Turkish-Syrian idyll, which was abruptly shattered by the outbreak of civil war. Very quickly, faced with the regime’s brutal repression, Turkey severed ties with Damascus in the summer of 2011 and threw its support behind the Syrian opposition—including military support to certain Islamist militias such as Jabhat al-Nusra, now known as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). For Ankara, the fragility of the Syrian regime was evident from the early months of the revolution. But what truly enabled the regime to survive was not its own resilience—it was the backing of Iran, Hezbollah, and above all, Russia’s decisive military intervention in late 2015. The initial phase of the civil war did not turn out in the opposition’s favour. Turkey found itself dealing with a fragmented, destabilised country dominated by two regional powers—Russia and Iran. Ankara therefore changed tack and pursued a diplomatic route, notably through the Astana Process launched in 2017 alongside Iran and Russia. This process, designed to compensate for the shortcomings of international bodies, allowed Turkey to re-enter the Syrian arena via diplomacy.
However, this process did not prevent the Syrian regime from regaining territory—at least on the surface. Until, that is, the end of 2024, when everything changed. With its traditional allies weakened—Iran on the back foot, Hezbollah under pressure, and Russia distracted by the war in Ukraine—the Syrian regime was no longer able to defend itself. This opened the door for Turkey to refer to a “magnificent revolution”: a strategic victory in which the regime fell with little resistance. Turkey now finds itself in a position of strength, particularly in northern Syria and in Idlib. Whereas in 2020 Moscow and Damascus were demanding its withdrawal, by December 2024 it was Ankara that was calling for their departure during the last Astana Process meeting in Doha. This reversal of power dynamics clearly illustrates the ongoing geopolitical shift, and for Turkey, it represents a major strategic win. But is Turkey the sole beneficiary of this “new Syria”? As I’ve said before, while this is undeniably a strategic victory, it does have its limitations. First, as you pointed out, the situation in Syria is far from stable. The civil war is not entirely over—there’s still a great deal that could happen. Even if Turkey currently holds an advantageous position, the terrain remains volatile. We might even be witnessing the beginnings of a renewed civil war, with different actors and different terms—much like what we’ve seen in Yemen or Libya. It’s a frightening scenario.
Turkey’s relationship with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, as with other Syrian militias, is complex. However, one potentially positive development is the recent agreement between the SDF (the Syrian Democratic Forces—predominantly Kurdish and controlling the country’s northeast) and HTS. This agreement is promising. If it holds, it could give the current government broader legitimacy and demonstrate its ability to negotiate inclusively—something that has been widely anticipated. There was also the incident in Latakia, where Assad loyalists were present. In Damascus, people—who were not necessarily HTS sympathisers—were heard saying, “Bashar is coming back,” which reveals a certain fear. This suggests that something significant took place in Latakia, but that it has, to some extent, been offset by the agreement with the Kurds. Nonetheless, the situation remains far from resolved. The central issue for Turkey is still the Kurdish question. When Ahmed al-Sharaa visited Istanbul, the discussion focused on this point. Turkey does not want to see the institutional recognition of Rojava within Syria. Al-Sharaa stated that Turkey should not feel threatened by terrorist movements in Syria, but he did not specify which ones. It was unclear what he intended to do, and it seemed unlikely he would start a war against the Kurds.
For now, the situation is rather favourable for Turkey. Al-Sharaa’s visit to Ankara was well received and echoes Abdullah Öcalan’s recent appeal to seek internal resolution of the Kurdish issue. A few weeks ago, in response to Öcalan’s call, Erdogan said he was ready to resolve the Kurdish question and create a Turkey free from “terrorism,” both domestically and beyond its borders—since the YPG and Rojava are viewed by Ankara as terrorist organisations, akin to the PKK. Is Turkey now in a position of total dominance? Not entirely. We mustn’t forget Saudi Arabia’s presence, which remains active—albeit not overly assertive. Riyadh is notably working to lift international sanctions. Turkey, for its part, is pursuing this for reasons tied to European engagement and to secure international recognition for Ahmed al-Sharaa as a stabilising force in Syria. Still, Saudi Arabia is likely to remain a key player. There may well be competition between the two countries, both of which are now seen as potential architects of Syria’s reconstruction. Turkey has proposed restoring Damascus airport, and is doing what it does best—advising Syria on how to build a national army. In this sense, we’re seeing both rivalry and a certain degree of complementarity.
In 2015, Turkey’s aim in supporting the opposition was to establish a conservative Islamic—or even Islamist—Syria that would be favourable to its interests. The goal was to bring the Sunni majority to power, with support from Saudi Arabia as well. Subsequently, tensions emerged as a result of conflicts with Iran. Saudi Arabia fell out with Iran, then later with Qatar. Turkey then aligned itself with Iran to support Qatar, which blurred the strategic lines. Today, there is a form of competition between Saudi Arabia and Turkey. It’s clear that Turkey is trying to position itself as the spokesperson for the Palestinian cause, at a time when Iran is absent from the scene. Turkey is attempting to fill that void, while the Arab countries that once offered post-conflict solutions are now adopting more moderate stances. In contrast, Turkey is adopting a more radical position in defending the Palestinian cause than Gulf Arab countries or Egypt, for instance.
Moreover, Turkey and Saudi Arabia could also find themselves competing when it comes to Syria’s economic reconstruction. Saudi Arabia could hold a significant advantage in this regard, as it is an Arab nation. Other issues are also at stake, such as the sharing of the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, as well as the situation surrounding the port of Iskenderun and the Hatay province. For now, relations between Ankara and Riyadh are fairly cordial. But it is clear that, for Turkey, this represents a strategic victory—particularly since Iran and Russia have faded from the Syrian landscape.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] Thank you for your overview of Turkey’s role in Syria. It has answered many questions regarding the country’s uncertain situation, and the involvement of foreign powers, especially Israel in the south, in the Golan region.
[Jean Marcou] Yes, there are indeed actors present in the south of the country. The situation in Syria is still far from stabilised.
[Lyna Ouandjeli] Exactly, and it is also apparent that Turkey is reflecting on the Kurdish issue and its broader influence in Syria. I have two final questions. We’ve seen that the events of 7 October have influenced Kurdish politics in various regions, notably in Syria with the rise of Ahmed al-Sharaa, and in Turkey with Ocalan’s call. Could you explain a bit more about how Turkish policies on this matter have evolved since these events?
[Jean Marcou] I’m not sure the events of 7 October are directly linked to the launch of a peace process with the Kurds, particularly Ocalan’s call. The origins of this initiative are fairly recent—the process began in October 2024. There had been earlier attempts by the AKP through political channels between 2009 and 2015, in three main phases. These were known as the “democratic opening” between 2009 and 2010, followed by the “Oslo process” between 2010 and 2011—which was unusual in that it involved secret negotiations between Turkish intelligence and the PKK—and finally, the “resolution process” which began in 2013 with high hopes, but was eventually frozen. It was briefly revived in 2015 but ended in failure and led to urban guerrilla warfare. Since then, the increasingly authoritarian nature of the Turkish regime—particularly after the 2016 coup attempt and the 2017 constitutional reform—led many to believe that hopes for a political solution had all but vanished. Yet suddenly, in October last year, the topic resurfaced during a parliamentary session, triggered by a significant event: the leader of the Turkish far right visited Kurdish MPs in parliament. These MPs have been present since 1990, and their party is legal. Since 2007, they’ve even had a formal parliamentary group. That group has grown significantly and is now the third largest in parliament, giving it substantial influence in Turkish politics. For instance, in 2015, they dealt Erdogan a political blow by preventing him from winning an outright majority. In 2023, they again played a key role by backing the opposition, forcing Erdogan into a run-off—similarly for the Istanbul mayoral elections.
So, what happened? It felt like a return to the 2015 process. MPs from the DEM Party (formerly the HDP) were granted permission to visit Ocalan to discuss the conditions for a resolution. What’s ambiguous here is that the party least expected to engage with this issue took the initiative. There may be strategic thinking behind Bahçeli’s move towards Ahmed Türk. Bahçeli took the lead, while the AKP remained somewhat in the background, possibly to advance the issue without appearing to concede to the PKK in front of its own electorate. As a result, Ocalan’s call for the PKK to dissolve gained traction. The evolution of the situation remains ambiguous: the AKP is currently presenting it as an unconditional dissolution of the PKK. Officially, no negotiations took place—but it is widely assumed that some form of agreement was reached. Ocalan, for his part, stated that the PKK was an outdated institution, rooted in a time when Kurdish identity was denied in Turkey, which is no longer the case today. The PKK was socialist and inspired by the Eastern Bloc, which is also no longer relevant. The movement now advocates for democratic confederalism, champions women’s rights and environmentalism, and no longer demands independence. Their aim now is to exist within a democratic society, regardless of the state they live in.
Following 7 October, the Kurds found themselves in an awkward position. Historically supported by the West, particularly the United States, they were expected to take a stance on events in Gaza—where repression and bombings targeted Palestinians with whom they had longstanding ties, since the PKK was formed in the Bekaa Valley. So what explains this shift by Erdogan and Bahçeli? There are also less idealistic, more pragmatic motives. Erdogan’s desire to run in the next presidential election is a key one. The opposition has raised suspicions over this process—especially the Kemalist party, which supports a resolution to the Kurdish issue but opposes any instrumentalisation of it. They want a proper parliamentary debate and demand transparency. The Speaker of Parliament has announced that a parliamentary initiative will be launched, and very recently, off-the-record comments suggest that a meeting between Erdogan and the Kurdish parliamentary party could be on the cards.
There will have to be some form of quid pro quo for Ocalan’s call—hence for the PKK’s dissolution. Will there be one? What was negotiated behind this announcement? It may involve institutional reforms, opening the door to broader discussions on political reform. This could provide Erdogan with a legal solution to his candidacy issue. After all, he has already completed two terms—three, in fact, as the 2017 constitutional reform was supposed to reset the count—but this point has been contested. It was Bahçeli who first proposed amending the Constitution to allow Erdogan to run again, and he often takes the lead on such matters ahead of the AKP.
